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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to develop a typology 
of collective political violence. The study was pursued from the 
premise that collective political violence like any other socio- 
historlcal phenomenon could be adequately classified only on the basis 
of a multivariate scheme. Review of the extant literature demonstrated 
the lack of a comprehensive typological scheme of collective political 
violence. The multivariate model which was Introduced as the basic 
framework of the typological scheme developed here - comprised of 
three sets of variables - structural variables, extent variables and 
extraneous variables, each of which, It was assumed, contributed 
towards the unique characterization of each mode of CPV.
Having developed the test model, an attempt was made 
to verify the scheme in terms of a sample of empirical cases of CPV.
A cluster analysis was performed on the sample of the thirty empirical 
cases of collective political violence, to discern any distinctive 
pattern comparable to the 'ideal typical* patterns of the test model. 
The analysis of the data revealed three relatively distinct patterns 
quite comparable to the inodes of CPV identified as 'coup d'etat',
'revolution/rebellion' and 'people's war/revolt* in the test model*
A second objective of this project was to attempt to 
Isolate the intervening variables which make the difference between 
successful and unsuccessful collective political violence. The 
analysis of the data reveals that the CPVs do not follow a certain
viii
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mould when successful and another when unsuccessful. There are no 
exclusive variables to which success or failure can be distinctively 
attributed. Thus* no definite formula can be suggested, pursual of 
which can deliver a certain Intended outcome.
Chapter I
Introduction
The subject matter of the present study deals with the 
phenomenon of collective political violence. More specifically, the 
task is to formulate a typology of the various modes of collective 
political violence within sovereign national entitles.
Collective political violence denotes any collective report 
to violence which gives rise to actions, which are regarded by the 
power structure as lying beyond the established range of legitimacy. 
Collective political violence is used here to designate the generic 
category, which encompasses all the various modes of struggle to 
capture political power. Collective political violence may be classi­
fied as the 'genus', of which revolution, rebellion, revolt, coup 
d'etat, mutiny, putsch, peasant war, riot - are the 'species'.
Social science literature has recently become Inundated 
with studies on the phenomenon of collective political violence. 
However, individual researchers have addressed the subject matter with 
different sets of concepts and labels, chosen to satisfy their parti­
cular interests. For example, on the one hand we have social scien­
tists who refer to specific modes of collective political violence; 
such as rebellion (Russell, 1974), revolution (Brinton, 1938; Pettee, 
1938; Hunter, 1940; Arendt, 1963; Johnson, 1964), coup d'etat 
(Luttwak, 1968; Malaparte, 1932), peasant rebellion (Lewis, 1974),
1
2peasant war (Wolf, 1969), and urban guerrilla warfare (OppenheInter, 
1969), while others prefer taking a more general approach using a more 
generic terminology, such as- internal war (Eckstein, 1964), mass poli­
tical violence (Hibbs, 1973), civil strife (Gurr, 1968; Rosenau, 1964), 
and collective violent action (Tilly, 1975). No matter what the termi­
nology, the subject matter still refers to violent, political, anti­
government, collective or mass action. The result is that, there is 
no real consensus regarding which set of terminology is better. There 
is nothing necessarily reprehensible about using specific terms. It 
makes obvious sense if one is Interested in theorizing about one speci­
fic form of collective political violence. However, using a more 
general approach has its share of convincing merits. Since all cases 
of collective political violence indicate shared features such as, 
breakdown of legitimate power structure, violent behaviour, collective 
manifestation of anger, frustration and anti-system sentiments, a 
general approach would evolve theories which would aid in the explana­
tion and understanding of the overall phenomenon of collective political 
violence, and also the more specific manifestations of such actions 
(Eckstein, 1965).
Moreover, studies which adopt an idlographlc approach by 
emphasizing specific modes of collective political violence are more 
susceptible to the problem of terminological confusion, especially 
when they do not define their terms adequately. As a result, they 
often find themselves uBing such terms as rebellion and revolution 
interchangeably, when technically they refer to quite different 
patterns of collective political violence. An example of this is
3Johnson's (1964) simultaneous use of the terms revolution and rebel- 
lion . By using a more nomothetic or more general approach such a 
confusion is easily averted, since reference is made only to the 
general phenomenon of political violence which encompasses all the 
various patterns which It can undertake. Therefore, a general approach 
is preferred since it resolves the conceptual confusion which ensues 
from using inadequately defined specialized terminology.
The term which has been chosen for our presentation of 
the subject matter is collective political violence. Collective 
political violence specifies that the type of action we are interested 
in is collective action. Collective action implies the movement and 
participation of a substantial number of individuals. Unlike Hlbbs 
(1973) we prefer the term collective over mass, because the former 
implies the presence of a certain degree of awareness and consciousness, 
whereas the latter carries the idea of blind, hypnotic following. In 
short, collective includes mass but is not limited to it. The impli­
cation which we derive from the terms mass and collective. cannot be 
substantiated. We are not familiar with any literature that draws a 
similar distinction. We differentiate between these two terms on the 
basis of the assumption that the term mass is appropriate when 
referring to pre-political, proto-political forms of protest such as - 
social banditry, gangsterism, whereas collective is used in conjunction 
with modern political forms of protest, such as revolution, rebellion,
We shall elaborate this problem of terminological confusion which 
ensues from the use of specific terms in the second chapter.
4coup d'etat and so on (Oppenheliner, 1969). Mass movement Involves 
following without the understanding of the Issue Involved In the act 
or acts of political violence. It is blind following without any 
appreciation of the goal of action. However, collective Implies that 
the people involved in the acts of political violence have some under­
standing and appreciation of the goal(s). Therefore, their action is 
'goal-directed' whereas the action of the mass is not.
In sum, our inquiry is limited to those acts of political 
violence which indicate collective following. Therefore, excluded 
from our consideration are those cases of political violence which are 
limited in terms of collective participation, for example, political 
assassinations and certain instances of political terrorism in which 
only individual or small-group initiative and practice are indicated. 
However, whenever these acts of violence, such as assassinations and 
terrorisms are part of a broader act of political dissent, they will 
be taken into consideration. Non-collective political violence could 
be adequately integrated into a general study of political violence, 
but for our present purposes we are only interested in political 
violence as a collective venture.
Collective political violence also states that we are only 
interested in those types of collective activity which are political 
in character. In other words, they are activities that wield a 
certain power potential which are perceived by the reigning political 
personnel as threatening their authority and power. Acts of collective 
violence that do not threaten the overthrow of the regime are con­
sidered non-political and therefore, beyond the realm of the present
5study. Our inquiry is thus limited to acts of collective violence 
which threaten the overthrow of the regime.
Whether a certain Instance of collective violence is poli­
tical or not can be discerned from two sets of factors. First, an 
instance of collective violence can safely be labeled as political 
when its participants openly disavow the legitimacy of the existing 
regime and threaten to overthrow it. However, as Russell (1974) has 
pointed out, it is no easy task determining whether the overthrow of 
the regime has been threatened when;
(a) the action is unsuccessful; and
(b) when the aims of the collective action cannot be
clearly understood.
In such Instances collective action shall be regarded as political or 
non-political depending on its intensity. When the scale of collective
action is extensive, we shall consider it to be political on the basis
of the argument that the larger the magnitude of collective action, 
the more threatening it is to the regime, How we shall measure inten­
sity will be discussed at a later time.
For our present purposes we are only interested in collec­
tive poltical violence as it occurs within 'autonomous political 
systems', i.e. societies which are structurally independent of a 
foreign power. Therefore, we shall deal with collective political 
violence as it occurs within a sovereign, independent political 
entity. A separate study could be done at a later date to incorporate 
the phenomenon of political violence in non-sovereign colonial poli­
tical systems into a general study of political violence. However, 
at present our Interest is limited to those actB of collective
6political violence which threaten the central government of an auto­
nomous country.
By delimiting ourselves to collective political violence 
as it threatens the overthrow of the central government, we are exclu­
ding all instances of collective violence for 'independence', 'self- 
determination', 'secession', 'autonomy' and so forth, which do not 
threaten the overthrow of the regime but only intend to set up alter­
native seats of government.
The phrase, collective political violence further implies 
that we shall consider collective political action as a violent pheno­
menon. We are interested in collective political actions which 
involve violence, in the form of disruption, destruction and injury to 
individuals and property. Our Interest in violence as a tactic for 
collective political action is based on the historical fact that 
violent political action is usually more intense in spirit and more 
far-reaching in its consequences than non-violent collective political 
action.
We can now summarize our definition of the basic subject 
matter- collective political violence as;
(1) involving collective following and participation;
(2) threatening the overthrow of the central regime of 
an autonomous political entity;and
(3) using violence as the tactic of collective action.
7Purpose
Having delineated the basic subject matter it is now 
necessary to present the purpose of the study. In conducting this 
study we have a twofold purpose.
The first and foremost objective is to formulate a typo­
logy of the various modes of collective political violence. As ve 
have seen earlier, collective political violence is a general social 
phenomenon which finds expression in such specific forms as revolutions,
rebellions, coups, mutinies, jacqueries, putschs, riots, so on and so
forth. Each of these variations are instances of collective political 
violence, because all of them are unique expressions of;
(1) collective frustrations and aggressions;
(2) which result from the insurgents' perception of the 
inadequacies of the socio-political system;
(3) and which involve the use of violence.
Our primary task here is to attempt to order these
various modes of collective political violence into mutually exclusive 
exhaustive and homogeneous classes on the basis of a set of predeter­
mined attributes. These attributes are variables which give each 
type of collective political violence its particular form and charac­
ter. Instances of collective political violence differ from each 
other because they differ with regard to a number of variables such 
as ideas, class, extent, consequence, leadership and so on. And each 
type of collective political violence is a special combination of 
these attributes, each different from the other. Before proceeding
8any further it would be helpful to elaborate the variable list which 
we have put together as the basis of our classification scheme.
The Multivariate Model
Any particular type of collective political violence can 
be distinguished from others on the basis of three sets of variables: 
structural variables, extent variables and extraneous variables.
In the first place we can identify the structural 
variables which give collective political violence its particular 
form and character. Note that in this study we ideas and strategy as 
structural in the manner of Heberle (1951) who demonstrates that an 
Ideology consists of the constitutive ideas of a social movement, 
carried by observable collectivities. The variables under this set 
Include:
1. The ideas of collective political violence (CPV). (I)
2. The strategy undertaken to carry out the ideas. (S)
3. The class character of CPV. (C)
4. The organizational structure of leadership.
5. The class character of leadership. ^ 2^
6. The degree of organization of CPV. (0)
Therefore,
CPVt - f (I,S,C,LltL2,0)   (i)
which describes collective political violence of type (t) as a func­
tion of the ideas, class character, class of leadership, leadership 
structure and the degree of organization of CPV.
9The second set of variables refers to the degree of 
extensiveness of collective political violence. Types of CPV can be 
distinguished on the basis of their magnitude. The variables which 
measure the extent of CPV are:
1. The degree of participation In CPV. (p)
2. The duration of CPV. (d)
3. The amount of violence which results from CPV. (v)
U. The geographic area covered by CPV. (a)
Therefore,
CPVt - f (p»d,v,a) ....  (ii)
which describes CPV of type (t) also as a function of the degree of
participation in CPV, the duration of CPV, the amount of violence 
resulting from CPV and finally the area covered by CPV.
We have entitled the third set of variables as the 
extraneous variables. These are the variables which determine the 
potential and outcome of CPV externally. They are not integral or 
structural aspects of CPV. The variables under this set are:
1. The government response variable. (GR)
2. The armed force disloyalty variable. (AFD)
Therefore,
CPVt - f (GR.AFD)....... ......  (ill)
which describes CPV of type (t) also as a function of the type of
governmental response it calls forth and the degree of armed force 
disloyalty it brings about.
Therefore, according to our Multivariate model:
CPVt - f(I,S,C,L1,L2,0) (p,d,v,a) <GR,AFD) ---  (iv)
10
which describes CPV of type (t) as a function of the structural, 
extent and extraneous variables. The assumption of this study is that 
each type of collective political violence represents a particular 
combination of values on this multivariate model. Ve have derived 
this list of variables on the basis of our familiarity with available 
literature and our exposure to the historical accounts of empirical 
cases of collective political violence. This set of variables 
reveal a synthesis of those attributes which have been recognized by 
the social scientists in the extant literature as decisive in deter­
mining the form and character of any mode of collective political 
violence.
The primary purpose of this study is to formulate a typo­
logical scheme on the basis of the assumption that any particular 
type of collective political violence can be distinguished from 
others by explicating the particular combination of values on this 
set of multiple variables. The information on the basis of which the 
typology would be developed will be gathered from a sample of con­
crete cases of collective political violence within member nations of 
the United Nations. Details on the sample and the data will be 
provided in later chapters.
Formulating such typological and classification scheme 
is indispensable if we are to reduce the complex to the simple, the 
unique to the general and order concrete data so that they may be 
described in terms, which make them comparable (Mcklnney, 1967). To 
classify the various types of collective political violence in terms 
of a certain attribute or criterion is also to describe them In
11
reference to that particular attribute or criterion. Typlficatlon 
thus lays the basis for further elaboration of existing theories of 
collective political violence and provide insight into the inconsis­
tencies of such theories when compared to empirical data (Mcklnney, 
1967). Therefore, effective classification of various forms of 
collective political violence into a typological scheme is an impor­
tant precondition for developing a more sophisticated theory on the 
phenomenon of collective political violence, because such schemes;
(a) transfer unique cases of collective political
violence into general typologies of collective
political violence;
(b) describes types of collective political violence in 
terms of the attributes used for classifying.
Therefore to summarize: The primary task of this project 
is to formulate a typological scheme of collective political violence 
in its varied forms,
A second objective of this project is to attempt to iso­
late the Intervening variables which make the difference between 
successful and unsuccessful collective political violence. We shall 
define a successful CPV as one which overthrows the central govern­
ment and establishes its own authority. It is felt that while
setting up our multivariate classificatory scheme of various types 
of CPV we will be able to Isolate those variables on which success­
ful and unsuccessful classes of political violence vary in degree 
and kind. And from this we will be able to deduce the crucial 
variables which determine the outcome of CPV. Social scientists are 
distinctly aware of the direct relationship between the 'alienation* 
of the masses from the sources of power (Independent variable) and
12
Che potential for political violence (dependent variable). However,
a majority of these studies overlook those intervening variables
which transform the vague sentiment of powerlessness into successful 
or unsuccessful collective political violence Hopefully, due to the 
nature of our primary venture, in which we draw our typology on the 
basis of empirical data gathered from concrete cases of CPV, we shall 
have a certain insight into the way in which the variables figure in 
the case of successful and/or unsuccessful collective political vio­
lence.
It is felt that if we can isolate the intervening vari­
ables which determine success and/or failure, then;
(a) it will provide us with a powerful predictive tool, and
(b) will also be able to throw a certain amount of light on
the reasons why apparently potent CPVs ultimately fail.
In concluding this chapter an outline of the organiza­
tional layout of the rest of the work is presented.
In Chapter II an overview of the literature on classifi­
cation schemes of collective political violence is presented. On the 
basis of information gathered from these sources on the multiple 
variables which make up collective political violence, a test model 
of collective political violence is developed.
Chapter III will provide inforamtlon on the methodo­
logical aspects of the study. The variables are operationalized, the 
universe from which the sample of collective political violence is 
drawn is defined, the sampling procedure is delineated, the sample is 
presented and finally the statistical technique is explained.
13
In Chapter IV the data Is analyzed in order to determine 
its degree of relevance to the 'ideal typical* classification. The 
intervening variables which determine success or failure of collec­
tive political violence are also indicated.
In Chapter V general conclusions on the subject matter 
are presented.
In Appendix data on the thirty cases of collective poli­
tical violence are presented In a detailed manner. Information on 
each of the clusters as provided by the cluster analysis procedure, 
are presented.
Chapter II 
Toward a Test Model of CPV 
Introduction
Two specific objectives are realized in this chapter. 
First, the attempt Is made to identify the various concepts adopted 
to signify the diverse modes of collective political violence.
Second, the typological schemes of political violence as put forward 
by the various authors are reviewed In terms of their exhaustiveness 
and clarity.
The Idea, that collective political violence, as a 
social process, assumes different forms, and manifests itself through 
different patterns, was Introduced earlier. Each of these different 
patterns, it was held, was a unique combination of a set of para­
meters which were isolated as being significant in determining the 
form and character of each Instance of CPV. Though we can argue that 
each individual case of collective political violence is historically 
unique, so far as its particular mix of attributes is concerned- the 
fact remains that certain uniformities can be discerned even from 
these unique caseB. And the existence of such uniformities has led 
the theorists on political violence to lump empirical instances of 
CPV under such categories as: revolution, rebellion, coup d'etat, 
jacquerie and so on. The underlying argument is that these cate­
gories reveal a certain 'ideal-typical' mix of relevant parameters, 
and that all Instances of CPV can be classified under these
14
categories, with a high level of certainty about their inclusive- 
*
ness *
In the first part of the present chapter we shall try 
to identify and define each of these different modes of collective 
political violence, which social scientists have identified as 
being 'ideal typical'. Therefore, our first objective in this 
chapter is to attain a certain degree of conceptual clarity so far 
as the various terms used to designate varied patterns of CPV is 
concerned.
The first part of the chapter leads quite naturally 
to the second one. There we shall review the categories as put 
forward by the social scientists and consider their validity as far 
as their exhaustiveness and clarity is concerned. Our second objec­
tive, therefore, is to scan the varied typological schemes on poli­
tical violence and look for any Inconsistencies and invalidities as 
as there may exist.
On Classifying CPV
There have been numerous attempts at classifying poli­
tical violence, in one way or the other. Many such attempts are
Such an implication can be attained from a majority of the authors 
of the varied typological schemes of political violence. How satis­
factory such claims are will be discussed in the second part of the 
present chapter, where we shall judge the schemes from the point of 
view of their degree of IncluslvenesB, exhaustiveness, and how far 
they succeed in limiting the number of residuals.
16
direct and bold ventures at formulating typological schemes; 
others merely imply such classifications in their expositions, 
without making explicit claims of having done so. In our pre­
sent effort we shall try to consider a number of these varied 
typologies, whether implied or openly explicated by their res­
pective authors, and offer clarification and definition for each 
of the 'ideal typical* categories inherent therein.
Two qualifications need to be made before we proceed. 
Many of the 'ideal typical* categories of political violence as 
explicated by social scientists may not be relevant to our subject 
matter as delineated in the previous chapter. Modes of political 
violence, such as those which occur in response to foreign domi­
nation or those which are associated with secessionistlc and 
self-determination movements are not relevant for our analysis. 
However, classification schemes which have such modes of politi­
cal violence as one or more category have not been discarded, 
because to do so would be to deprive ourselves of a whole set of 
important typological formulations and other categories in such 
schemes relevant to our analysis. Nor have we presented these 
schemes by eliminating such categories as may appear because, to 
do so would disturb the inherent continuity of these schemes and 
thus render them invalid. Moreover, it would not be ethical to 
tamper with the work of other individuals. However, in our subse­
quent analysis in the rest of the project we will simply overlook 
these categories.
Our second qualification deals with the particular
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terminology which is used to refer to the general phenomenon which we 
designate as collective political violence. As was indicated in the 
previous chapter, social scientists have their own Individual 
preferences in choosing terms to signify the general phenomenon of 
collective political violence. Therefore, when we venture out into 
the field of classificatory schemes of this phenomenon, we shall 
discover very Boon that the theorists concerned do not utilize uni­
form terminology. Thus, what we refer to as categories of collective 
political violence, others may refer to as categories of 'revolution1, 
'rebellion', 'civil strife', or 'internal war'. No matter how much 
ambivalence we have regarding the adequacy of such terminology- such 
differences do not inconvenience our analysis, one way or the other. 
Because, as we clarified in the first chapter - no matter what the 
terminology, reference is usually being made to comparable phenomenon. 
Therefore, differential terminology usage in reference to the general 
phenomenon of collective political violence does not pose any problems, 
so far as our analysis is concerned.
Let us now proceed to fulfill the purpose which we set out 
for ourselves in the beginning of the present chapter. In this part, 
in order to realize our objective of conceptual clarification, we 
shall follow these procedures:
First, classification schemes as delineated by theorists on political 
violence are reviewed in order of their publication. The schemes 
which have been chosen for this review are the ones which we came 
across In our review of literature, as earnest or even cursory 
attempts at formulating typologies of collective political violence.
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Second, these schemes are discussed In terms of; (i) their underlying 
criterion/criteria as used for the formulation of such schemes; and 
(ii) the categories included therein. Third, the criteria and the 
categories will be presented in the form of a table, whenever deemed 
appropriate.
Review of Literature
The first classification scheme which we have chosen to 
discuss was developed by Lyford P. Edwards (1927) in his classic work 
on The Natural History of Revolution. Edwards refers to three classes 
of revolution distinguished on the basis of the nature of factions 
which take part in them.
The first is composed of the abortive revolution in which 
moderate reformers assume power essentially peacefully. They are prima­
rily supported by the middle class of ordinary citizens. This is 
referred to as an abortive revolution, since the moderate reformers are 
unable to hold power against the threat of the conservatives or radicals.
The second class constitutes of the moderate revolution.
In this case, the moderate reformers are overthrown by the conserva­
tives. Example: Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in which Hapsburg power 
was restored.
The third and the most significant category refers to 
the radical revolution. In this case the moderate reformers are over­
thrown by the radicals. Radical revolution is by far the most violent 
and far reaching in its consequences. This type of revolution is
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historically the roost infrequent. Example: Russian Revolution 1917, 
French Revolution 1789.
In his classic work The Anatomy of Revolution, Brinton 
(1938) makes what appears to be only a cursory attempt at typologizing 
’revolutions'. He refers notably to three kinds of revolutions;
(i) The revolution Initiated by authoritarians, oligarchies or conser­
vatives - that is the rightist revolution Example: Fascist revolu­
tions In Spain and Italy.
(ii) The territorial nationalist revolution: Brinton illustrates this 
category of revolution with the example of the American revolution 
which was "not attempting to overrun our social and economic system, 
but rather to set the English North American colonies up as an indepen­
dent national states" (Brinton, 1938: 23).
(ill) The abortive revolution! Abortive implies "simply the failure 
of organized groups in revolt" (Brinton, 1938: 24). Example: The Paris 
Commune of 1871.
The problem with Brinton’s classification is self-reflec­
tive. It is not based on any uniform criteria or criterion. Each
category is differentiated on the basis of quite different attributes. 
Thus, the first category is distinguished on the basis of participa­
tion, the second on the basis of objectives and the third on the basis 
of outcome. A valid classification has to start by delineating uni­
form criteria on the basis of which the different modes of collective 
political violence can be compared.
Since Pettee (1938), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) and 
Rosenau (1964), have comparable modes of classification of collective
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political violence, except for slight semantic differences - for the 
sake of convenience it was decided to discuss them together. This 
trio of sources have formulated threefold typologies of what Pettee 
and Lasswell and Kaplan refer to as 'revolution* and Rosenau refers to 
as 'internal war'. Since no specific criterion was put forward as 
determining the typological scheme in all the three cases, we can only 
guess. However, one attribute which seems to stand out in all the 
cases as the determining factor in developing these categories was the 
degree of change Intended or realized.
Therefore, the first category deals with those types of 
revolutions and internal wars which brings about only a limited degree 
of change. Such is the nature of palace revolutions, private coup 
d 'etat, and personnel wars. These revolutions and internal wars usually 
bring about change only in the occupancy of existing roles in the 
structure of political authority.
The second in line are the political revolutions, public 
coup d'etat and authority wars which bring about changes in the autho­
rity structure or in other words, which bring about changes in the 
arrangement of roles in the structure of political authority. Revolu­
tions or internal wars which bring about constitutional changes are 
appropriate examples.
Social revolutions, as Lasswell and Kaplan, and Pettee 
label them, or Structural wars, as Rosenau refers to them, constitute 
the third category of revolutions and internal wars. In these cases 
along with the changes in the personnel and authority structure, the 
entire sub-structure of society, its system of ownership, the bases of
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power, the Institutions and so on - all undergo drastic changes. The 
changes brought about by social revolutions and structural wars are 
the most pervasive and far reaching. (See Table I, which follows for a
graphic representation of this typology).
William Stokes* (1952) classification of revolution is by
far the most ornamental as far as terminology is concerned. Stokes
developed a fourfold typology of revolutions on the basis of no really
specifiable criterion. Though the basis of classification is rather
arbitrary, the categories are unique:
(i) Machetlsmo: Machetismo "is a crude, primitive method of
mobilizing violence primarily in local, rural politics but occasionally
in national, urban areas as wellM(Stokes, 1952: 447). Machetismo -
absolute authority and power commanded by the machete - the general
utility knife widely used throughout Latin America, is as we infer, as
much an upholder of existing authority as it is a potent source of
bringing about changes in such authority.
(ii) Cuartelazo: According to Stokes, the cuartelazo is
......a more developed, complex method of organizing and
changing governments than machetismo, has its focus in the 
barracks (cuartel). Its classic pattern is the treason of the 
single barracks.... the march on centers of communication, sites 
of military supplies, the exchequer, government headquarters, 
and ultimately the capital itself (Stokes, 1952: 451).
(iii) Golpe de Estado: Golpe de Estado, frequently called the
coup d'etat -
 is a direct assault on power - almost always personal in
Latin American countries - which means the lmmobollzatlon of 
the president either through assassination or detention....
The golpe de estado is distinguished from the cuartelazo by 
the fact that the professional military experience is less 
needed the golpe, is a forceful method of organizing and
Table 1
Threefold Typology of Revolutions/Internal War
Typology of
Revolution/Internal War
Degree of change intended and/or realized
Personnel/Minimum Political/Average Structural/Maximum
Palace Revolution
1 Private Coup D'etat 
Personal Wars
+
Political Revolution
2 Public Coup D'etat 
Authority Wars
+
Social Revolution
3 Social Revolution 
Structural Wars
+
N?
to
changing governments which definitely permits, even 
encourages civilian participation* (Stokes, 1952: 456-457).
(iv) Revolution: Revolution to Stokes -
....is fundamental change In the nature of the state, the 
functions of government, the principles of economic partici­
pation and distribution, the relationship of the social 
classes, particularly as regards the control of government - in 
a word a significant breaking with the past. (Stokes, 1952: 
461).
George Blanksten (1958) formulated a threefold typology 
of revolutions quite similar to those developed by Lasswell and Kaplan, 
Pettee and Rosenau. Blanksten uses objectives of revolutions as the 
distinguishing criterion. His three categories are:
(i) Revolutions resulting in national independence from 
foreign rule.
(ii) Revolutions leading to the forced removal of a president 
from office by a rival;
(ill) And finally, the real revolutions which bring about 
restructuring of the social order.
The primary criterion which Feliks Gross (1958) uses for 
his classification of revolutions is the structural position of its 
major participants, or in other words, whether the participants are 
primarily from the elitist sections of society, or are they primarily 
from the ranks of general masses. On the basis of this criterion,
Gross develops his four categories of revolutions. (See Table 2).
(i) Revolution from below: which are characterized primarily 
by the "mass movements agalnBt the existing government, the state, 
against the socio-political system". (Gross, 1958; 47). The ideologies 
of "revolutions from below" reflect the deep social and cultural
Table 2
Gross's Categories and Subcategories of Revolution
Participation Categories Subcategories
Elite Coup D'etat/Palace Revolution
Mass and Elite Combined Seizure
Mass Revolution from below Rebellion, Civil War,
Insurrection
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changes which the Insurgents desire. Such revolutions are usually 
spontaneous events, not the result of an a priori plan conceived by a 
small group of elitist leaders.
Gross develops sub-categories of ’revolution from below', 
on the contention that they are slight variations of the general pro­
cess, such as:
a) Rebellions: One variation of 'revolutions from below',
Rebellions are spontaneous mass movements without ideology or organi­
zation .
b) Civil War: Also a variation of a 'revolution from below’.
In a civil war, an army representing a dissenting and a significant 
segment of the population fights another army - loyal to the govern­
ment .
c) Insurrection: In the case of insurrection, regular or 
underground army, supported by rebels unite against foreign rule.
(11) Revolution from top or Coup d'etat: is usually accom­
plished by a small, well organized group, usually a military group.
The first tactical move is almost always the seizure of the means of 
violence - the military and police establishments with the aim of 
Immobilizing the government. However, revolution from top seldom 
results in profound (social, economic or political) change, beyond 
the substitution of personnel in the positions of power.
(iii) Combined Seizure: of power occurs when a 'revolution
from top' is combined with a limited 'revolution from below'. This is 
usually the case when action from the top is supported by large sec­
tion of the masses.
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(iv) Palace Revolution: Involves the excahnge of power within
the ruling elite through means which involve violence.
These are Gross' categories and sub-categories of 'revo­
lution', based primarily on the nature of the participants. However, 
as we have seen, Gross uses other attributes such as ideas, degree of 
planning, and so on to further qualify the categories.
Samuel Huntington (1962) developed a typology of 
"patterns of domestic violence". He has two major categories: Revo­
lutionary war and coup d'etat. Coup d'etat is further classified into 
governmental coups, revolutionary coups and reform coups.
(i) Revolutionary War: Revolutionary war as exemplified by
the Chinese civil war, the struggle between the Viet Minh and the 
French in IndoChina, the guerrilla war of communist rebels in Malaya, 
Phillipines, insurrection in Algeria, all reflect (a) anti-colonialist,
(b) anti-feudal, (c) alienation from central authority structure, (d) 
egalitarian sentiments. They indicate protracted, guerrilla warfare, 
terroristic tactics of violence, which finally gives way to full scale 
war.
(ii) Coup d'etat: Whereas, revolutionary war is an assault
from outside, coup d'etat can be undertaken by groups which are 
already participants in the existing political system - as such it is 
an assault from inside. Coup is a short-lived strategy to overwhelm 
the government from support from the army,
(a) A governmental coup occurs when the leadership of the 
government is changed without significant changes occurring in the 
social structure.
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(b) Revolutionary coups on the other hand brings about fun­
damental changes in the socio-economic and political structure of the 
society. Whereas a revolutionary war is revolution from outside, 
revolutionary coup is revolution from the Inside out.
(c) Reform coup falls between the other two. A combined 
military and civilian effort; it seizes power with the Intention of 
making reforms in the political, economic and social structure. 
(Huntington's classification is schematically represented in Table 3).
The next classification scheme was developed by Chalmers 
Johnson (1964). Lawrence Stone (1966) in his review of Johnson's 
scheme regards it as "the most fruitful typology" of revolutions. In 
view of the fact that Johnson uses a relatively extensive set of crite­
ria to develop this typology, we might go along with Stone's evaluation. 
Johnson identifies six patterns which revolutions follow (See Table 4). 
The variables selected to develop this scheme were:
(i) Targets of revolutionary activity: Does the revolution
aim at replacing government personnel, the political regime or the 
*
community.
(ii) Identity of the revolutionaries: Whether they come from 
the ranks of the elites or the masses.
(lii) Revolutionary goals or Ideology: Whether reformist.
"By community is meant the consciousness of human solidarity that 
overlays a society technically defined - i.e. people united by the 
division of labor - and by which men actually perceive their social 
life". (Johnson, 1964: 28).
Table 3
Classification of Patterns of Domestic Violence
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Table 4
Johnson's Typology of Revolution
Typology
Criteria
Jacquerie
Mlllenarlan
Anarchist
Jacobin
Communist
Conspiratorial
Coup
Targets Revolutionaries Ideology
Govt. Regime Community Masses Elite Elite R ES N NF E NM
Masses
Mass
Militarized
Insurrection
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A
eschatological , nostalgic, nation forming, elitist or nationalist.
The six modes of 'revolution' identified on the basis of these 
criteria are:
(1) Jacquerie: which is a spontaneous mass rebellion of the
peasants, usually carried out in the name of traditional authorities, 
Idealized king or church, with limited aims of removing local or 
national elites. Examples: The original jacquerie - the French
peasant revolt of 1358, the Pugachev rebellion in Russia in 1773-75.
(2) The Mlllenarlan Rebellion: Also a spontaneous mass 
rebellion which pursues revolutionary action in order to realize a 
utopian dream inspired by a prophet, through the "total transformation 
of the social system, sweeping away the status quo and uncompromising 
elite, leaving the faithful in control of veritable paradise"
(Johnson, 1964: 35). Such revolutions have occurred in traditional 
societies under the pressure to change as a result of their exposure 
to industrialism, imperialism and forces of secularization. It is 
quite easy to confuse revolutionary millenarianism with Jacquerie if 
we do not explain the primary ideological differences. Whereas 
jacquerie, in purging the existing structure of elites, local and 
national, demonstrates the willingness to compromise with the tradi­
tional authority structures such as church or king, revolutionary 
millenarianism breaks sharply with the old order in the pursuit of 
their utopian dream. The ideology of revolutionary millenarianism
Branch of theology concerned with the final events in the history of 
mankind.(Webster's dictionary).
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is eschatological. Examples: Talping and Boxer rebellion In China,
in 1851-1864 and 1900 respectively; Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950's in 
Kenya have definite millenarian overtones.
(3) Anarchistic Rebellion: Occur in response to progressive
change supported by some dominant part in the population, brought 
about to relieve certain dysfunctions in society. Anarchistic revo­
lutions occur when a coalition of groups oppose such change, because 
they perceive the changes as threatening their roles in the system.
The ideology of anarchistic rebellions are nostalgic since they arti­
culate the goals for the future on the basis of experience in an 
idealized but increasingly redundant past. Anarchistic rebellions are 
made by members of the landed aristocracy and peasantry who feel that 
they have poor prospects for the future in view of the changing times. 
Their target is the government and their ideology is based on romantic 
idealization of the old order. (Johnson, 1964: 40-45), Examples:
The American Civil War, 1861-65, Counter Revolution in the Vendee, 
1793-96.
(4) The Jacobin Communist Revolution: Has been defined as
"a sweeping fundamental change in political organization, social struc­
ture, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social 
order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development" 
(Johnson, 1964: 2). Therefore, the Jacobin Communist revolution 
envisages the replacement of the old order by a more progressive one. 
They are made by the masses under elite guidance, and their target is 
the government, regime and society. Examples: French Revolution,
1789; Russian Revolution Revolution, 1917.
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(5) Conspiratorial Coup d'etat: Attempts at revolutionary
change by small, elitist, secretive groups of individuals with highly 
organized action framework. Examples: Egyptian coup of 1952* Ghana
coup of 1966.
(6) The Militarized Mass Insurrection: Elite directed, deli­
berately planned, mass revolutionary war. They are based on the vio­
lent techniques of protracted guerrilla warfare. The ideological base 
is usually a combination of "xenophobic nationalism and Marxism". 
Examples: China, 1937-49; Algeria, 1954-62.
William Kornhauser (1964) in his classification scheme 
demonstrates the relationship between authority structures and rebel­
lions which develop in response to the inadequacies of such authority 
structures, as perceived by the rebels. He classifies authority and 
the rebellions which ensue in response to them under four heads:
(i) Alien authority: Authority that is foreign rather than
indigenous to the society gives rise to rebellions for political inde­
pendence. Example: Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 against British rule.
(ii) Insufficient authority: Authority that is believed to be
weak, ineffective and fragmented results in rebellion for centraliza­
tion of authority. Example: The Chinese revolution of 1911, which
overthrew the Manchu dynasty which was Incapable of coping with 
Western encroachments, as well as the internal problems.
(iii) Arbitrary authority: Authority that is perceived as
irresponsible and repressive gives rise to rebellions for constitution­
alism. Example: The Nicaraguan rebellion, 1978-79 against the arbi­
trary authority of Somoza, the Iranian rebellion, 1978-79 against the
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repressive authority of the Shah.
(iv) Exclusive authority: Authority that is believed to be
inaccessible to the large sections of the population* such as certain 
classes, parties or ethnic groups giving rise to rebellions for citi­
zenship rights. Example: Revolution of 1848 in France, which aimed
at greater political equality. One of the first acts of the provi­
sional government was to proclaim the right of Universal Suffrage. 
(Kornhauser, 1964: 153).
Andrew C. Janos (1964) classifies the "techniques of the 
transfer of authority" in terms of the capabilities of the Insurgents 
so far as potential for violence is concerned. Janos contends that 
the capability of the rebels not only determines what kind of tech­
niques of violence he would use but would also isolate the strategic 
objectives for the realization of the goal of authority transfer. Thus 
capabilities for Janos is the independent variable, which determines 
both strategy and techniques of violence (See Table 5).
Janos contends that when the capabilities of the insur­
gents are low, as is usually the case in the Initial stages of a move­
ment, the range of potential choices is severly limited. "The 
strategic objective is attrition in military arena and mobilization in 
civic arena" (Janos, 1964: 138). The techniques of violence practiced 
are terrorisms, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of subviolence.
However, when the balance of capabilities for violence 
tips in favor of the rebels, the struggle proceeds from attrition to 
annihilation in the military arena and from mobilization to decision 
in the civic arena. The techniques of violence appropriate in these
Table 5
Techniques of Transfer of Power
Capabilities Strategic Objectives Techniques
Low / Initial Stage
Attrition - Military Arena
Mobilization - Civic Arena
Terrorism,
Strikes,
Demon s t rat ions
High / Second Stage
Annihilation - Military Arena
Decision - Civic Arena
Guerrila, civil 
war, 
Insurrection,
Coups
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instances are guerrilla war, civil war, insurrection (violent elimina­
tion of power holders), and coups de force.
In his exposition on "Dimensions of Social Conflict in 
Latin America'1 , Douglas Bwy (1968) developed a typology of civil 
violence on the basis of the degree of planning and organization 
involved (See Table 6). His two categories turmoil and internal war 
are comparable to similar categories developed by Ted Gurr (1968), 
whose exposition we shall review following this.
(1) Turmoil: Refers to'spontaneous, sporadic, and essentially
non-organized conflict behavior". The sub-categories under this dimen­
sion are : anti-government riots, political clashes, anti-foreign 
riots and demonstrations, strikes, coups, cuartelazos , assassinations, 
plots. Coups, cuartelazos, assassinations and plots are explained in 
majority of the literature on these phenomena, as activities which 
take place in the realm of highly organized and clandestine behavior. 
Bwy's inclusion of such conflict behavior in this category requires 
an explanation:
Since the vast majority of Latin American coups are relatively 
bloodless and of short duration (generally because of the lack 
of interest and participation of the masses), they rarely 
appear to be serious challenges to the legitimacy of the 
systems Involved. Instead, they appear more in the form of a 
frequent game of rotation between the set of upper class "ins" 
and "outs". The coup d'etat, or palace revolution, then , as 
it is practiced in Latin America, appears to be as institu­
tionalized a form of challenging governments as the ballot, or 
as viable a mechanism of protest (although more often prac­
ticed by an elite clientile) as the manifestacion (»riot), 
or demonstration, or strike. As such its emergence.... in 
association with these events, is more than acceptable.
(Bwy, 1968:208).
The point Bwy makes is that coup d'etat is a routine act 
in Latin American politics. And like all other routine acts it does
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not need a substantial degree of pre-planning or organizing, every 
time it is enacted - and is therefore, classified under the category 
of "turmoil'* as a relatively spontaneous and routine behavior.
(ii) Internal War; Internal war, Bwy's second category 
includes those forms of domestic conflict which "appear to represent 
organized conflict behavior, i.e., behavior that is planned with defi­
nite objectives and methods in mind " (Bwy, 1968; 209); such as 
"continuing guerrilla warfare, terror/sabotage, revolutionary invasion, 
guerrilla action, and discrete terroristic act and sabotage" (Bwy,
1968: 210-11).
Ted Gurr (1968) formulated a threefold typology of what 
he refers to as "civil strife", which he defines as all collective, 
nongovernmental attacks on persons or property that occur within 
boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit. The criteria 
implied in the typology are:
a) The degree of planning that went into the organization of 
the strife; and
b) The extent of the strife.
The major categories of "civil strife" which Gurr
evolves are:
(i) Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unstructured mass strife.
Turmoil usually takes the form of demonstrations, political strikes, 
riots, political clashes and localized rebellion.
(il) Conspiracy: Intensively organized, relatively small scale 
strife, which usually manifests itself through political assassination, 
small scale terrorism, small scale guerrilla warfare, coups, mutinies, 
plots and purges, on the ground that they are evidence of planned
38
strife.
(iii) Internal War: Large scale, organized, focussed civil
strife which is almost always accompanied by extensive violence. Such
A
as, large scale terrorism and guerrilla war, civil war, private war , 
and large scale riots. (See Table 7 for graphic representation).
The next typology is Martin Oppenhelmer's (1969) 
classification of types of Violent protest1. Oppenhelmer uses three 
dimensions of violent protest to construct his typology:
a) a historical dimension - which Involves a rural-urban 
continuum determining whether the countryside or the city is the 
scene of protest. If the scene of protest is the countryside - 
peasants are the predominant participants, and if it is urban, the 
workers are the predominant actors.
b) a second dimension Involving the degree of political 
consciousness - signifying whether the protest behavior Is guided by 
some sort of political ideology or is it merely a pre-political 
endeavor.
c) a dimension of mass participation - determining whether 
the protest Involves a small number of people, an elite, effecting 
changes from the top down, or whether it Involves masses of people, 
with the strategy of change from bottom up.
On the basis of these three dimensions Oppenhelmer 
evolves an eightfold typology of 'violent protest', four in the rural
The category of 'private war* is ambiguous.
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context and four in the urban, 
caaes In the other.
Rural
1. Social Banditry
2. Peasant Uprisings
3. Guerrilla Bands
4. Liberation Army
The four In one setting have analogous
Urban
Gangsterism
Riots
Terrorism
Rebellion or 'rising
Source: Oppenheimer, 1969: 33.
Social Banditry and Gangsterism - are pre-political or proto-poli­
tical forms of protest behavior which Indicate absence of political 
consciousness and mass participation. Examples: Vendettas and
Hooliganism.
Peasant Uprisings and Riots - are also pre-political forms of protest 
behavior with the absence of political consciousness but presence of 
mass participation. Examples: revitalization movements, looting and 
vandalism.
Guerrilla Bands and Terrorism - are modern politically oriented 
"revolutionary movements", which indicate the presence of political 
consciousness but the absence of mass participation. Examples: 
Guevaristas in Bolivia, selective assassination, sabotage, kidnapping. 
Guerrilla Liberation Army and Rebellion or 'rising* - Modern poli­
tical revolutionary movements possessing both political consciousness 
and mass participation. Examples: Chinese PeopleTs Army, Russian 
Revolution. (Oppenheimer's typology presented in Table 8 ).
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Table 8 *
Types of Political ^
Protest Consciousness
Rural
1. Social Banditry
2. Peasant Uprising
3. Guerrilla Bands
4. Guerrilla 
Liberation Array
Urban
1. Gangsterism
2. Riots -
3. Terrorism +
4. Rebellion, 'rising* +
Mass @
Participation
+
+
*
Source - Oppenheimer (1969: 33)
+ indicates presence 
- indicates absence
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Mark Hagoplan (1974) has developed a most comprehensive 
classification of 'revolutionary' and 'non-revolutionary' phenomenon. 
His categories include revolution, coup d'etat, revolt and secession - 
each with subsequent sets of categories. As with quite a few of the 
others, no definite criterion for classification can be Isolated for 
Hagoplan. (See Table 9).
(1) Revolution: Hagoplan defines a revolution as "an acute, 
prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of strati­
fication (class, status, power) of a political community, which 
involves a purposive, elite-directed attempt to abolish or reconstruct 
one or more of said systems by means of an Intensification of politi­
cal power and recourse to violence." (Hagoplan,1974:1).
(2) Coup d ’etat: Denotes a blow or a sudden attack on the 
government. It usually results in the expulsion of the existing 
governmental leadership. Coup d'etat can assume either of the follow­
ing forms -
a. Palace revolutions - In their classic form, as por­
trayed in the political dramas of Shakespeare, palace revolutions 
involve the forced abdication or assassination of a ruler by a rival, 
who is either a relative or a subordinate.
b. Executive coups - occur when the chief executive of a 
republic abolishes the existing constitution and proclaims himself 
king or dictator, with the intentions of founding a dynasty.
c. Military coups - are coups in which the military 
plays a predominant role. Military coups can lead to primary rule by 
the military or civilian rule under the protection of the military.
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d. Paramilitary coups - refer to those attempts at cap­
turing power, in which a private, paramilitary group (e.g., Hitler's
*
Brown shirts) plays the role of prime mover.
(3) Revolt: is the next class of violent political behavior.
Revolt can be distinguished from revolution in terms of -
a. The stakes of the uprising - unlike a revolution, 
revolts do not threaten the existing systems of stratification, dis­
tribution of power, or the institutions of the society. Thus, the 
impact of a revolt on the socio-economic structure of a society is 
minimal,
b. The function of ideology - whereas a revolution 
Implies a program, a doctrine, revolts are associated with low levels 
of ideology. The existence of ideology before the actual outbreak of 
revolutionary action, helps determine the mentality of the insurrec­
tionists. The lack of such preparatory phases in revolts helps 
explain why they are shortlived and easily dislntegrable by the nor­
mal procedures of internal security.
c. The role of leadership - is the final major point of 
difference between revolt and revolution. The point being made here 
is not that revolts are leaderless, but that they lack comprehensive 
plan or strategy to guide their action - attributable primarily to 
the revolts lack of definite plan or Ideology, Keeping in mind these
Hagoplan cites the Kapp putsch (1920) as an example of paramilitary 
coup- which definitely invalidates the classification. Anyone 
remotely familiar with post-World War 1 German History would be aware 
of the fact that the Kapp putsch was conducted by a segment of the 
German army. It represented the reaction of part of the German 
officers' corps to the treaty of Versailles.
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points of distinction, Hagoplan regards a revolt as "the angry, vio­
lent expression of the refusal of an andivldual or group to continue 
in its present condition" (Hagoplan, 1974: 11). Revolts according to 
Hagoplan can assume either of the following forms -
a. Jacqueries or peasant revolts - which are further sub­
divided into; (i) Primitive collective violence - which Includes such 
acts of collective violence as "feuds, brawl, and scuffles between 
members of guilds, communes, and religious congregations, etc.". These 
are primarily small scale, localized and apolitical types of collec­
tive violence. This category, as we shall see later on is quite com­
parable to Tilly's category of 'competitive collective action*.
Example: Jacquerie. (ii) Reactionary collective violence - usually 
occurs when a group feels that the authorities are depriving them of 
rights which they once enjoyed. This category is similar to Tilly's 
category of 'reactive collective action*. Example: Traditional
peasant revolt, (ill) Modern collective violence - develops on the 
basis of well-defined objectives, which organizes action for the 
realization of "rights not yet enjoyed but within the reach".
Example; Modern peasant revolt.
b. Urban mobs - is a movement of all classes of the urban 
poor, a predominantly lower class phenomenon - attempting to bring 
about economic or political change through direct action, such as 
riots and rebellions, but which lack specific Ideological foundations.
c. Nativism - is another variation of the revolt. Natlvls- 
tic revolts occur in order to defend cultural values regarded sacred 
by the participants.
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d. Millenarianism-messianism - Includes the general cate­
gory of movements which claim to replace the sinful, corrupt, or soon 
to be destroyed community, with one that is directly informed and 
inspired by a charismatic leader or Messiah.
e. Aristrocratic revolts - are most often violent protests 
against political socialization. Aristrocratic revolts usually 
emerge as traditional movements, in which the aristrocratic rebels 
demand the "restoration of old privileges or creation of new ones in 
the guise of restoration".
(4) Secession - is the act of breaking off one part of a 
state and proclaiming its independence. Four forms of secession are 
listed: (1) Regional, (li) Colonial, (iii) Ethnic, and (iv) Religious.
This is therefore, in a summarized form the classifica­
tion scheme of Hagoplan. It is highly comprehensive and has some 
important insights to offer in terms of differences between revolu­
tionary and non-revolutionary phenomena.
Russell (1974) developed a'typology of rebellion', in 
which the distinguishing factors are participation and the type of 
political system In which they take place (see Table 10 ).
(1) Therefore, mass rebellions occur within autonomous poli­
tical systems in which the participants are largely from the masses. 
Example: China 1949.
(2) Military rebellions, also occur within autonomous political 
systems, however, the overthrow is threatened by the military forces. 
Example: Egypt 1952.
(3) Anti-colonial rebellions, are intersocietal power
Table 10
Russell’s Typology of Rebellion
Preconditions Social Conditions
Fora of Upheaval
Short Term 
Consequences
Long Term 
Consequences
Military
Rebellion
Mass
Rebellion
Anticolonial
Rebellion
Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
Successful
Revolution
Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful 
Revolution Revolution Revolution Revolution Revolution
Source: Russell (1974: 63)
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struggles In which the overthrow of colonial systems are threatened 
by violent means. Example: Algeria 1962.
Russell uses the term 'revolution', to signify the 
consequences of a successful rebellion - that is one that overthrows
the regime. Substantial social change following a successful rebel­
lion is a successful revolution, whereas, nonsubstantial social change 
following a successful rebellion is unsuccessful revolution.
Charles, Louis and Richard Tilly's (1975) categories of
collective action are the most abstract categories that we have 
encountered so far. The Tillys refer to three types of collective 
action - competitive, reactive and proactive, which refer more to the 
angle of response than to the techniques or patterns of response.
(i) Competitive collective action reflects horizontal con­
flict, in which members of one group define another group as rival. 
Competitive actions which produce a great deal of violence include 
"feuds, acts of rivalry between adjoining villages, recurrent ritual 
encounters of competing groups of artisans" (Tilly, 1975: 50).
(ii) Reactive type of collective action are vertical responses 
of one group which lays claims to resources under the control of 
another group. Tax rebellions, food riots are examples of reactive 
type of collective action.
(iii) Proactive collective action is also a vertical response 
of groups "making claims for rights, or resources not previously 
enjoyed. The deliberate attempt to seize control of (these resources) 
and the state is proactive" (Tilly, 1975: 51).
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On the basis of his review of a number of typological 
schemes of political violence, Harry Eckstein (1964) develops, what 
he refers to as a 'composite* typology. He does not believe that it 
is any better than the other schemes, but he claims that it "relates 
the various typologies by including most of the terms of the compli­
cated schemes and adding more terms to the simple ones.."(Eckstein, 
1964: 135-36).
His classification consists of:
(i) Relatively unorganized and spontaneous riots by crowds 
with low capabilities for violence and modest alms
(ii) Coup d'etat by members of an elite against other members 
of the elite;
(iii) Full scale political revolutions to achieve important 
constitutional changes;
(iv) Social revolutions to achieve large scale socio-economic 
as well as constitutional changes;
(v) And lastly, Wars of Independence to achieve sovereignty 
in a previously dependent society.
Eckstein is quite right in his evaluation of his typo­
logy. Not only is it not an improvement over other typologies - it is 
also rather arbitrary in its differentiation criteria. As is obvious 
ther are no uniform attributes on which these five categories could 
be related, except may be the idea of the respective movements.
With Eckstein's scheme we come to the end of this sec­
tion. In the next section a critical review of these typological 
schemes will be presented, where the schemes will be judged on the
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following:
(1) Clarity and appropriateness of conceptual categories;
(11) Relative Inclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the schemes;
(111) Justifiableness and adequacy of the criteria used for 
classifying.
A General Critique Of The Existing Typologies 
Of Collective Political Violence
Probably the most pervading drawback of existing typo­
logies of collective political violence ensues from their failure to 
develop their classifIcatory schemes on the basis of multivariate 
models. Most of these classifications are developed on the basis of 
one, two or at the most three attributes. (And as we have seen, in 
quite a few cases we could not even Isolate the attribute(s) used for 
evolving the'ideal typical' categories of revolution, internal war, 
domestic violence or what-have-you I) Therefore, most efforts at for­
mulating typologies of collective political violence are based on uni­
variate, blvarlate or at the most trlvariate models. There Is nothing 
inherently wrong with these efforts, If it can be demonstrated that 
the respective authors were particularly interested in certain aspects 
of collective political violence than in others, and that their parti­
cular concerns led them to base their typological schemes on certain 
attributes which they felt were more crucial than others However, 
how far this argument is true cannot be determined, since very few 
defend their choice of certain criterion(criteria) over others.
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The problem with these types of univariate, blvarlate 
or trlvariate classifIcatory schemes is quite obvious. Classifica­
tion of complex historical and social phenomenon such as collective 
political violence entails taking into consideration a varied array 
of important variables. No one variable can adequately characterize 
and differentiate one type of collective political violence (CPV) from 
the other. All elements taken together give each species of CPV Its 
unique form and character.
A single variable could adequately characterize any 
type of CPV, if its relations of covariance with other elements could 
be satisfactorily established. When this is a c h i e v e d " c o n c e i v a b l y , 
we may discover that, once the objective or participant structure or 
destructiveness or some other feature of an Internal war is known, 
everything about it is known as well" (Eckstein, 1964: 19).
However, in order to realize this objective, it is 
imperative that a satisfactory typology be developed, one that takes 
into consideration all the varied attributes which gives each mode of
CPV its distinct pattern. Because, only by developing such a typology
will we be able to point out the degree and nature of correlation 
between the different variables, which play a significant role in 
determining each type of CPV. Besides by developing a multivariate 
model for our typology, we can apply it to concrete cases and exactly 
determine to what extent they resemble the ideal. And as Eckstein so 
rightfully contends:
If one can establish how far any given case diverges 
from type, one can also determine to what extent a generaliza­
tion about the type can apply to it. The most obvious means
for assessing degree of divergence from type is of course a
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close comparison of the elements of the cases involved. One 
case may have the six of the seven elements of the type, 
another five; one case may one element of a type in impure 
form, another two, and so forth. The more such typical ele­
ments are present in pure form, the less a theory about the 
type should need modification to fit the atypical case. And 
in the world of phenomena there will always be atypical cases 
to plague the theorist. Such extensions of theories about 
types to atypical cases (and thus to the whole of one's sub­
ject) are not possible at all unless one constructs typologies 
from a proper analysis of the elements in a complex phenomenon 
(Eckstein, 1964: 20-21).
In Table 11 an effort is made to demonstrate the degree 
to which the schemes reviewed earlier exhaust the multivariate model 
developed for this study, in terms of their variable criterion/crite­
ria. As can be gathered from this table, a predominant amount of 
emphasis is placed on the variables 'idea* and 'class' for developing 
the typologies. Subsequently, it also demonstrates the lack of even 
partial exhaustiveness of the entire list of attributes which give 
each type of CPV its particular form and character.
Classification and definition are two processes in the 
delimitation of a subject matter that go hand in hand. Classifying 
phenomena in terms of certain attributes entails defining them in 
terms of those attributes. However, in situations as we have dis­
cussed above, where no definite criterion for classification can be 
discerned, the resulting definitions are also arbitrary. Therefore, 
with no definite set of criteria to show the way, each writer has his 
own unique classifIcatory scheme and subsequently a unique set of ter­
minology and definitions to denote the same process or processes.
The consequence of all this has not been too good. Firstly, because 
this means that every time we encounter a new piece of literature on 
collective political violence, we are exposed to a whole new set of
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terms and definitions. And secondly, such a state of affairs does not 
help the task of verification or replication of existing findings In 
the field of CPV.
This confusion over terminology Is most rampant In two 
specific areas, as demonstrated in the typological schemes discussed 
earlier -
(i) First, the confusion over type and technique.
(11) Second the confusion resulting from the use of terms 
which are usually considered exclusive, in a manner as 
to give the Impression that they are Interchangeable.
Let us delineate a little more on these issues. One 
area of major mix-up, as far as terminology is concerned has been the 
result of the failure to distinguish between types of collective poli­
tical violence, and techniques of violence used within individual 
CPV's. Thus, rebellion is a type of collective political violence, 
whereas riot, civil war, or guerrilla warfare are techniques, which 
can be used singly or in combination to effect a rebellion. Techniques 
or tactics of violence are one among many attributes which give a cer­
tain mode of CPV, its distinct form. They are Integral parts of CPV 
but it is very erroneous to confuse them as modes of CPV. The most 
Important distinction between type of CPV and techniques of CPV, is 
the fact that whereas the former has a political stand or character, 
the latter is politically neutral. Riots, civil war, guerrilla war­
fare, terrorism are themselves ideologically neutral, what ensues from 
their utilization has an ideological stand - this way or that way. 
However, each type of CPV, revolution or rebellion has an ideological 
character, thus we talk of Communist revolutions or Millenarian
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rebellions.
In his work. Janos appears to be aware of this distinc- 
tion, since his classification scheme categorizes 'techniques' of 
authority transfer specifically. Unfortunately, Oppenheimer and Gurr 
do not qualify for such clarity in their specifications. Thus, Oppen­
heimer deals with 'rebellion', 'peasant uprisings', 'riots’, and 
'terrorism' - in a way to give the impression that they were all, 
types of CPV, without specifying that the first two were modes/pat­
terns, whereas the other two were techniques Similarly, Gurr puts 
'revolts' and 'rebellions' alongside 'riots', 'civil war' and 'guer­
rilla warfare' - all on the same level of subcategories. Putting 
'type' and 'technique' in the same category, is like putting the 
chicken and the egg, all on the same stage In the causal process.
Before moving into our next area of "semantic incohe­
rence", a few words need to be said about the coup d'etat, and its 
war-time or post-war variation the putsch. Strictly speaking, coup 
d'etat (putsch) also refers to a particular technique of political 
violence - in which "the first tactical move is almost as a rule the 
seizure of the means of violence, of the military or of the police 
establishment" (Gross, 1958: 39). Or as Janos would contend, it 
involves "annihilation in the military arena". But unlike other 
techniques, coup d'etat possesses a definite political stand in that 
it indicates the targets of action and also its immediate goals.
Thus, when reference is made to a CPV characterized as a coup d'etat 
we are Immediately aware of the following Information:
Target: Existing personnel in the positions of authority 
such as President or King.
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(ii) Objective: Expulsion of such personnel and assumption of 
vacated positions by members of the coup.
(iil) Technique: Infiltration and occupation of a small but
critical segment of the state apparatus* which 
is then used to displace the authorities from 
the control of the remainder.
Riots, civil war, terrorism and guerrilla warfare have 
no such Independent characteristics. If not specified otherwise, 
riots, civil wars, terrorisms and guerrilla warfare do not indicate 
anything beyond their specific techniques, The point being made here 
is that, coup d'etat is more than a technique of violence - it is an 
independent mode of collective political violence with an immediate 
goal and strategy.
Therefore, one arena of terminological confusion in the 
classification schemes of CPV ensues from the inability to distinguish 
type from technique. Furthermore, this situation is aggravated since 
writers cannot or rather will not follow a standardized set of termi­
nology. Everyone has to come up with his/her own set of arbitrary 
definitions. As a result, in its most critical phase what one 
refers to as a technique (Example: Jano's category of Terrorism as an 
initial stage technique) the other refers to as a full fledged type 
of violent protest (Example: Oppenheimer's use of the category 'terro­
rism' ).
Our next source of terminological disarray results from 
the totally arbitrary use of such terms as 'revolutions', 'rebellions' 
and 'coup d'etat'. A general theoretical and historical survey of the 
extant literature on collective political violence by specialists and 
laymen alike, reveals that there Is a distinct difference between
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revolution, rebellion and coup d'etat, and that it is quite erroneous 
to use then as if they were Interchangeable,
On the basis of our extensive survey of the literature 
on CPV, we were able to discern a general idea, on which a majority of 
the social scientists agree about the generalized 'ideal-typical' 
form which these CPV's assumed namely, revolution, rebellion etc.
A revolution is generally believed to be based on the 
idea of bringing about fundamental change in the socio-economic and 
political strcture of the society. Significant changes in the pro­
perty system, in the distribution of power in the entire sub and 
super structure of society. Thus, it is contended that revolutions go 
beyond the mere substitution of personnel in the positions of autho­
rity, it goes beyond the restructuring of the authority system - it 
attempts to bring about changes in the power base. They are generally 
held to be mass phenomenon. They are, therefore, prolonged, violent 
crisis based mainly on the spontaneity of the masses rather than 
a priori planning by an elitist group.
There is a general tendency among writers to charac­
terize a rebellion, as a "revolutionary outbreak that has not yet 
succeeded" (Oppenheimer, 1969: 18). It is generally held that a 
rebellion is a rising of sufficient proportion to challenge the 
existing authority structure seriously, but without the capacity to 
create an alternate authority (Bell, 1976: 7). Therefore, according 
to these opinions, rebellions primarily imply failure. Since they do 
fail, it is very difficult to attribute specific goals and objectives 
to rebellions, "except through speculation". And since there are no
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guidelines for standard speculative procedures - It is understandable 
why researchers have come up with such divergent views on what rebel­
lions try to do. So, according to Arendt (1963) rebellions .... Mdo 
not indicate radical change .... but is a matter of only exchanging 
the person in authority." According to Kornhauser, (1964:142) they 
are, "ways of making demands on authority for the change of specific 
acts, rulers, structures of authority." On the other hand Lewis and 
Hartford (1974) contend that they are baBed on "economic grievances 
of the peasantry." The Encyclopeadia of the Social Sciences, consi­
ders rebellions as "uprising intended to effect territorial autonomy 
or independence." And last but not least, according to Russell 
(1974:56) rebellions are "violent power struggles in which the over­
throw of the regime is threatened." As we see there is little con­
sensus about the aims and objectives of a rebellion. In a situation 
like this, where there are no definite opinions about the idea of a 
CPV, we shall have to resort to other sources. As was indicated in 
the first chapter, whenever we are faced with a case in which there 
are considerable ambiguities about the objectives which the CPV is 
pursuing, we shall use the magnitude or intensity of the action as 
an indication of whether the authority structure is threatened or 
not. Following this recourse we can assert with a certain degree of 
caution that an uprising which is relatively significant in its pro­
portions but is susceptible to rapid suppression by more than regular 
apparatus of the government is a rebellion which desired to over­
throw the government. On the other hand one that was relatively 
insignificant in its proportions and quickly suppressed by normal
59
governmental apparatus, was a rebellion with limited, non-political 
aims. Therefore, the primary criterion identifying rebellions are 
the fact that they imply failure. According to Russell (1974), the 
most significant difference between revolutions and rebellions are 
the fact that revolutions refer to changes which are made possible 
by a successful rebellion. A rebellion which fails never makes way 
for a revolution, since no changes ensue from the process.
Contrary to the case of rebellion, there is very little 
dissensus over the nature of coup d ’etat. It is generally recognised 
as a forceful, violent and sudden overthrow of the persons in the 
positions of authority. It often involves a secretive well organized 
group whose sole Intention is to simply substitute the personnel in 
the positions of authority. The coup in Itself does not seek to 
reconstruct the country's fundamental political, economic or social 
structure - this might follow after the replacement has been carried 
out in the positions of authority. The coup in itself simply aims 
at exchanging persons in the positions of authority with others from 
Its own rank and file.
It was felt necessary to go into this consideration of 
these three types of CPV, revolution, rebellion, and coup d'etat - be­
cause this has demonstrated to us that they refer to quite exclusive 
patterns of collective political violence, and that it is highly 
erroneous to consider them interchangeable, or to handle the termino­
logy in a manner as to imply that they were Interchangeable.
The literature on collective political violence abounds 
with instances of such usage. For example, Johnson in his analysis
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continuously juggles the terms revolution and rebellion as If they 
were referring to the same type of CPV, Similarly, when It comes to 
qualifying his category of the Conspiratorial coup d'etat' - he 
refers to It as attempts at revolutionary change by a small elite.
But as we have just seen, a coup d'etat's sole purpose. Its immediate 
objective, is simply replacement. No apriori assumptions can be 
made about what happens after that. And whenever a coup d'etat 
brings to power a group of individuals who bring about fundamental, 
revolutionary changes in the sub and super structure of the society- 
in such instances the coup is simply regarded as a technique of vio­
lence, a means to an end. Example: The October coup in Russia in 
1917, which led to the realization of the revolution.
Similarly, Gross' use of the term 'revolution from 
above' to signify his category of collective political violence 
which utilizes the technique of coup d'etat - is technically erro­
neous. For, the coup d'etat does not necessarily imply revolutionary 
change in itself. It would be helpful at this point to recount 
Huntingtons’ classification of coup d'etat. He differentiated bet­
ween the 'governmental coup' and the 'revolutionary coup'. In 
situations where the coup overthrows the persons in the positions 
of power in order to establish those persons in authority who shall 
effect fundamental changes in society - in such instances the coup 
is a technique of revolutionary violence. However, whenever the coup 
simply exchanges the personnel in the positions of authority with 
members from its own rank and file, without effecting fundamental 
changes, in these situations coup d'etat is an Independent mode of 
collective political violence or according to Huntingtons'
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classification - it is a governmental coup.
The term*palace revolution' as used by so many writers 
(Gross* Lasswell and Kaplan, Hagoplan) Is equally unnecessary and 
misleading. Since it never implies any fundamental changes in the 
social structure. Palace revolutions Involve the removal of the 
president or the king - in this situation the most appropriate and 
adequate (though less dramatic) terminology is coup d'etat.
Criteria For Satisfactory Typology
A typological scheme to be considered adequate must 
satisfy the following criteria:- (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:357)
(1) Inclusiveness - A proper typological scheme must have
empirical cases to justify each of its 
categories. Nothing theoretical can be 
said about empty categories.
(2) Exhaustlveness -The categories must be exhaustive enough
to accomodate the varied manifestations 
of CPV. The larger the number of cases 
in a non-category, the less adequate is 
the classification.
(3) Unambivalence and unambiguity - "Typologies have the
purpose of providing descriptive infor­
mation in short-hand ways. They can 
hardly achieve this goal if the classes 
of which they consist do not have pre­
cisely defined traits - that is, are 
'ambiguous*. If the definitions of types 
make it difficult to determine whether 
a case belongs to one class or another, 
which is the essence of ambiguity, des­
cribing cases by the names of classes 
conveys more noise than Information. ... 
From this objective of classification it 
also follows that classes in a good typo­
logy must not be 'ambivalent'.
(Eckstein and Gurr,1975(357-358)
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The most appropriate way In which the adequacy of the 
existing typological schemes surveyed here can be ascertained In 
terms of the criteria mentioned above - is by applying them to 
empirical cases of CPV and to determine how far they approximate 
the real world phenomena.
So far as 'inclusiveness' is concerned, it is quite 
fair to say that most of the categories evolved by the social scien­
tists in their respective classification schemes approximate to a 
satisfactory degree instances of CPV in the real world. This is 
Indicated by the fact that each category is usually qualified by an 
empirical example.
However, determining the 'exhaustiveness1 of particu­
lar typological schemes is purely an empirical exercise. We can 
simply speculate, on the basis of their theoretical soundness, at 
this point. As indicated before, most of these typological schemes 
are not based on multiple attributes. They are usually based on the 
accentuation of one, two, or three attributes. It is highly unlike­
ly, therefore, that typologies with such a limited variable base can 
adequately accomodate or account for even slightly atypical cases. 
Classification schemes based on multiple variables can account for 
the degree to which the 'typical' categories fit the 'atypical* 
empirical cases. However, since all the schemes discussed above fall 
to to put forward a multivariate model of classification - it Is 
highly unlikely that they will satisfy the criterion of 'exhaustive­
ness '.
So far as clarity and definitiveness in the terminology
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Is concerned - our views were expressed In the previous section.
Our analysis upto this point has revealed that we are 
still far from a satisfactory typology of collective political vio­
lence. It is rather surprising that given the incredible mass of 
literature on the phenomenon of political violence, the typological 
schemes do not even partially exhaust the relevant material avai­
lable.
The typology which is being developed here, will be 
used in an attempt to correct the deficiencies revealed in the pre­
vious schemes. Most Importantly, it is based on a multivariate model 
of collective political violence. Moreover, we apply the 'ideal 
typical' model to a set of empirical cases of CPV - to determine 
how far they resemble the ideal and to what degree they deviate from 
the ideal.
In the rest of this chapter, we shall attempt to 
develop the 'ideal typical* test model of CPV.
The Test Model Of CPV
The multivariate model which we introduced in the first 
chapter forms the basis of our 'test typological model of collective 
political violence*. Logically the twelve variables and their forty 
different variations can be combined in N number of ways. In order 
to develop an exhaustive typology of CPV, it might be considered 
imperative to Include all the N combinations. However, in view of 
the fact that the forty sub-variables could be combined in almost an
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Infinite number of ways - such an approach had obviously to be 
abandoned. For the purposes of simplicity, plausibility and genera- 
lizability, we have limited ourselves to formulating a test model 
of CPV by incorporating into our scheme only a certain number of 
multivariate combinations. We have chosen five such combinations, 
on the basis of the assumption that each of these combinations 
approximate a particular type of CPV in the real world more than 
others.
On the basis of our critique of the extant literature 
on CPV, we can generally conceptualize CPV's such as revolutions, 
rebellions, coup d'etat, revolt, and so on - in terms of combina­
tion of certain values on the multiple variables. As we have seen 
earlier in this chapter, social scientists generally agree on the 
overall characteristics that distinguish between revolution, rebel­
lion, coup, people's war and so on. They might disagree on the 
Intricacies involved in each of these cases, but so far as a general 
characterization is concerned - there is considerable consensus.
Our familiarity with the literature, exposure to historical accounts, 
and basic intuition, have provided us with clues about their typical 
characteristics. These clues would aid us in deriving the 'ideal 
typical* combinations of the multivariables for the 'test model' of 
CPV. In developing the typology of CPV, therefore, we shall follow 
these characterizations while attributing certain values on the 
variables as typical of the multivariate combinations idealizing 
varied types of collective political violence. Each type of CPV 
can be represented in terms of a combination of the multiple
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variables. Example: Combination 1, may reflect the characteristics of 
a 'revolution', combination 2 may reflect the characteristics of a 
'coup d'etat', and so on. The five multivariate combinations of CPV 
which we develop here constitute ideal types, and as such rarely 
exist in their pure form. However, as we discussed in our general 
critique of typologies - a typology to be considered satisfactory 
must be inclusive i.e. - it must have certain empirical cases to 
Justify each category. If in the subsequent analysis, that Is,when 
this typology is applied to a set of empirical cases, we end up with 
a heap of residual cases which cannot be satisfactorily categorized 
under any of the categories of this model scheme, we shall conclude 
that the categories of this 'ideal typical' typology were in fact 
invalid. For, the larger the number of cases in a non-category, the 
less adequate is the classification scheme.
In developing the 'test model' these steps shall
be followed:
First, the mode of collective political violence which we 
contend best typifies the particular combination of multiple varia­
bles is identified.
Second, a substantive definition of this particular CPV is 
offered, which essentially is a synthesis of the elements which 
authors on collective political violence identify as crucial In 
determining its form and character.
Third, the multivariate combination derived on the basis of 
the definition and its implications - is presented.
Lastly, the entire set of multivariate combinations and
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the CPV'a which they characterize are presented In the form of a 
teat model of collective political violence.
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Conclusion
In this chapter the classificatory schemes developed 
by various authors on collective political violence were reviewed.
A general critique was presented on the adequacy of such typologies. 
On the basis of the multivariate model developed earlier In the work, 
and the characterizations which writers on political violence 
attribute to the various modes of collective political violence, 
the test model of political violence Is developed. This model 
presents a summary description of five types of collective political 
violence, In terms of their variable characterizations The Multi­
variate combinations and the test model are presented in the next 
few pages.
The adequacy of this test model, its degree of 
resemblance to the empirical categories of collective political vio­
lence, will be determined later in the work, by applying it to a 
set of empirical cases of CPV.
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The Multivariate Combinations
Combination 0 1 CPV 1
Exemplar
Definition
Revolution
Revolutions go beyond simple substitution of 
personnel in the positions of authority. They 
usually involve substantial and fundamental 
change in the socio-economic and the political 
structure of the society. It, generally, is a 
prolonged, elite directed, violent crisis 
based on the spontaneity of the masses rather 
than a-priori planning.
Codesheet of CPV 1
Structural Variables
(a) Ideas - Structural/transitional
(b) Strategy - Combinational
(c) Class Character - Petit Bourgeois/Prole­
tarian
(d) Leadership Structure - Centralized/
Decentralized
(e) Leadership Class - Petit Bourgeois/Prole­
tarian
(f) Organization - Spontaneous/Semi organized
Extent Variables
(a) Participation - Considerable (1000 +)
(b) Duration - More than six months
Week to six months 
Less than a week
(c) Amount of violence - Considerable
(d) Area - Disturbance in capital city, dis­
turbance engulfing the entire 
country
Extraneous Variables
(a) Government response - violent/positive
(b) Armed force disloyalty - High
Example Russia, 1917
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Combination
Exemplar
Definition 
Codesheet of
2 CPV 2
Rebellion (Synonyms - Uprising, Insurrection, 
Commune)
Typically a CPV classified as a rebellion Is a 
spontaneous, violent, armed uprising of suffi­
cient proportion to challenge seriously the 
existing regime, but that which has not suc- 
ceded yet and is susceptible to rapid suppre- 
sion by normal procedures of internal security
CPV 2
Structural Variables
(a) Ideas - Exchange/Structural
(b) Strategy - Open
(c) Class Character - Petit Bourgeois/Prole­
tarian
<d) Leadership Structure - Decentralized
(e) Leadership Class - Petit BourReois/Prole-
tarlan
(f) Organization - Spontaneous
Extent Variables
(a) Participation - Some/considerable
(b) Duration - Less than a week
Week to six months
(c) Violence - Some/considerable
(d) Area - Provincial/Country
Extraneous Variables
(a) Government Response - Violent
(b) Armed Force Disloyalty - Nil
Example Parris Commune, 1871
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Combination
Exemplar
Definition
Codesheet of
3 CPV 3
Coup d'etat (putsch)
The coup d'etat Is a forceful violent and 
sudden overthrow of the persons in the posi­
tions of authority. It involves quite often a 
secretive well organized military group which 
simply alms at substituting an elite by other 
members of the elite.
CPV 3
Structural Variables
(a) Ideas - Exchange
(b) Strategy - Conspiratorial/Combinational
(c) Class Character - Petit Bourgeois/Bourgeois
(d) Leadership Structure - Centralized
( e )  Leadership Class - Bourgeois/Petit
Bourgeois
(f) Organization - Organized
Extent Variables
(a) Participation - Few/Some/Considerable
(b) Duration - Less than a week
(c) Violence - Minimum/Some
(d) Area - Capital City
Extraneous Variables
(a) Government Response - Positive/Violent
(b) Armed Force Disloyalty - High
Example Egypt, 1952
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Combination
Exemplar
Definition
Codesheet of
4 CPV 4
People's War (Peasant War)
People's Wars usually espouse fundamental 
changes in the socio-economic and political 
structure of the society. Its principal parti­
cipants are the peasants, and Its centerstage 
the country side. By employing protracted 
guerrilla warfare, Its final strategy is based 
on the Idea of encirclement of the cities by 
the rebel rural base areas, and the final cap­
ture or 'strangulation' of the city
CPV 4
Structural Variables
(a) Ideas - Structural
(b) Strategy - Combinational/Open
(c) Class Character - Peasant/Petit Bourgeois
(d) Leadership Structure - Centralized/
Decentralized
(e) Leadership Class - Peasant/Petit Bourgeois
(f) Organization - Organized/Semiorganlzed
Spontaneous
Extent Variables
(a) Participation - Considerable
(b) Duration - Week to six months/Slx months +
(c) Violence - Considerable
(d) Area - Entire Country
Extraneous Variables
(a) Government Response - Violent/Positive
(b) Armed Force Disloyalty - Nil/Low
Example China, 1949
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Combination
Exemplar
Definition 
Codesheet of
5 CPV 5
Revolt (Peasant Rebellion, Peasant Uprising, 
Jacquerie)
Revolt or peasant rebellion is a spontaneous 
violent armed rising of the peasantry, which 
can challenge seriously the existing regime, 
but that which is susceptible to rapid suppre- 
sion
CPV 5
Structural Variables
(a) Ideas - Exchange/Structural
(b) Strategy - Combinational/Open
(c) Class Character - Peasant
(d) Leadership Structure - Decentralized
(e) Leadership Class - Peasant
(f) Organization - Spontaneous
Extent Variables
(a) Participation - Some/Considerable
(b) Duration - Less than a week/Week to six
months
(c) Violence - Some/Considerable
(d) Area - Provincial/Country
Extraneous Variables
(a) Government Response - Violent
(b) Armed Force Disloyalty - Nil
Example Autumn Harvest Uprising in China, 1927
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Guide to the Ideal Typical Test Model of CPV 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
Ideas - 1. Exchange of personnel in positions of power
2. Constitutional Change
3. Structural Chage
4. Transitional - (Ideas chage from one of the
above to the other)
Strategy - 1. Open
2. Conspiratorial
3. Combination of 1 and 2
Class - 1. Bourgeois
2. Petit Bourgeois
3. Proletariat
4. Peasant
Leadership 1. Centralized
(Structure) 2. Decentralized
Leadership 1. Bourgeois
(Class) 2 » Petit Bourgeois
3. Proletariat
4. Peasant
Organization 1. Spontaneous
2. Semi Organized
3. Organized
EXTENT VARIABLES
Participation 1. Few (Less than 500)
2. Some (501 - 1000)
3. Considerable (1000 +)
Duration 1. Less than a week
2. Week to six months
3. Six months +
Violence 1. Minimum (Less than 50 casualties)
2. Some (50 - 150)
3. Considerable (More than 150)
Area 1. Locally concentrated
2. Disturbance in a larger province, Important city
3. Disturbance In capital city, entire country
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EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES
Government 1.
Response 2.
3.
Armed Force 1.
Disloyalty 2.
3.
Positive (Indicating success of CPV)
Nonviolent
Violent
Nil
Low
High
Table 12
Ideal Typical Test Model Of Collective Political Violence
Structural Variables Extent Variables
Extraneous
Variables
Ideas Stra- Class 
tegy
LS 1 LS 2 Organi­
zation
Parti­
cipa­
tion
Dura­
tion
Vio- Area 
lence
G.R AFD
1 2  3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2  1 2 3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 1 2  3 1 2  3 1 2  3 1 2  3 1 2  3
CPV 1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Revolution
CPV 2
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Rebellion
CPV 3
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Coup D'etat
CPV 4
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
People's War
CPV 5
4- 4. +  + + +  + +  + + + +  + + + +  + +
Revolt
Chapter III 
The Methodological Procedure
Introduction
This chapter Is divided into three major subdivisions: 
In the first part we elaborate the procedure which was 
followed in order to develop a universe of collective political vio­
lence. Following this the rudiments of the sampling procedure are 
discussed. And finally the sample is presented.
The second part deals with the multivariate model outlined 
earlier in the work. Here we operationalize the variables which con­
stitute the multivariate model in a way so as to make them amenable 
to quantitative analysis.
Lastly the statistical technlquef which we shall use to 
analyze the data in order to discern patterns (groupings) of collec­
tive political violence, will be discussed. The statistical tech­
nique of cluster analysis is regarded as the most appropriate proce­
dure to group individuals or objects into categories.
76
77
The Sampling Procedure and Sample
The Universe
The universe as designated here refers to all cases 
of collective political violence which have occurred in the first 
seventy years of the present century, in all countries which were 
members of the United Nations in 1973. (A total of 135 countries).
United Nations membership was used, since it ensures 
a certain degree of homogeneity in the sample in terms of interna­
tional political status of countries in which CPV occurs. And as 
was indicated in the first chapter, the definition of collective 
political violence requires that they occur in countries which have 
achieved independent political status. UN membership assures us that 
this criterion is being met. In the case of countries which once 
were under foreign domination, only those cases of CPV have been con­
sidered which occur after the country achieved independent status.
Following Russell (1974: 70) the universe of CPV was 
created by consulting the historical sections in the Encyclopeadia 
Brlttanica (1975) of all these countries. While consulting the 
Encyclopeadia Brlttanlca (EB) we made note of any reference which in­
dicated a violent political upheaval, for which an approximate date 
could be Inferred. This exercise resulted in a list of 205 possible 
cases of collective political violence, in 135 countries between 
1900-1975. This, however, did not constitute our final universe. A
lot more Investigation had to be done before the 'final universe' was
compiled with some degree of certainty that the cases met all our
definitional criteria of a successful or unsuccessful CPV.
In the second stage of our universe selection process, 
each of the 205 cases were subjected to detailed scrutiny. Here we 
attempted to derive further Information on each of these cases from 
(1) New International Year Book; and (11) The Annual Register of World 
Events. These yearbooks were selected instead of others due to the 
relatively extensive Information which we found on most countries In 
them, Usually Information from one had to be suuplemented with Infor­
mation from the other. As can be Imagined this was the most time 
consuming endeavour In the entire project. This second stage proce­
dure doubly ensured that all cases In the universe were valid so far 
as our definitional criteria were concerned.
As a result of our second stage examination of all the 
cases of CPV, a number of the original 205 had to be discarded:
(1) Whenever further Investigation revealed that the CPV waB 
essentially 'nonviolennt* and 'bloodless' - since this did not fit 
our criterion of violent political action. Example; Nonviolent Coup 
In Mall, 1968.
(2) Whenever sources indicated that the violence was seces-
sionlstic, or was primarily racial, ethnic, religion or territory
oriented - In which the existing authority Is not overthrown, only
the establishment of an alternate seat of government along acceptable
*
racial, ethnic, religion or territorial lines Is attempted. Example: 
Nigeria, 1966.
However, when such racial, ethnic or religious upheavals overlap with 
political violence in such a way that the existing regime la threatened 
then In that case the Instance of CPV in the universe would not be dis­
carded.
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(3) Whenever it Is Indicated that a substantial amount of 
foreign troops were Involved either to strengthen the CPV or to sup­
press it. Example : Nicaragua, 1928.
(4) Whenever the CPV occurs before the country in question 
attained political Independence. Example: Malaysia, 1948.
(5) Whenever sources indicate that despite substantial 
violence there was no reason to believe that the regime was threa­
tened, Example: Indonesia, 1965.
(6) Whenever information was so Inadequate that no commit­
ment could be made about the validity of the case one way or the 
other.
After we had completed this second stage in the com­
pilation of the universe, quite a few of the original 205 cases were 
discarded, leaving us with a final universe of 120 cases of collec­
tive political violence, which to our best knowledge fulfilled all 
the definitional criteria of CPV.
Before the sample could be drawn another task had to 
be completed. This Involved dividing the final universe into two 
groups on the basis of their outcome. One group consisted of all 
successful cases of CPV, i.e., those which succeeded In overthrowing 
the regime; the other consisted of those which did not succeed. 
Contrary to expectations, the sample split up into almost equal num­
bered subaanples. The subsample of successful CPVs was 61 and the 
subsample of unsuccessful CPVs was 59. The universe was divided into 
successful and unsuccessful CPVs In order to facilitate the drawing 
of the sample in a way such that the intervening variables deter-
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mining outcome can be discernible.
The Sample
In order to ensure:
a) representativeness in our sample of CPV in countries with 
different levels of socio-economic development and professing different 
ideologies; and
b) subsequent control for variations which can result from 
having different levels of development and pursuing different ideo­
logies .
a proportional stratified sampling procedure was decided upon.
In a proportional stratified sample the first step Is 
to divide all units in the population into categories or 'strata* in 
terms of a pre-designed criterion or a set of criteria and then draw 
Independent samples from each category in proportion to their relative 
strength.
Due to the nature of our 'universe*, attempts at
stratifying had to start by forming categories of the countries in
which CPV occurs. Once this task was accomplished, Independent samples
of CPV were drawn from each of these categories of countries.
In designating the criterion for stratifying the
nations, we have been Influenced by two sets of facts.
Horowitz's theory on international stratification and
the 'three worlds of development* gave us an obvious clue about the
fundamental divisions in the world. Horowitz's theory explains:
the interaction and interpretation of the three main
sources of economic, political and social power in the
world today; the First world of the United States and 
Its Western allies, the Second world of the Soviet 
Union and Its Eastern Bloc allies, and the Third world
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of non-aligned, but variously committed nations of
Latin America, Asia and Africa, (Horowitz, 1966; vli).
U Thant's contention that the General Assembly is a 
'realistic representation of the present day world' (quoted in Alker 
and Russet, 1965: 2) indicated that the pattern of international stra­
tification is reflected in the United Nations.
Alker and Russets' World Politics in the General 
Assembly provided definite proofs for such a criterion. Their factor 
analysis of Issues and alignments in the General Assembly yielded cer­
tain groupings which almost converge with Jalee's (1969) division of 
the world on the basis of the predominant economic systems and levels 
of economic development In different countries.
The primary purpose of Alker and Russetts* research 
was to uncover alignments of nations In their stand on main and dis­
tinctive issues brought before the General Assembly. By factor ana­
lyzing the 'roll calls' on different Issues In the Assembly and plot­
ting the factor scores in terms of a graph, Alker and Russett show the 
degree of cohesiveness of member nations in the different groupings 
and alsothe direction of dissent of deviant members. Their analysis 
uncovers a rather distinct east-west, north-south alliance (Fig. 1).
The plotting of factor score suggests a definite 
north-west, north-east, south-west and south-east alliance. The only 
exceptions appear to be Uruguay, Ethiopia and Guatemala. Nevertheless, 
the existence of issue alignments in the United Nations seems too 
obvious to be denied.
Jalee's analysis of 'Third World in World Economy' 
reveals similar divisions. Jalee bases his division primarily on
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Source: Alker, H. R. and Bruce M. Russett. World Politics In
the General Assembly, 1965: 50.
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demographic data, data on indices of economic development, data on 
indices of social development of the countries of the world. Jalee's 
categories refer to the distinctions among the countries also in terms 
of differences in the socio-economic systems. He makes, this distinc­
tion by dividing the world into countries with planned economies 
(socialist) and countries with market economies (capitalist), and by 
sub-dividing the latter Into developed countries with market economies 
and developing countries with market economies. This research yields 
the following groupings:
COUNTRIES FORMING THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM
U.S.S.R.. the People's Democracies of Europe (including 
Yugoslavia), China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam and 
Cuba.
COUNTRIES FORMING THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM
U.S.A., Canada, Europe (excluding the U.S.S.R and the 
People's Democracies), Japan, Israel, Australia and New 
Zealand.
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. OR THE THIRD WORLD
America (excluding the U.S.A., Canada, and Cuba), the 
whole of Africa, Asia (excluding the socialist countries, 
Japan and Israel), Oceania (excluding Australia and New 
Zealand).
Jalee's grouping of countries forming the socialist 
system (excluding China) converges with Alker and Russetts' N.E. 
alliance, whereas the developed countries of the capitalist system 
coverges with N.W. alliance, the entire Southern alliance coverges 
with Jalee's developing countries of the capitalist system.
It should be noted that Alker and Russetts' work was carried out 
before China was admitted to the UN - hence the discrepancy.
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The entire point In discussing Alker and Russett, and 
Jalee’s work has been to prove the point that Horowitz's theory of 
International stratification is reflected In the Issue alignments In 
the United Nations, as U Thant had contended, Proving this point was 
necessary since the criterion for stratifying our universe of CPV, as 
noted earlier had to start by dividing the countries In the United 
Nations Into groups or categories. And our criterion for forming these 
categories was based upon the Idea of 'Three Worlds of Development'.
On the basis of Alker and Russett and Jalee's work we divide the mem­
ber nations Into three categories:
1. The First World Countries - This category comprises of the developed
capitalist countries, U.S.A., Canada, Western European
countries, Japan, Israel, Australia and New Zealand,
2. The Second World Countries - This category comprises of the socia­
list countries of the world. These countries are U.S.S.R.,
China, the East European countries, North Korea, Vietnam and 
Cuba.
3. The Third World Countries - This category comprises of the deve­
loping countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania.
Once these divisions were made, independent samples of 
CPV were drawn from each of these categories In proportion to the 
number of countries In each of these divisions.
It was expected that such a sampling procedure would
ensure:
a) representativeness of CPV in countries with different levels of eco­
nomic development and pursuing different ideologies;
b) control for intervening variables which can result from different 
levels of economic development and different economic systems.
In keeping with our intention about drawing a propor­
tional stratified random sample, we first had to stratify the universe
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in terms of the three categories identified; CPVs in the First world 
countries, CPVs in the Second world countries and CPVs in the Third 
world countries. By following this procedure we came up with 17 
successful CPVs and 25 unsuccessful CPVs in the First world countries;
11 successful and 6 unsuccessful CPVs In the Second world countries and 
33 successful and 28 unsuccessful CPVs in the Thirl world countries.
Following this procedure the sample was drawn. Ori­
ginally a rather ambitious sample of n ■ 60 was planned in which 30 
would be successful and 30 would be unsuccessful. However, in view of 
the disproportionate amount of time that would be needed to gather data 
for 60 cases of CPV - it was decided to cut the original size in half 
and thus have a sample size n *30 (15 successful and 15 unsuccessful).
The total sample of n ■ 30 (or subsample 1, n - 15 and 
subsample 2, n » 15) had to be drawn from the three stratas of countries 
in proportion to the total number of CPVs in each. Drawing a propor­
tional random sample was necessary, since, otherwise there was a sig­
nificant probability that due to the overabundance of CPVs in the Third 
world countries, the final sample might be made up totally of CPVs in 
those countries. Therefore, It was decided that the samples would be 
drawn in such a manner so as to ensure proportional representation for 
each of the groupings of countries. Subsequently in each of the 
samples, 3-4 cases were from First world countries, 2 cases from 
Second world countries and 9-10 cases from Thirld world countries were 
drawn.
The next step was the actual drawing of the samples. 
Numbers were assigned to each case and a simple random sample from a
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table of random numbers was drawn for each strata.
After the two final subsamples of collective political 
violence were drawn, each case was subsequently studied in great depth 
to acquire the necessary Information. At this point we realized that 
there was still a possibility that one or more of the cases In the 
final sample might turn out to be Invalid - and we kept the possibility 
of replacing these cases with other more valid ones - open. Fortunately 
none of the cases In the final sample were invalidated as a result of 
further research. Information for a few cases in the sample (espe­
cially Honduras 1933 and 1956) was rather insufficient. However, it 
was not felt that this plagued our research disproportionately. Sub­
sequently the cases were retained In the final sample.
Random Samples of CPV 
Successful Unsuccessful
1. Portugal 1915 1. Germany 1919
2. Germany 1918 2. Greece 1935
3. France 1934 3. Spain 1934
4. Cuba 1958 4. Japan 1936
5. Russia 1917 5. Rumania 1907
6. Turkey 1908 6. Bulgaria 1923
7. Brazil 1930 7. Ethiopia 1960
8. Iraq 1958 8. Thailand 1933
9. Mexico 1910 9. El Salvador 1932
10. Afghanistan 1929 10. Peru 1932
11. Paraguay 1936 11. Honduras 1933
12. Haiti 1946 12. Turkey 1925
13. Yemen 1962 13. Panama 1958
14. Ghana 1966 14. Paraguay 1947
15. Bolivia 1952 15. Honduras 1956
The date Indicates the approximate time when the CPV succeeded or was 
contained.
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After the final sample was drawn, the next task was to 
go through as many historical accounts on each of these cases as was 
deemed necessary to acquire data on each of the variables - specified 
in the multivariate model. In all the cases, information obtained from 
one source was verified with Information from others. In case of con­
flict, information supported by majority of the accounts was usually 
used. By following this procedure of using substantive verification 
from multiple sources it was hoped to overcome the problem of relia­
bility of data derived from secondary sources - a problem which plagues 
most comparative historical research.
Operationalization of the multiple variables
As Indicated earlier, the multivariate model developed 
in this work consists of three sets of variables, which are, In fact, 
the building blocks of CPV. They give each type of CPV its particular 
form and distinctiveness. These three sets of variables are:
(1) The structural variables,
(2) The extent variables, 
and (3) The extraneous variables.
In this section each of these sets would be elaborated, 
and the subvariables contained therein would be defined - in a manner 
that would make them observable in real world situations and amenable 
to quantitative testing.
Structural Variables
Structural variables refer to that set of variables 
which determine the primary form and character of CPV indigenously.
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The variables included in this set are:
1. Ideas;
2. Strategy;
3. Class Character;
4. Class and Structure of Leadership;
5. Degree of planning.
Each of these variables are delineated below:
Ideas
The ideas of CPV are the reason why CPVs come into 
existence in the first place. They delineate the objectives and goals 
of CPV, They provide ’guidance and Justification’ (Leiden and Schmitt,
1968: 97) for CPV. We prefer the term 'ideas' rather than ’ideology’ -
because we felt that the term 'ideas' was on a lower level of abstrac­
tion - than 'ideology'. By 'ideas' we refer to the exact changes which 
CPV desires in specific aspects of the social structure, Whereas 
'ideologies' can be realized more in terms of a congeries of phrases, 
rhetoric, vague ideas and symbols rather than a coherent guide to poli­
tical action, 'ideas' are an inherent part of 'ideology' from which it 
originates. However, it is easier to grasp the conceptual framework 
of exact ideas (such as overthrow of president), than the nuances of 
abstract ideological notions (such as eschatology). Therefore, for the 
purposes of empirical research the term 'ideas' was much preferred over 
'Ideology'.
The ideas of CPV can undertake either of the following
forms:
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(a) CPV can aim at exchanging personnel In the positions
of power with candidates provided by the rank and file of CPV. In such 
cases, CPV simply alms at replacing persons in the positions of autho­
rity. It does not desire any changes In the authority structure per se 
only in who occupies them.
(b) CPV can also aim at bringing about constitutional changes. 
In these instances CPV aspires not only to exchange personnel in the 
positions of authority but also to bring about major changes in the 
structure of authority, I.e., In the organization of power; such as a 
change from Monarchy to Republic or the restoration of a constitution.
(c) CPV can strive towards bringing about structural change 
in society. In such cases, major reconstructing of the old order Is 
intended, In terms of changes in the systems of property and power 
distribution. CPVs with such Ideas aspire not only towards exchanging 
personnel In the positions of power/authority, or changing the autho­
rity structure, but also try to restructure the power base.
(d) The ideas of CPV can also take on a transitional form.
In such instances the ideas of CPV change from one of the above to the 
other. This is also the case when collective non-political violence 
(such as food riots) transforms into collective political violence.
Strategy
The startegy of CPV Involves the techniques used to 
achieve the Ideas which CPV sets out for itself. This study, as was 
specified earlier, Is limited to only those Instances of CPV which
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uses violence as a technique for achieving Its goals. We, therefore, 
exclude all those cases of collective political action which Involves 
non-violent techniques/strategies.
The strategies Involved In CPV can be braoadly classi­
fied Into techniques which Involve open Interaction between Insurgents 
and incumbents, and the other, which Involves conspiratorial or secre­
tive manoeuvres,
(a) The startegy of open violence usually takes the 
form of rioting (violent, disorganized, disorder - involving looting, 
destruction of property and injury to persons) and/or civil war (inter­
nal war between two segments of army and/or populace; one loyal to the 
regime, the other a rebel). In these forms of open violence, the Insur­
gents are Involved In direct, bloody confrontation with the armed
forces of the Incumbents.
(b) Conspiratorial techniques of CPV represent "orga­
nized conflict behavior; I.e., behavior that is planned with definite 
objectives and methods In mind" (Rummel quoted In Bwy, 1968: 209).
These activities are also generally associated with a high degree of 
violence. Three specific conspiratorial techniques can be Identified: 
coup d'etat, terror and guerrilla warfare.
(i) The technique of coup d'etat Involves sudden, swift 
seizing, and usually killing, of the political elite. It also Indi­
cates Infiltration, penetration of critical structural points (example: 
military barracks, radio station, airport) in the state apparatus, 
which is then used to displace the government from the control of the 
remainder.
(li) Terror includdes assassinations, kidnapping, boobing 
and sabotage Intended against the personnel and Instruments of the 
regime,
(ill) The essence of Guerrilla Warfare is laid down by Mao
Tse Tung &967: 82) where he writes:
"guerrilla warfare Is a protracted struggle, and the enemy 
is defeated more by attrition and demoralization than by 
decisive military confrontation",
Wrting about the essential tactic of guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse Tung
contends:
"the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps we harass 
the enemy tires we attack; the enemy retreats we pursue"
Guerrilla warfare is always a technique employed by the objectively 
weaker Insurgents agalnstly the objectively stronger incumbents. Thus, 
they avoid positional warfare and the establishment of fixed battle 
lines and offers battle only 'when it will produce quick and favorable 
results for the guerrilla forces'.
(c) Strategy of CPV can also take the form of combi­
national tactic in which a combination of open and conspiratorial 
techniques Is used.
Class Character
It Is possible to classify CPV on the basis of the 
class character of Its participants. While there Is ambiguity Involved 
in the concept of class , we have no intention of getting Involved In 
a discussion of the pros and the cons of using one definition over the 
other. In the light of the fact that this study adopts a conflict
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model of society, It Is considered appropriate to use 'class' from a 
Marxian perspective. Besides, the Marxian class model is comprehen­
sive enough to accomodate both capitalistic and pre-capitalistlc 
societies. On the basis of the contention that the class of a person 
is determined by his/her relationship to the means of production, or in 
terms of his/her position in the social relations of production - a 
model of stratification is adopted in which is society is divided among 
the following classes;
*
(i) The Bourgeoisie - This class includes the major controllers 
of capital (big industrialists, bankers, owners of large enterprises), 
controllers of the land, the upper echelons of the ruling class and 
top ranking army/military officers with access and considerable influ­
ence in the decision making process.
(ii) The Upper Petit Bourgeoisie - This class is comprised of 
westernized intellectuals, civil service and white collar employees, 
western oriented merchants ('compradors', both native and foreign), 
small landowners, officials of traditional pre-western bureaucracies, 
the clergy, proprietors of enterprises, managerial and professional 
groups, and middle ranking army officers, such as Lieutenant, Captain, 
Major, Colonel.
(ill) The Lower Petit Bourgeoisie - This class consists of the 
artisans, small local merchants, local tribal leaders, prosperous 
peasants, lower white collar employees (mostly clerical and sales
a
Information on the constituents of each class, based on CHIROT's 
(1977) comparable exposition.
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persons), trade union leaders, middle noncommissioned army personnel - 
such as corporal, sergeant,
(iv) Proletariat - The constituents in this class are the blue- 
collar workers in the industries and mines and the lowest echelons in 
the army, and the lower service workers, such as servants and janitors.
(v) Peasantry - Tenants or landless peasants, farm labourers, 
plantation workers make up this class.
Collective political violence can result from the par­
ticipation of any of these classes, singly or in combination with other 
classes.
Leadership Structure
The leadership structure of CPV can either be centra­
lized or decentralized.
(1) A CPV is considered as having centralized leadership when a 
single center of power, in terms of person(s) or group(s) can be 
identified (Gamson, 1975: 93).
(11) In the instance where such a power center in terms of per- 
son(s) or group(s) cannot be identified, the leadership structure of 
CPV shall be regarded as decentralized.
Leadership Class
The character of CPV is also determined by the class 
origins of its leaders. The leaders of CPV could emerge from any of
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the classes designated earlier:
(I) Bourgeoisie
(II) Upper Petlr Bourgeoisie 
(ill) Lower Petit Bourgeoisie
(iv) Proletariat
(v) Peasantry
Organization
Organization implies systematic, aprlorl planning and 
coordination of activities before the CPV ensues. CPVs can be differen­
tiated in terms of this variable. Thus we could have:
(1) CPVs which display high level of organization. CPVs 
are considered organized when a centralized leadership is Indicated, 
along with prior planning of strategy and targets of action, coordi­
nation of activities of large number of people, and occasionally the 
existence of a written manifesto of its ideas.
(II) or CPVs which are semi-organized, when the above con­
ditions for organization are satisfied only partially.
(III) or CPVs which are unorganized/spontaneous. In such 
cases action is totally uncoordinated and largely spontaneous. A 
central power center cannot be identified ; neither are there any 
indications of prior planning nor coordination of action.
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Extent Variables
The extent variables measure the extent and Intensity 
of CPV. In evaluating the scale of the extent variables, we have 
adopted an index comparable to the one evolved by Russell (1974: 69).
(a) Participation
1 - few (Less than 500)
2 - some (501 - 1000)
3 - considerable (1000 + )
(b) Duration
1 ■ less than a week 
2 - 1  week to six months 
3 ■ more than six months
(c) Amount of violence
1 * minimum (less than 50 casualties)
2 - some (50 - 150)
3 ■ considerable (more than 150)
(d) Geographic Area
1 ■ locally concentrated (e.g., rural country)
2 * disturbance in a large province, important city, or
a number of rural counties
3 ■ disturbance in capital city, several large provinces
disturbance engulfing the entire country.
Extraneous Variables
The third set of variables which distinguish one CPV 
from the other by determining their different potential and outcome, 
are the extraneous variables. The variables under this set are;
(1) The Government Response Variables 
and (ii) The Armed Force Disloyalty Variables
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The government response variable determines the 
various types of government response, which CPV calls forth.
(a) Government response could take the positive form of 
resignation, abdication, dismissal, dissolution of the personnel In 
the positions of authority. This response Is concommltant to 'success' 
of CPV.
(b) Governement can respond negatively - that is by trying 
to contain CPV, Such negative responses could either be nonviolent, 
or violent. In case of nonviolent response, the government proclaims 
a state of emergency, martial law, or expatriates the key individuals 
in CPV.
(c) Government's efforts at repressing CPVs can also take 
violent forms. In such cases, government undertakes such actions as 
arrests, retributions, executions, counter-insurgency methods to 
repress CPV.
Armed Force Disloyalty
The variable, armed force disloyalty has been incor­
porated in our multivariate model, since it is considered very impor­
tant in determining the potential and eventual outcome of CPV. Armed 
force disloyalty can manifest in the following degrees:
(a) Armed force disloyalty could be nil. In this case the
armed forces are absolutely loyal to the government. They have no
overt sympathies for the rebel cause.
*
Positive from the perspective of the participants in the CPV.
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(b) Armed force disloyalty is considered low, when the 
entire/partial armed forces are unwilling to fight for the regime. 
Armed force disloyalty Is also considered low, when less than 20 X 
of the entire armed force flghtB on the side of the rebels.
(c) Armed force disloyalty Is considered high, when the 
entire/partial (more than 20 X) armed forces, fights on the side of 
the rebels.
The Statistical Technique
As has been made quite clear in the preceedlng pages, 
the purpose of this dissertation is to evolve a typological scheme on 
the basis of the empirical data on the thirty cases of collective 
political violence, in order to determine how well this scheme resem­
bles the 'ideal typical test model'. Therefore, a statistical proce­
dure is needed which would help us in classifying our sample (n * 30) 
of CPV in terms of distinct patterns discernible in the data. The 
task of the statistical technique would be to reveal any groups/cate­
gories of comparable modes of CPV as there may be, and thus, determine 
if our sample could be classified into categories comparable to the 
types of CPV evolved in our test model. For the sake of clarifying 
the basic nature of the problem, it could be compared to a situation 
in which ten individuals (observations) are categorized in terms of 
fifteen traits (variables) such as - sex, ethnicity, color, height, 
weight, length of hair, color of eyes, IQ, SES, nationality, religion, 
language, education, rural-urban residence etc.
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The problem undertaken by the present study is to cate­
gorize thirty cases of collective political violence (observations) In 
terms of the twelve variables delineated under the multivariate model.
On the basis of the review of literature on statis­
tical techniques for classifying data In terms of certain criterion/ 
criteria, the technique of cluster analysis Is found to be the most 
appropriate for this study. Because, cluster analysis Is equipped to
analyze multivariate data In which given a sample of 'n' objects,
cases or Individuals, each of which is measured on a set of 'v' 
variables, a classification scheme is devised for grouping the objects, 
cases or individuals into 'g' classes (Everitt,'?' : 1). Initially,
"little or nothing is known about the category structure. 
All that is available, is a collection of observa­
tions whose category memberships are unknown. The
operational objective is to discover a category
structure which fits the observation. The problem is
frequently stated as one of finding the 'natural
groups',In a more concrete sense, the objective is to 
sort the observations Into groups such that the degree 
of 'natural association' is high among members of the 
same group and low between members of different groups" 
(Anderberg, 1973: 2-3).
A variety of other statistical techniques have been 
employed in classifying data, such as factor analysis (Rummel, 1970), 
and multi-dlmenslonal scaling (Greene and Carmon, 1970). However, 
more recently the problem of classification has been successfully 
tackled by cluster analysis techniques, especially in the life 
sciences and the medical sciences.
Both cluster analysis and factor analysis are aspects 
of correlational analysis (Thorndike, 1976). Each procedure seeks to 
describe "the structure of a set of variables without reference to
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any variable that Is not In the set M (Thorndike, 1978: 227). Cluster 
analysis has been called a "poor man's factor analysis" since computa­
tions Involved are much simpler than those Involved In factor analysis. 
The results for each are derived from a correlation matrix of the 
variables which measure the observations. A positive correlation 
among the variables signifies that their vectores make an angle of less 
than 90° with each other in a scatter plot and that their vectors form 
a group or cluster. Thus highly correlated variables form a tighter 
group than do lowly correlated variables. Cluster analysis "provides 
a way of identifying those variables that tend to cluster In this way" 
by deriving a "coefficient of belonging" (Thorndike, 1978: 228).
Note that one of the Important differences between 
cluster analysis and factor analysis lies In the fact that "a variable 
Is assigned to only one cluster, whereas factor analysis...breaks up 
the variance of a variable Into several additive parts" (Thorndike, 
1978: 229). According to Thorndike (1978; 229-230), then, cluster 
analysis is the proper technique to use when the analysis goal Is to 
build up something (like a classification, for example) from several 
somethings (a number of variables). Factor analysis, on the other 
hand, Is used properly to break down something into several somethings 
(the variance of variables into independent parts), "Both have their 
uses, but It Is a common mistake to consider clustering procedures to 
be poor relatives of the more elegant factoring ones" (Thorndike, 1978: 
230).
In terms of the purposes of this study, the method of 
cluster analysis would seem to be appropriate as we wish to build
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relatively Independent groupings "starting with a large number of
separate observations and adding them, one by one" (Thorndike, 1978:
238). Thorndike states the case quite nicely:
Cluster analysis Is particularly appropralate for 
problems such as those In biological taxonomy. Ini­
tially each object (person, variable, or whatever) 
forms a cluster by Itself, Then, the two most simi­
lar clusters are joined, and a new value Is computed 
for the cluster which Is the average of the separate 
values for the members of the cluster. The procedure 
goes on combining clusters until there Is only one 
cluster, and It contains all the objects.
The Cluster Procedure
The 1976 manual of the Statistical Analysis System 
(SAS) refers to the cluster procedure as performing hierarchical clus­
ter analysis, based on an algorithm originally used by Johnson (1967). 
Hierarchical classification or clustering technique Is a sequence of 
classification in which larger clusters are obtained through the 
merger of small ones.
The basic procedure with all hierarchical clustering 
analysis Is similar. They begin with the computation of distance 
between each observation in the data set. The most commonly used 
distance measure is the Euclidean metric, where the distance between
observation 1 and j denoted by d ^  is defined as
( P , I 1/2
- tkZ1 <Xik*V )
where is the value of the k th variable of the 1 th entity. 
Euclidean distance used on raw data may be vary unsatisfactory If the 
scale of variables are not similar.
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Integral to this distance measurement between obser­
vations Is the clustering of observations with minimum distance. The 
two closest observations are combined Into one cluster, then the two 
closest of the new set of clusters are combined into a cluster - and 
so the process continues by reducing the number of successive clusters. 
Ideally the process Is performed (n-1) times, at which point there 
will be only one cluster. This process can be demonstrated by taking 
the example of a Bample of five observations (Everitt, *?’ : 9-10).
Suppose five observations are to be classified, and 
the matrix of distance between the observations is as follows:
1 2 3 4 5
1 0 2 6 10 9
2 2 0 5 9 8
3 6 5 0 4 5
4 10 9 4 0 3
5 9 8 5 3 0
The number in the 1 th row and j th column denotes the distance d ^
between observations 1 and j .
As we can see the smallest distance is between 1 and 
2 (D * 2). Therefore, observations 1 and 2 are fused to form one
cluster. The distance between this new cluster and the three remain­
ing observations is calculated and the result of the new distance 
matrix is as follows:
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D 2
12 3 A 5
12 0 5 9 8
3 6 0 A 5
A 9 4 0 3
5 8 5 3 0
The smallest number In Is 3 which is the distance between A and 5,
Therefore, A and 5 are combined to form the second cluster. The dis­
tance between the two new clusters and observation 3 are calculated, 
and the resultant distances are:
12 3 A5
12 0 5 8
3 5 0 A
A5 8 A 0
As is evident, the distance between 3 and 45 is the smallest and they 
are, therefore, merged into one group. And finally the two clusters 
are merged at this stage to form one cluster containing all the five 
observations. This procedure of hierarchical clustering can be 
graphically presented in the following diagram or 'cluster tree'.
1 2 3 4 5
OBSERVATIONS
Adjustment of Variable Scales
Before we can apply the cluster analysis technique to 
our study, a major adjustment has to be made In the scale of our 
variables. As was mentioned earlier, the Euclidean distance metric 
requires that the technique be used on data in which the scale of 
variables Is similar and so far as nominal variables are concerned, 
only when one has binary data. The variables In our data set not 
only have more than two levels but are also based on more than one 
scale type.
These problems can be easily resolved, however, by 
transforming our entire mixture of variable types into binary or 
dlchotomous variables. A binary or dlchotomous variable is a dis­
crete variable which may take only two values - 0 or 1, where the
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numeric value 0 indicates absence and 1 Indicates presence. Example:
Observation Variables (Binary)
1 2  3
1 0 1 0
2 1 0  0
3 0 0 1
4 1 0  0
5 0 1 0
where 0 or 1 Indicates the presence or absence of variables 1, 2 and 
3 in the observations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 3.
Having adjusted our variable scale, the basic pro* 
cesses involved In the application of the cluster analysis technique 
to our study is quite simple.
First, the distances between each case of CPV will be 
calculated in terms of their variable content, and the resultant 
information would be presented in the form of a distance matrix,
Once the distances are computed, the observations 
would be fused Into clusters In terms of their mutual distances. No 
aprlori assumption can be made as to the distinctiveness of the 
clusters.
Interpretation
Interpretation of the data would be quite simple If 
distinct clusters are revealed, In this case we can definitely con­
tend that each cluster reflects a mode of CPV.
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However, It Is quite likely that the data may not 
reveal such distinct patterns, In which case no such definite patterns 
evolve. If the situation Is such that the clusters overlap in a 
manner to complicate the analysis immensely, we can only conclude 
that there are no reasons to believe that the modes of CPV conform to 
exclusive patterns.
As we said earlier, we cannot make any aprlorl assump­
tions about the results of the analysis. The results would be Instruc­
tive In themselves.
Chapter IV
Empirical Verification of the Test Model of 
Collective Political Violence: Analyaia of Findings
Introduction
In analyzing the findings, the discussion will be
divided into four parts. In the first part, the pattern of clustering
as revealed by the statistical analysis of the data is presented in 
terms of the variable content within Individual clusters. This exer­
cise evolves variables which are significant In determining the par­
ticular structure which distinguishes one cluster from the other. In 
the second part, we try to determine the degree to which these clus­
ters reflect the 'ideal typical' classification of the test model, on 
the basis of their variable characterization. In the third part, we 
address ourselves to the issue of outcome as an Independent variable 
in determining the patterning of the clusters. From here we move on 
to the last part, where an attempt is made to Isolate the possible 
intervening variables which make the difference between successful 
and unsuccessful CPVs - If such a determination can be made at all.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a technical Issue
will have to be resolved. The program for running the cluster proce­
dure requires that the number of clusters which can be abstracted from 
the data be specified. Since this issue Is Integral to the hierarchi­
cal clustering procedure employed in the study, It is necessary that
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the technique be explained as It applies to the empirical data In 
this study.
By following the logic of hierarchical clustering the 
first stage consists of thirty clusters In which each case of CPV 
(our sample observations) Is considered one cluster, thirty observa­
tions, thirty clusters. In the second stage of the hierarchy, the
*
two cases of CPV with minimum distance are fused Into one cluster on 
the basis of their similarity to each other In terms of their variable 
content. Therefore, in the second stage of the hierarchy, the number 
of clusters Is NCL ■ (30-1) ■ 29, Similarly, In the third stage of 
the hierarchical process the two other cases of CPV which have the 
second least amount of distance are merged and the resulting number 
of clusters is NCL ■ (30-2) - 28. Thus, the process Is repeated by 
successively merging cases with minimum distance Into clusters, and 
fusing clusters with minimum distance Into larger clusters until in 
the last stage of the hierarchy after being repeated (n-1) times, one 
large cluster of all the thirty cases of CPV (observations) emerge.
The distances between each case is presented In the distance matrix 
on the following page, and the 'cluster tree' which graphically 
represents the hierarchical clustering procedure follows the matrix. 
The ' cluster tree* demonstrates the hierarchical clustering tech­
nique as it proceeds, as one can view it , from the extreme left when 
NCL - 30, to the extreme right when NCL > 1 ,  As can be seen in the 
'cluster tree', in the first stage of the hierarchical process, cases
The formula used for computing distance has already been discussed 
in Chapter III.
Table 13
Dlntance
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0 27 29 27 27 17 11 17 27 27 17 14 12 7 11 27
27 0 29 IS 21 27 27 27 20 14 27 27 27 27 27 21
29 29 0 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
27 20 29 0 21 27 27 27 14 18 27 27 27 27 27 21
27 21 29 21 0 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 14
17 27 29 27 27 0 17 8 27 27 7 17 17 17 17 27
U  27 29 27 27 17 0 17 27 27 17 14 12 11 10 27
17 27 29 27 27 8 17 0 27 27 8 17 17 17 17 27
27 20 29 14 21 27 27 27 18 27 27 27 27 27 21
10 27 14 29 18 21 27 27 27 18 0 27 27 27 27 27 21
11 17 27 29 27 27 7 17 6 27 27 0 17 17 17 17 29
12 14 27 29 27 27 17 14 17 27 27 17 0 14 14 14 27
13 12 27 29 27 27 17 12 17 27 27 17 14 0 12 12 27
14 7 27 29 27 27 If 11 17 27 27 17 14 12 0 11 27
IS 11 27 29 27 27 17 10 17 27 27 17 14 12 11 0 27
16 27 21 29 21 14 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 0
17 29 29 9 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
10 27 21 29 21 14 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 5
19 17 27 29 27 27 11 17 11 27 27 11 17 17 17 17 27
27 21 29 21 8 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 14
21 29 29 27 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
22 12 27 29 22 27 17 12 17 27 27 17 14 12 12 12 27
23 12 27 29 23 27 17 12 17 27 27 17 14 12 12 12 27
24 27 21 29 21 14 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 11
25 29 29 27 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
26 27 14 29 18 21 27 27 27 18 7 27 27 27 27 27 21
27 29 29 16 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
26 29 29 16 29 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
29 27 14 29 18 21 27 27 27 18 7 27 27 27 27 27 21
30 17 27 29 27 27 12 17 12 27 27 12 17 17 17 17 27
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 14 29 29 14 27
9 29 29 29 27 29 29 29 27 29 16 16 29 29
29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 18 29 29 18 27
29 14 27 8 29 27 27 U 29 21 29 28 21 27
29 27 11 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12
29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 27 11 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12
29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 18 29 29 18 27
29 21 27 2] 29 27 27 21 29 7 29 29 7 27
29 27 11 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12
29 27 17 27 29 14 14 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 5 27 14 29 27 27 11 29 21 29 29 21 27
0 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 20 29 16 16 29 29
29 0 27 14 29 27 27 11 29 21 29 29 21 27
29 27 0 27 27 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12
29 14 27 0 29 27 27 14 29 21 29 29 21 27
20 29 29 29 0 29 29 29 9 29 20 20 29 29
29 27 17 27 29 0 3 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 27 17 27 29 3 0 27 29 27 29 29 27 17
29 11 27 14 29 27 27 0 29 21 29 29 21 27
20 29 29 29 9 29 29 29 0 29 20 20 29 29
29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 0 29 29 5 27
16 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 20 29 0 9 29 29
16 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 20 29 9 0 29 29
29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 5 29 29 0 27
29 27 12 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 0
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22 and 23 which have the least distance D • 3 (distance is measured 
on the vertical axis) are merged together into one cluster. In the 
second stage, cases 26 and 29, and 16 and 18, with distances D ■ 5, 
are merged into one cluster each. Accordingly the process continues 
by successively merging cases with relatively smaller distances 
until finally there is one large cluster comprising of all the cases 
and all the smaller clusters. Thus, in every successive stage of the 
procedure the number of clusters which emerge, vary.
As indicated earlier, the computer program for ana­
lyzing the cluster technique is equipped to handle only a specified 
number of clusters at a time. Since the test model of collective 
political violence developed in Chapter II refers to five 'ideal 
typical* combinations of the multiple variables, designating the 
five 'ideal types' of CPV, it was considered logical to direct the 
cluster procedure to evolve five clusters from the data on collective 
political violence. Thus, the issue was resolved by specifying that, 
in the first run, the cluster procedure abstract five groupings. As 
can be viewed from the 'cluster tree* above, Cluster 1 comprises of 
all the cases between case # 1, # 14, # 7 and so forth upto case # 30 
(n - 13)^ Cluster 2 comprises of the cases between case # 2, # 10 and 
so forth upto case # 9  (n ■ 6), Cluster 3 is made up of the cases # 5,
# 20, # 16, # 18 and case # 2 4  (n • 5), Cluster 4 consists of cases 
# 3 ,  # 17, # 27 and case # 28 (n - 4) and Cluster 5 comprises of caBe
# 21 and case # 2 5  (n ■ 2).
Ill
However, as shall be discussed later, this specifica­
tion had to be changed twice In the later stages of the analysis to de­
rive fewer and Internally numerous clusters, In order to enhance the 
analysis.
Primary Characteristics of the Five Clusters
In this part of the discussion an effort Is made to 
Isolate the variables which are significant In distinguishing one cluster 
from the other as depicted by the distributions of observations on the 
cluster tree. These are the variables whose measurements contribute 
significantly to the distance coefficients in determining the consti­
tution of each of the clusters. Henceforth these variables will be 
referred to as the 'primary variables'. These variables can be easily 
discerned from the histograms on the following pages. The histograms
provide summary description of the Impact of each variable on each of 
*
the clusters. And since each variable Is measured on a scale of 1 to 
10 representing mean values (group means), the histograms also Indicate 
the varlbles which have high mean values in one cluster and low mean 
values In another. The mean value is, therefore, used to Isolate the 
significant variables In each cluster, such that variables with mean
a
In order to spare the reader the torturous details of each case and 
each cluster, the more extensive part on the case and cluster des­
cription have been saved for the Appendix,
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value equal to or greater than 6 are considered significant. This is 
based on the argument that in more than half of the cases of collective 
political violence included in any particular cluster - these variables 
are present.
The Information presented in the histograms helps In 
deriving a list of primary variables on which each cluster significant­
ly differs. In (Table 14) these primary variables are presented in 
a systematic fashion along with their respective mean values.
Determining these primary variables was considered an 
important step, since In the next part each of these five clusters will 
be compared to the five 'ideal types' of CPV developed In the test 
model - in terms of these 'primary variables*.
Towards a Comparison of the Test Model with the Five Clusters
Having isolated the 'primary varibles' characteristic 
of each cluster of observations, we are in a position to compare these 
clusters of collective political violence with the test model In order 
to determine their degree of resemblance and the corresponding validity 
of the test model. The process which will be followed in determining 
the degree of similarity between the 'ideal typical* categories in the 
test model and the clusters of the empirical cases of CPV, will be to 
compare each of these clusters in terms of their primary variables 
with the characteristic variables of the 'ideal typical' categories.
The more the number of 'primary variables' which resemble characteris­
tic variables of the 'ideal type' the more significant is the match 
and vice versa.
Table 14
Comparison of Cluster Primary Variables with Test Model
Variables Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Idea
Exchange 8 7 8 1 1 1
Constitutional 1
Structural 10 1 1 1 1
Transitional 1
StrateRy
Open 7 10 8 1 1 1 1
Conspiratorial 1
Combinational 10 1 1 1 1
Class
Bourgeois 6 1
Petit Bourgeois(I) 10 7 8 1 1 1
Petit Bourgeois(II) 10 10 8 1 1 1 1
Proletarian 8 10 6 1 1 1
Peasant 10 1 1
Leadership
Centralised 9 7 6 10 10 1 1 1
Decentralized 1 1 1 1
Table 14 (Continued)
Variables Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Leadership(Class) 
Bourgeois
Petit Bourgeois(I) 
Petit Bourgeois(II) 
Proletarian 
Peasant
6
8 10
7
10
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
Organization
Spontaneous 6 1 1 1 1
Seal Organized 8 10 1 1
Organized 8 1 1
Participation
Few 1
Sone 1 1
Considerable 7 10 10 1 1 1 1 1
Duration
Less than a week 9 6 1 1 1 1
Week-six Months 7 8 1 1 1 1
Six Months + 1 1
Table 14 (Continued)
Variables Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Violence
Minimum
Some
Considerable 8 10
8
10 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Area
Local
Provincial 10 1 1
Country 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1
Government
Response
Positive 7 7 1 1 1
Non violent
Violent 7 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1
Armed Force
Disloyalty
High 8 7 10 1 1
Low 1 1 1
Nil 8 1 1 1
LI
X
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In (Table 15)the variables comprising this test 
model of CPV as developed in Chapter II, and the list of primary varia­
bles characterizing each cluster are compared In order to discern any 
similarities.
Discussion
The match between Cluster 1 and CPV 3, which we have 
designated as the 'ideal typical* representation of coup d'etat is 
obvious. The 15 primary variables which distinguish Cluster 1 from 
the other four clusters matches 15 of the 24 variables which charac­
terizes a coup d'etat. Further analysis of the variable content of 
Clusterl (See Appendix for reference) reveals at least two other 
relatively significant variables other than the primary variables, 
with mean value equal to 5, I.e., variables which are present in at 
least half of the cases in the cluster, which brings Cluster 1 closer 
to being recognized as comparable to CPV 3, or coup d'etat In the 
test model. These two variables are (1)'conspiratorial strategy'; and 
(11)'minimum violence'. 'Conspiratorial strategy* is used in half 
of the cases of CPV in this cluster for realizing the objectives of 
CPV. Moreover, at least 40Z of the cases also use a combination of 
'conspiratorial and open* strategy to realize their objectives. Thus, 
It would not be erroneous to contend that the strategies involved in 
Cluster 1 and in the 'Ideal type* of CPV 3, or coup d'etat are quite 
comparable. The test model of CPV also mentions that so far as vio­
lence is concerned, coup d'etat involves'minimum' or some violence.
Table 15
Degree of resemblance between five clusters and Test Model
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
CPV 1 (Revolution) 73 Z 92 X
CPV 2 (Rebellion) 46 Z 69 Z
CPV 3 (Coup d'etat) 100 Z 84 Z
CPV 4 (People's War) 60 Z 76 Z
CPV 5 (Revolt) 33 Z 53 Z
Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
91 Z 91 Z 55 Z
91 Z 63 % 33 Z
63 Z 72 Z 44 Z
82 Z 91 Z 88 Z
82 % 54 Z 77 Z
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50 Z of the cases In Cluster 1 also experienced minimum violence. We 
could, therefore, sum up that It would be appropriate to suggest that 
Cluster 1 with 13 cases of CPV resembles the 'ideal typical' category 
of CPV 3, or coup d'etat.
As was gathered from the general definition of coup 
d'etat provided by the social scientists, coups involve primarily the 
exchange of personnel in the positions of power. It is predominantly 
an elite directed affair which is highly planned and secretive. 
Moreover, the definitions also suggest that in majority of the coups 
the army Is the prime mover of events. The CPVs Included in Cluster 1 
are also oriented primarily towards the exchange of personnel in the 
positions of power (Mean Value *8); it also reflects an elite direc­
ted (Mean value for bourgeois participation ■ 6 ; petit bourgeois 
participation * 8); organized (Mean value for organization * 8); secre­
tive (Mean value for conspiratorial strategy • 5) affair with consider­
able support and participation from the army (Mean value for armed 
force disloyalty ■ 8). Thus, the variables which give coup d'etat its 
structure and distinctive form, are the same primary variables which 
distinguish Cluster 1 from other clusters. We can contend with confi­
dence that Cluster 1 significantly resembles the 'ideal typical' cate­
gory of coup d'etat.
The resembalance with the 'ideal types' is much less 
distinct in the case of other clusters.
Cluster 2, for example, shows 12 out of its 13 signi­
ficant variables in resemblance of 12 of the 24 variables which distin­
guishes 'revolution', i.e., CPV 1 in the test model. However, the
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13th variable which does not natch CPV 1 or 'revolution', is the 'Idea' 
of Cluster 2. For Cluster 2, the significant idea is exchange of per­
sonnel, whereas, the significant idea behind revolutions, on which 
social scientists unanimously agree is 'structural change , Therefore, 
even though all the other 12 primary variables signifying Cluster 2 
match the variable characteristics of CPV 1, or revolution, the very 
fact that It does not match on such an important variable as idea, a 
variable which is so distinctive of a revolution - bars us from accep­
ting Cluster 2 as the empirical Image of CPV 1, or revolution. And we 
can sum up for the time being by contending that the relative resem­
blance between Cluster 2 and CPV 1, or revolution is more 'spurious* 
than factual.
Similarly, when Clusters 3 and A are compared with the
test model - no distinctive patterns emerge. Cluster 3 has 10 out of
11 primary variables which resemble 10 distinctive variables of both 
CPV 1 or revolution, and CPV 2 or rebellion. Before giving out any 
final words on Cluster 3, however, let us consider the situation with 
Cluster A and 5.
Of the 12 primary variables which characterize Clus­
ter A, 11 match the significant variables of both CPV 1, or revolution,
and CPV A, or people's war. However, in both the cases the variable
This finding distressed us considerably. However, when the cluster 
analysis technique was used to merge the categories in the 'ideal 
typical' model (see p.lAt) the problem was resolved to our extreme 
relief.
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on which Cluster 4 differs Is Idea. And as was argued In the case of 
Cluster 2, Idea of a revolution or people's war, lie,, structural 
change, Is probably the most Important variable distinguishing 'revo­
lution' and 'people's war' from other CPVs. Subsequently, It would be 
rather erroneous to contend that Cluster 4 Is comparable to CPV 1 or 
revolution; or CPV 4 or people's war when the divergence between them 
rests on such an Important variable.
So far as Cluster 5 Is concerned, 8 out of its 9 
primary variables matches similar variables in CPV 4, or people's war. 
The variable which does not match the characteristic variable of CPV 4 
or people's war is the area covered by the CPV. Whereas, CPV 4 or 
people's war usually occurs In several provinces or in the entire coun­
try, the cases in Cluster 5 occurred in one province or relatively 
unimportant townships. Thus it failed to meet the maximum score for 
area as CPV 4 or people's war does. But as can be expected the 'extent 
variables' such as 'area' are not as significant as the 'structural 
variables' such as 'idea', which actually determine the internal form 
and structure of CPV. The extent variables only demonstrate how mas­
sive or small the CPV is in terms of scale. Therefore, divergence in 
terms of 'area' is not as crucial as divergence in 'ideas'. In sum, 
we can generally contend that Cluster 5, with its predominant peasant- 
petit bourgeois base, its combinational strategy, peasant leadership 
and so on resembles CPV 4, or people's war more than any other 'ideal 
typical' category.
The situation with Clusters 2, 3 and 4 is highly 
problematic. No conclusive statement can be made on their relation-
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ship to Che 'Ideal Cyplcal' CPVs In Che cesC model. Therefore, In 
Cerms of a solution It was decided to repeac the clustering Cechnlque 
to evolve fewer number of clusters, so as to enable us to offer more 
definitive conclusions on the data. Since the data base at our disposal 
Is a rather small one (n * 30), It was felt that the fewer the number 
of clusters, the more numerous each would be, and hopefully the more 
meaningful. Accordingly, the cluster technique was repeated twice, 
first to evolve four categories, then to evolve three categories/clus­
ters.
Comparison of the Test Model with Four Clusters
When the cluster technique was directed to generate 
four clusters, the result was that following the logic of hierarchical 
clustering the two clusters which among the original five clusters had 
minimum distance were merged into one cluster, This process Is graphi­
cally represented in Fig. 2. Since the least distance Is between 
Clusters 4 and 5, they are merged together to form the New Cluster 4. 
The histograms on the next page present a summary description of the 
New Cluster 4, on the multiple variables. A list of the primary 
variables which characterize the New Cluster 4 follows the histograms 
in Tab: 16. As was Indicated earlier, the primary variables are vari­
ables with mean values equal to or more than 6, signifying that the 
variable is present in more than half of the cases In the cluster. In 
Fig, 6 the test model of CPV Is compared to the New Cluster 4 in 
terms of the new primary variables to discern similarities.
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Table 16
Comparison of New Cluster A with Test Model
Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
A 1 2 3 A 5
Idea
Exchange 7 1 1 1
Cons ti tut ional 1
Structural 1 1 1 1
Transitional 1
Strategy
Open 1 1 1 1
Conspiratorial 1
Combinational 1 1 1 1
Class
Bourgeois 1
Petit Bourgeois(1) 1 1 1
Petit Bourgeois(II) 1 1 1 1
Proletarian 1 1 1
Peasant 1 1
Leadership
Structure
Centralized 10 1 1 1
Decemtrailzed 1 1 1 1
Leadership
Class
Bourgeois 1
Petit Bourgeois(I) 7 1 1 1
Petit Bourgeois(11) 7 1 1 1 1
Proletarian 1 1
Peasant 1 1
Organization
Spontaneous 1 1 1 1
Semi Organized 1 1
Organized 1 1
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Table 16 (Continued)
Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
4 1 2 3 4 5
Participation
Few 1
Some 1 1 1
Considerable 1 1 1 1 1
Duration
Less than a week 1 1 1 1
Week to six months 7 1 1 1 1
Six months + 1 1
Violence
Minimum 1
Some 1 1 1
Considerable 1 1 1 1
Area
Local
Provincial 1 1
Country 7 1 1 1 1 1
Govt. Response
Positive 1 1 1
Non violent
Violent 10 1 1 1 1 1
Armed Force
Disloyalty
High 1 1
Low 1 1 1
Nil 7 1 1 1
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Table 17
Degree of resemblance between New Cluster A and Teat Model
New Cluster A
CPV 1 (Revolution) 75 X
CPV 2 (Rebellion) 75 X
CPV 3 (Coup d'etat) 75 X
CPV A (People's War) 87 X
CPV 5 (Revolt) 50 X
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Discussion
As can be gathered, the New Cluster 4 resembles CPV 4 
or people's war on all but one variable. And the variable on which 
this discrepancy exists Is again 'idea'. The significant idea for the 
New Cluster 4 is exchange of personnel in the positions of power, 
whereas for CPV 4 or 'people's war' the significant idea is structural 
change. The CPV which occurred in Bulgaria in 1923 (ID # 21) is the 
only CPV in New Cluster 4, which advocated structural change. However, 
if significant variables (with mean values ■ 5) other than the primary 
variables are considered, a tentative conclusion can be drawn by con­
tending that relatively speaking the New Cluster 4 resembles CPV 4, or 
'people's war' more than it resembles any other 'ideal type' in the 
test model. These variables with Mean values equalling five, i.e., 
variables which are present in about half of the cases of CPV in the 
cluster are:
Strategy: The mean value for both 'open' strategy and 'combina­
tional strategy', i.e., involving both 'open* and 'conspiratorial' 
techniques of violence is 5. Indicating that at least half of the 
cases utilized 'open* or 'combinational' strategy to realize their 
goals. Similarly, in the test model, CPV 4 or people’s war is charac­
terized as using an 'open' strategy or a 'combinational' one to 
achieve Its purposes. Therefore, the strategies significant in New 
Cluster 4 are comparable to the starategies significant of 'people's 
war' in the test model.
2, Class Character: CPV 4 or people's war specifies class character 
in it as predominantly 'peasant* and/or 'petit bourgeois'. The New
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Cluster 4 also indicates a relatively significant 'peasant1 and/or 
'petit bourgeois' participation. The mean value for each 'class' 
category being 5.
3. Participation and violence: Similarly when the degree of match
between the 'extent' variables (such as 'participation' and 'violence') 
in the New Cluster 4( and CPV 4, or 'people's war' is considered, 
considerable participation and considerable violence is revealed in the 
case of both. In half of the cases of CPV in the New Cluster 4, par­
ticipation was considerable (1000 +), so was the amount of violence 
(150 + casualties). Therefore, so far as the extent variables are 
concerned - the degree of resemblance between New Cluster 4 and CPV 4 
or people's war is also considered significant.
Therefore, on the basis of the added Information 
provided by the variables with mean value equaling 5, it can be con­
tended that the degree of similarity between New Cluster 4 and CPV 4 
or people's war is significant.
Since the situation with Clusters 2 and 3 remained 
unchanged and subsequently no definite comparisons could be made, the 
cluster analysis was performed again to generate three clusters, with 
the expectation that this would provide new clues for a better compa­
rison.
Comparison of the Test Model with Three Clusters
In generating three clusters from the data on collec­
tive political violence, the hierarchical clustering procedure simply
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merged the two clusters which had the least Inter-cluster distance, 
when the number of clusters equaled four. By referring back to Fig.2 
(the cluster tree) it can be seen that when the number of clusters 
equal 4, the least distance is between clusters 2 and 3. Therefore, 
when the program is specified to evolve three clusters, cluster 2 and 
cluster 3 are merged to generate New cluster 2. In sum, when the num­
ber of clusters equals 3, Cluster 1 is the same as original Cluster 1, 
New Cluster 2 is the merged version of original clusters 2 and 3 and 
New cluster 3 is the fusion of original clusters 4 and 3 (or New Clus­
ter 4). Refer to the Cluster tree in Fig. 2 for a graphic represen­
tation of this process. The histograms on the following page provides 
a summary description of the New Cluster 2 on the multiple variables. 
The primary variables generated thereby are presented in Tab. 18 on 
the page following the histograms. In Tab.19 the New Cluster 2 is 
compared with the test model in terms of its primary variables.
Discussion
As can be discerned from Tab.19, the degree of 
resemblance is relatively the most between New cluster 2 and CPV 1 or 
'revolution*. The similarity between New cluster 2 and CPV 1 or 
'revolution' becomes even more apparent when we consider a few other 
relatively significant variables (with mean value of 5) which distin­
guish New cluster 2 from other clusters. Thus, so far as the 'idea* 
of CPV is concerned, half of the cases in New cluster 2, espoused 
'structural change*. The significant cases of CPV which aimed at
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Table 18
Comparison of New Cluster 2 with Test Model
Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
2 1 2 3 4 5
Idea
Exchange 1 1 1
Constitutional 1
Structural 1 1 1 1
Transitional 1
Strategy
Open 8 1 1 1 1
Conspiratorial 1
Combinational 1 1 1 1
Class
Bourgeois 1
Petit Bourgeois(I) 1 1 1
Petit Bourgeois(11) 1 1 1 1
Proletarian 8 1 1 1
Peasant 1 1
Leadership
Structure
Centralized 6 1 1 1
Decentralized 1 1 1 1
Leadership
Class
Bourgeois 1
Petit Bourgeois(1) 1 1 1
Petit Bourgeois(II) 1 1 1 1
Proletarian 1 1
Peasant 1 1
Organization
Spontaneous 1 1 1 1
Semi Organized 1 1
Organized 1 1
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Table 18 (Continued)
Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV
2 1 2 3 4 5
Participation
Few 1
Some 1 1 1
Considerable 10 1 1 1 1 1
Duration
Less than a week 1 1 1 1
Week to six months 1 1 1 1
Six months + 1 1
Violence
Minimum 1
Some 1 1 1
Considerable 9 1 1 1 1
Area
Local
Provincial 1 1
Country 10 1 1 1 1 1
Govt. Response
Positive 1 1 1
Non violent
Violent 10 1 1 1 1 1
Armed Force
Disloyalty
High 1 1
Low 1 1 1
Nil 1 1 1
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Table 19
Degree of resemblance between New Cluster 2 and Test Model
New Cluster 2 
CPV 1 (Revolution) 100 %
CPV 2 (Rebellion) 85 %
CPV 3 (Coup d'etat) 85 X
CPV 4 (People's War) 85 X
CPV 5 (Revolt) 57 X
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structural change In New cluster 2 are, Russia 1917, Germany 1919, and 
Spain 1934, The mean value for structural change as 'idea* would have 
been more than 5, If we consider that the CPV of Cuba In 1959 was coded 
as espousing Constitutional' change instead of ’structural' change - 
since Fidel Castro and his cohorts advocated "free elections and 
restoring the 1940 constitution" as their objective before the final 
outcome of the revolution was realized. Thus, if we coded 'structural 
change* as what the Cuban CPV espoused instead of 'constitutional 
change', the mean value for 'structural change* as 'idea' would be 
definitely slginifleant, in terms of a higher mean.
Similarly, if class of leadership is concerned, the 
test model specifies 'class of leadership' for CPV 1 or 'revolution' 
as being both proletarian and petit bourgeois. As the list of the 
primary variables for the New cluster 2 shows, the criterion for pro­
letarian leadership is easily met. However, so far as 'petit bourgeois' 
leadership is concerned the mean value is 5, which determines that in 
at least half of the cases of CPV in the New cluster 2, leadership was 
also 'petit bourgeois' in character.
Another characteristic which distinguishes CPV 1 or 
'revolution' is that it calls forth a high degree of armed force dis­
loyalty. In half of the cases in New cluster 2, armed force disloyalty 
is also high.
Therefore, on the basis of all these facts it can be 
quite strongly contended that New cluster 2 matches CPV 1 or 'revolu­
tion' significantly.
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Summary of findings on empirical verification of the Test Model
We now have three clusters of empirical cases of collec­
tive political violence, of which Cluster 1 and New Cluster 2 compare 
quite satisfactorily to CPV 3 or 'coup d'etat' and CPV 1 or 'revolution' 
respectively. New Cluster 3 resembles the 'ideal typical* version of 
*people*s war' or CPV 4, though the degree of resemblance is not as
significant as it is in the case of Cluster 1 and New Cluster 2. In
sum, on the basis of this analysis, only three 'ideal typical' modes
of CPV - CPV 1 or 'revolution', CPV 3 or 'coup d'etat' and CPV 4 or
'people’s war’ - are proven to exist in the reality, we have sampled. 
Since CPV 2, or 'rebellion' and CPV 5 or 'revolt' could not compare 
with any empirical clusters of CPV, these categories are theoretically 
invalid. However, instead of discarding them as meaningless categories
it was decided to follow the cluster technique and merge them with any 
of the other three categories in terms of their minimum distance. The 
five 'ideal typical' CPVs were clustered into three groups with minimum 
intra-group distance, on the basis of their variable characteristics.
The result was that CPV 2 or 'rebellion* was merged with CPV 1 or 
'revolution/rebellion'*. Similarly, CPV 5 or 'revolt' was merged with
As can be seen in Tab.20, the variables in the new test model of CPV, 
are depicted in terms of 5's and 10's, Instead of l's and 0*s. This is 
the result of performing the clustering technique. By grouping 
together CPV 1/CPV 2, and CPV 4/CPV 5, it qualified each variable with 
a mean value. Thus for the New CPV 1, the presence of 'exchange' as an 
idea in only one of the two CPVs grouped is described as the presence 
of 'exchange* as an idea in only 50 % of the cases, in this case only 
in CPV 2. Similarly, since 'structural change* as idea was present in 
both CPV 1 and CPV 2 before they were merged into New CPV 1, the 
variable is qualified as present in 100 X of the cases and so on.
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Table 20
The New Test Model of Collective Political Violence
Variables New CPV 1 New CPV 2 New CPV 3
Idea
Exchange 5 10 5
Constitutional 0 10 0
Structural 10 0 10
Transitional 5 0 0
Strategy
Open 10 0 10
Conspiratorial 0 10 0
Combinational 5 10 10
Class
Bourgeois 0 10 0
Petit Bourgeois(I) 5 10 5
Petit Bourgeois(II) 10 10 5
Proletarian 10 10 0
Peasant 0 0 10
Leadership
Structure
Centralized 5 10 5
Decentralized 10 0 10
Leadership
Class
Bourgeois 0 10 0
Petit Bourgeois(I) 5 10 5
Petit Bourgeois(II) 10 10 5
Proletarian 10 0 0
Peasant 0 0 10
Organization
Spontaneous 10 0 10
Semi Organized 5 0 5
Organized 0 10 5
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Table 20 (Continued)
Variables New CPV 1 New CPV 2 New CPV 3
Participation
Few 0 10 0
Some 5 10 5
Considerable 10 10 10
Duration
Less than a week 10 10 5
Week to six months 10 0 10
Six months + 5 0 5
Violence
Minimum 0 10 0
Some 5 10 5
Considerable 10 0 10
Area
Local 0 0 0
Provincial 5 0 5
Country 10 10 10
Govt. Response
Positive 5 10 5
Non violent 0 0 0
Violent 10 10 10
Armed Force 
Disloyalty
High 5 10 0
Low 5 10 5
Nil 5 0 10
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CPV 4 or 'people's war', to form the new 'ideal type' New CPV 3, or 
'people's war/revolt* (see Tab.20), Semantically, 'revolution' or 
'people's war' would indicate the successful outcome of a CPV with the 
'ideal typical* characteristics of New CPV 1 or New CPV 3, whereas 
'rebellion' or 'revolt' would Indicate unsuccessful outcome of CPV 
with the 'ideal typical' characteristics of New CPV 1 or New CPV 3.
This clustering exercise had a definite influence on 
the degree of resemblance between the New Cluster 3 and New CPV 3
(i.e., original CPV 4) or 'people's war/revolt*. The match was
significantly improved. This occurred, because as a result of the
merger of CPVs 4 and 5, there was now a 50 % possibility that New CPV
3, or 'people's war/revolt' would have exchange of personnel as one 
of its 'ideas', whereas earlier it was non-existent. The resultant 
was that, New Cluster 3 which had a significant mean value for
'exchange of personnel' (mean value ■ 7) as Its predominant Idea, had
a definite Improvement in its degree of match to New CPV 3, or 
'people's war/revolt'.
A summary description of the findings on the verifica­
tion of the test model of CPV, in terms of its resemblance to the
empirical cases of CPV Is presented In Table 21.
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Table 21
Degree of reseniblance between final clusters and 
the New Test Model
Cluster 1 New Cluster 2 New Cluster 3
New CPV 1 73 X 100 % 75 %
(Revolution/
Rebellion)
New CPV 2 100 % 85 % 75 %
(Coup d'etat)
New CPV 3 33 % 85 % 100 %
(People's War/ 
Revolt)
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Conclusiont ■* ■ ■■■■
The three distinct clusters which emerge from the data 
on the 30 cases of CPV validates three modes or 'Ideal types' of collec­
tive political violence - coup d'etat, revolution/rebellion, people's 
war/revolt. On the basis of this outcome, we may, therefore, conclude 
that collective political violence can assume three distinct forms.
It can assume the form distinctive of coup d'etat, in 
which case changes are intended in the personnel composition of the 
authority structure; the strategy Involved is conspiratorial and accor­
dingly highly organized, the action is elite directed and participated, 
and it calls forth high armed force disloyalty. So far as scale is 
concerned, coups take place primarily In capital cities, involve sig­
nificant participation, minimum violence and are usually shortlived.
This pattern Is quite uniformly followed by the 13 cases of empirical 
CPVs In the first cluster.
The second form which collective political violence 
may assume can be designated as 'revolution/rebellion*. The CPVs which 
assume the characteristics of 'revolution/rebellion', usually espouse 
constitutional or structural change along with the exchange of person­
nel in the positions of power; they employ 'open' strategy In realizing 
their goals, they are mostly spontaneous, participated and directed by 
the urban petit bourgeois and proletariat, and calling forth a certain 
degree of armed force disloyalty. So far as magnitude is concerned, 
'revolutions/rebellions' engulf the entire country or at least the
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major portions, last from less than a week to more than six months, 
involve considerable support and participation and In most cases 
results in massive amounts of violence.
Whereas, Germany (1918 and 1919), Russia (1917), Spain 
(1934) and Cuba (1959) follow this pattern almo.st completely, other 
cases such as Rumania (1907), Mexico (1910), Afghanistan (1929) would 
seem more appropriately classified under New Cluster 3, due primarily 
to the fact that they Indicate a significant peasant participation too! 
However, since these latter cases of CPV are relatively closer to the 
other cases of CPV in New Cluster 2 in terms of their total variable 
distance, than to the cases of CPV in New Cluster 3, the cluster tech­
nique incorporated them in New Cluster 2 instead of New Cluster 3. 
Despite this fact , we cannot vouch without a certain amount of reser­
vation that New Cluster 2 resembles the 'ideal typical' category of 
New CPV 1 or 'revolution/rebellion*, in toto, as we can about the match 
between Cluster 1 and coup d'etat. However, on the perspective of our 
argument made earlier In the study that 'ideal types' are rarely ref­
lected in their 'ideal' form in reality - all that can be expected is 
relative resemblance. Thus, New Cluster 2 even with its atypical cases 
is closer to the 'ideal type' 'revolution/rebellion', than to any other 
cluster.
As was Indicated earlier, the difference between 
'revolution* and 'rebellion' is decided ex-priori. Thus, after a CPV 
with the characteristics of New CPV 1 succeeds, it is designated a 
'revolution* and if it falls, it is designated a 'rebellion'.
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Russell's (1974) distinction between 'revolution' and 
'rebellion' is quite relevant to the point being made here. As was 
discussed In Chapter II, Russell considers 'revolution' as the funda­
mental changes which ensue following the successful completion of 'mass 
rebellion' - thus an unsuccessful 'rebellion' Is followed by an unsuc­
cessful revolution.(See Table 10, In Chapter II).
The third general pattern which CPV may assume Is 
designated as 'people's war/revolt'. The CPVs which assume the charac­
teristics of 'people's war/revolt' usually intend to bring about 
exchange of personnel In the positions of power and/or structural 
change in the distribution of the power base. They utilize 'open' 
and/or 'conspiratorial' means for realizing their alms, command a pre­
dominant 'peasant' and/or 'petit bourgeois' participation, (the abso­
lute lack of proletarian participation is significant) and are usually 
directed by the petit bourgeoisie. 'People's war/revolt' may be parti­
ally organized with a central leadership core. So far as scale is con­
cerned, 'people's war/revolt' may be short lived or protracted, with 
quite significant participation, occurring usually In few districts or 
provinces but may also engulf the entire country, both Insurgent and 
Incumbent violence Is considerable. The total absence of armed force 
disloyalty Is significant.
As in the case of New Cluster 2, not all cases In New 
Cluster 3 follow these characteristics definitely. Nevertheless, on the 
basis of Its total variable characteristics New Cluster 3 resembles the 
'Ideal typical' category of 'people's war/revolt* more than any other 
cluster.
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The difference between 'people's war' and 'revolt' is 
decided ex-priori on the basis of outcome. Thus, 'people's war* would 
refer to a successful CPV with characteristics comparable to New CPV 3, 
and 'revolt* would refer to an unsuccessful CPV with characteristics 
comparable to New CPV 3.
In sum, this analysis of the 30 cases of CPV has shown
that collective political violence can assume three forms: coup d'etat,
revolution/rebellion, or people’s war/revolt.
These conclusions are based on the information gathered
on the thirty cases of CPV, Interms of their variable content. No
claims are made as to their absoluteness, blaslessness or errorfreeness 
of these results. It is possible that someone else's conclusions might 
be quite different.
Outcome as an Independent Variable in Determining Clusters
Contrary to what was expected, the clusters do not 
break up in terms of outcome. All the three clusters contain Instances 
of CPV which are both successful and unsuccessful. Therefore, the 
outcome of CPV Is marginal so far as grouping cases of CPV into sepa­
rate clusters is concerned. If outcome was the only variable, then the 
clustering pattern would have followed that significantly. However, 
since outcome Is only one of the 12 variables, its Influence on the 
clusters la insignificant.
157
Intervening Variables Determining Outcome
Another task which was set out at the beginning of the 
project was to Isolate the Intervening variables which determined the 
outcome of collective political violence. The Intervening variables 
which are considered significant for determining outcome are variables 
which are present exclusively in either successful or unsuccessful CPVs. 
For example, if variable X occurs In all cases of successful CPVs and 
is totally absent In all cases of unsuccessful CPVs, then it can be 
generally concluded that the presence of variable X is crucial for 
success cetaris paribus.
At the outset It might be worth mentioning thatnot 
one variable In the multivariate model Is exclusively present In either 
successful or unsuccessful cases of CPVs. All the variables are pre­
sent In greater or lesser degree in both the groups. This Is expected, 
given the inherent complexity of a phenomenon such as collective poli­
tical violence. It is highly unlikely that the outcome of societal 
phenomenon such as collective political violence can be determined by 
one or by a combination of a certain number of variables. Too many 
factors, both obviously related and presumably unrelated influence the 
outcome of complex socio-hlstorlcal phenomenon such as collective 
political violence.
However, looking at the data on the thirty cases of 
CPV, certain uniformities are discernible, for whatever they may be 
worth.
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Firstf In 99 X of the cases of successful CPVs the 
'Idea' has been either to exchange personnel in the positions of power 
or to realize constitutional change. Only in the case of Russia (1917), 
'idea* was 'structural change'. This finding seems quite logical.
Since CPVs with relatively limited alms, such as exchanging personnel 
have more chances to succeed than CPVs which have grandiose aims - in 
the world of reality, coup d'etat which involve the espousal of limited 
alms, occur more often than revolutions and also succeed more often than 
revolutions. Accordingly, history is full of examples of coups, whereas 
revolutions are difficult, if not impossible to come across. Therefore, 
one condition for success may be cited as espousal of limited alms (see 
Gamson, 1975).
However, considering the fact that more than 50 X of the 
unsuccessful CPVs also espoused relatively limited aims like exchange of 
personnel or at the most constitutional change, the validity of the 
argument made earlier seems rather questionable. The only relative 
difference seems to be that, whereas, only one case of CPV (Russia,
1917) Intended to bring about structural change in the sample of success­
ful CPVs, in the sample of unsuccessful CPVs there are five cases 
espousing structural change. What may be contended therefore is that 
CPVs with intentions of realizing structural change are usually unsuc­
cessful. However, whether a CPV with more limited alms will succeed 
cannot be positively determined.
Second, all cases of successful CPV with the exception 
of Russia (1917) demonstrates a certain degree of petit bourgeois par­
ticipation within its ranks. However, this variable is present in at
159
least 60 X of the unsuccessful CPVs also.
Similarly, whereas participation is considerable in 
all cases of successful CPV, with the exception of Turkey(1908) and 
Iraq (1958), unsuccessful CPVs demonstrate similar trait too. Thus, 
both successful and unsuccessful CPVs have considerable participation.
Therefore, neither the degree of participation nor 
the presence of the petit bourgeoisie in the ranks of the rebels - 
determines the outcome one way or the other.
Finally, so far as armed force disloyalty is con­
cerned, 53 % of the cases of unsuccessful CPVs do not indicate any 
armed force disloyalty at all, whereas in the case of successful CPVs 
all the Instances demonstrate either high or low armed force disloy­
alty. And significantly, of the successful CPVs, 73 X indicate high 
armed force disloyalty and only 27 X Indicate low armed force disloy­
alty. Interestingly, 47 X of the unsuccessful CPVs also demonstrate 
a certain presence of armed force disloyalty. However, whereas in 
the case of successful CPVs armed force disloyalty is the rule rather 
than the exception, in the case of unsuccessful CPVs, armed force dis­
loyalty is more an exception than the rule, This finding is signi­
ficant. It partially supports the doctrines of Lenin, Chorley (1943), 
and Russell (1974); who have contended that armed force disloyalty is 
imperative for the success of CPV.
It was expected that a few other variables such as 
degree of planning and organization and the structure of leadership 
would correlate in a certain pattern with successful or unsuccessful 
CPV. Thus, a CPV with a greater degree of organization and planning,
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and which commanded a centralized leadership structure was logically 
believed to have greater chances to succeed than one which did not 
undergo planning or did not have centrellzed leadership. However, 
the research results have not supported either of these hypotheses. 
Both successful and unsuccessful CPVs demonstrate both organization 
and spontaneity. And surprisingly, almost 99 X of the unsuccessful 
CPVs had centrellzed leadership structures, whereas 73 X of the 
successful CPVs had centralized leadership. Thus, the actual results 
were quite contrary to expectations.
Conclusion
In sum, except for armed force disloyalty, the degree 
of correlation between outcome and other recurrent variables In the 
successful and unsuccessful cases of CPV is anybody's guess. As for 
armed force disloyalty, it can be concluded that a certain amount of 
armed force disloyalty is imperative for the success of collective 
political violence. Though the existence of armed force disloyalty 
does not automatically ensure success.
Chapter V
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to develop a typology 
of collective political violence. The study was pursued from the 
premise that collective political violence like any other socio- 
historical phenomena could be adequately classified only on the basis 
of a multivariate scheme. Review of the extant literature demonstra­
ted the lack of a comprehensive typological scheme of collective poli­
tical violence. The multivariate model which was introduced as the 
basic framework of the typological scheme developed here - comprised 
of three sets of variables, structural variables, extent variables 
and extraneous variables - each set encompassing such significant sub- 
variables as, ideas, strategy, class character, degree of organization, 
structure and class of leadership, the scale of the action, the degree 
of armed force disloyalty Involved and the type of government res­
ponse called forth - each of which It was assumed contributed to­
wards the unique characterization of each mode of CPV.
Having developed the test model, an attempt was 
made to verify the scheme In terms of a sample of empirical cases of 
CPV. A cluster analysis was performed on the sample of the thirty 
empirical cases of CPV, to discern any distinctive patterns comparable 
to the 'Ideal typical* patterns of the test model. The analysis of
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the data revealed three relatively distinct patterns quite comparable 
to the modes of CPV Identified as 'coup d'etat1, 'revolution/rebellion* 
and 'people's war/revolt* in the test model. In Chapter IV we substan­
tiated on the degree of resemblance each of the three final clusters 
of empirical cases of CPV had, to the 'ideal typical* modes of CPV in 
the test model. In concluding our study in this chapter, It was 
deemed appropriate to add a few observations and comments over and 
above what has already been written.
Though the analysis of the data does not directly 
indicate this, with a certain amount of perception it can be realized 
that in the final analysis, collective political violence assumes two 
distinctive, dlchotomous modes or patterns. One is exemplified by 
the 'coup d'etat* - the CPV initiated, led and participated by the 
'elite* (i.e., that segement of the society which either occupies the 
important positions in the state apparatus, or has easy access to It), 
which usually Is limited to the exchange of one elite by the other in 
the positions of power. It, therefore, represents competitive Inter­
action for domination over the resources and positions of power within 
the upper classes of society. It is lntra-class dialectic, reflecting 
horizontal conflict between one group and another occupying the same 
general class position.
The other mode of CPV as exemplified In such patterns 
as 'revolution/rebellion' and 'people's war/revolt', signify inter­
class conflict. They usually imply vertical responses of one group 
which lays claim to resources under the control of another group 
(Tilly, 1975). Accordingly, these CPVs are predominantly participated
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by such classes as the 'proletariat* and 'peasantry', Initiated and 
led by the 'petit bourgeoisie*. Moreover, these CPVs are mobilized to 
effect fundamental, socio-structural changes. Whereas, 'coup's under­
take to alter the personnel in the positions of power, 'revolution/ 
rebellion*, 'people's war/revolt' Intend to redistribute the resources 
of power and subsequently restructure the bases of power.
Thus, essentially CPVs are either actions 'from 
above', with intentions to reinforce the power differential within 
classes In society, or actions 'from below) with the goal of breaking 
the hegemony of the upper classes by redistributing the economic and 
political resources and thus restructuring the stratification pattern. 
This, interestingly enough, corresponds to Marx's typology of revolu­
tion based centrally on his idea of class domination. Marx theorized 
that, revolutions are historically led by two classes. In the case 
of the 'bourgeois' revolution, the capitalist class which emerges from 
the womb of feudalism leads the revolution to overthrow feudalism and 
establish capitalism in its place. In the 'socialist* revolution, the 
proletariat emerging from the womb of capitalism leads the revolution 
to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism. By extending Marx's 
categories slightly, accomodation can be made for CPVs which do not 
fit his characterization absolutely. Therefore, along with such 
'bourgeois' revolutions such as the Turkish CPV of 1908 or the CPV in 
Yemen in 1962, both of which overthrew the monarchy - the symbol of 
feudallstlc forces in society, accomodation can be made for CPVs which 
Involves bourgeois leadership and participation but which occur in
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post feudal societies .
Similarly,'proletarian’ revolutions subsume CPVs with 
predominant peasant participation due primarily to their comparable 
ideological orientations, I.e., undermining bourgeois hegemony.
In short, it could quite adequately be argued that 
in the final analysis CPVs can assume two primary forms - CPVs which 
are Initiated 'from above' and those which are realized 'from below*.
At this point it Is probably appropriate to give a 
little thought to an issue which has haunted us throughout this study. 
The Issue can adequately be expressed In the following question: how 
valid are our attempts at discerning uniformities in phenomena which 
are said to be historically and structurally unique? Social scien­
tists who espouse a structural, comparative historical approach such 
as Barrington Moore(1967), Immanuel Wallersteln (1974 ), Theda 
Skocpol (1978), Ellen Trimberger (1978), Daniel Chirot (1977) would 
contend that soclo-historlcal phenomena such as revolution, rebellion 
coup d'etat, revolt, people's war respond to societal and historical 
pressures in uniquely distinctive ways. Thus, like a piece of art, 
they are unique and, therefore, unrepllcable. Thus, the argument goes 
that 'revolutions* cannot be imported or exported. They have to arise 
In the context of the structural relations and historical processes 
distinctive of every society, Accordingly, it could be argued that 
any attempts at evolving patterns of a set of unique cases of revo­
lutions, rebellions, coups and so on , Is invalid, because the resul­
ting structures would reveal forced impressions rather than factual 
ones, This contention Is so strong and so convincing In Its logic
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that we have to consider It, Moreover> some of the problems we had In 
designating clusters to certain 'ideal types' and the ambivalence, lack 
of assurance and security which we still feel in having them assigned 
Into certain categories, Is Indicative of the fact that each case of 
collective political violence Is too Individualistic to be forced Into 
certain 'Ideal typical' abstract patterns. What we have done In our 
analysis has been simply to generate a certain amount of uniformity In 
the uniqueness of the thirty cases of collective political violence.
Similarly, prediction becomes very arbitrary when we 
are faced with phenomena which can assume distinctive forms. The CPVs 
do not follow a certain mold when successful and another when unsuc­
cessful. There are no exclusive variables to which success or failure 
can be distinctively attributed to. Thus, no definite formula can be 
suggested, pursual of which can deliver a certain Intended outcome.
The best we can do with prediction Is offer the probabilities of suc­
cess or failure given the presence of an array of variables. This 
point was made very aptly by Wilbert Moore (1964; 337) when he wrote 
that t "no social science can be expected to assign probabilities to 
individual occurrences within a class of events. A principal value, 
therefore, of systematic comparative analysis Is the establishment of 
common features despite detailed diversity, and thus the accumulation 
of an 'experience rating' or actuarial basis for prediction".
In this section of the present chapter, we Intend to 
substantiate on two specific variables, class character and class of 
leadership, in terms of the characteristics which they assume in the 
sample of empirical cases of CPV, in order to obtain certain genera­
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lizations.
A significant amount of literature exists on the 
behavior of different classes in instances of collective political 
violence (in the process of collective political violence). The pre­
sent effort does not offer a review of this literature - all that is 
intended here Is to provide an overview of the behavior of the classes 
in society identified as the bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, the 
proletariat and the peasantry in the respective CPVs in our sample - in 
order to generate certain propositions.
As was Indicated earlier the 'bourgeoisie* are repre­
sented primarily in CPVs Identified as 'coup d'etat', which usually 
Involve the substitution of personnel In the positions of power. The 
bourgeoisie is significantly represented In 'horizontal conflict' 
involving the exchange of one elite by the other. As such, it repre­
sents 'Intra-class' rivalry. And as such, they do not represent class 
conflict as envisaged by Marx, Therefore, in short 'coups' involving 
significant bourgeois participation do not signify substitution of 
control of the state from one class to the other, but within a class 
Itself. From this perspective, Skocpol (1978) argues that the state 
cannot be perceived as a class apparatus only. States according to 
Skocpol are "fundamentally administrative and military organization 
that extract resources from society and deploy them to maintain order 
at home and to compete against other states abroad " (1978: 128) and 
la subsequently "not reducible to class structures" (1978: 128) and 
from this perspective, "coups'V'bourgeols revolutions" or "revolutions 
from above" ... "are based upon political reorganization within a
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state that Is already strong and autonomous over against class forces" 
(1978: 128) "Independently of existing class structures" (1978: 130).
Though Skocpol*s point Is quite well taken, It could 
nevertheless be argued that bourgeois efforts at 'reorganization* of 
the state apparatus usually occurs In response to class pressures 
existing in the general social sphere. 'Coups' or 'bourgeois revo­
lutions from above* which give the apparent impression of being Inde­
pendent of the existing pressures of the class structure - usually 
indicate strong undercurrents of 'class’ behavior triggered by pressure 
-imagined or real felt from the general societal class structure. To 
take an example, the 1966 military coup in Ghana which overthrew 
Kwame Nkrumah would apparently seem to be an effort at '>reorganlza- 
tlon* of the personnel In the states apparatus. A little Insight 
would indicate, however, that the 'coup* was In reality a reaction to 
the socialistic tendencies tolerated, encouraged and even nurtured by 
the Nkrumah government. So, in fact the 'coup* did not result indepen­
dently of the class structure, It In fact arose to reinforce the exis­
ting stratification structure and stave off any tendencies at restruc­
turing the social base and subsequently the system of power and privi­
lege. The point being made here is that, what might seem innocent 
attempts at 'reorganizing* the state apparatus, may actually reflect 
efforts at staving off the larger danger to the overall organization 
of power and the bases of power. Thus, it may be proven with addi­
tional research that even when the 'bourgeois revolutions from above* 
seem to be reacting independently of the existing class structure, 
they are, in fact, responding to the exigencies arising out of con-
168
fllcting class pressures and Interests attributable to the societal 
class structure - al belt Indirectly.
The almost ubiquitous presence of the petit bour­
geoisie in the ranks of the CPV, both successful and unsuccessful, Is 
quite In line with our expectations. Not only have the petit bour­
geoisie been major participants in the various Instances of CPV, they 
have frequently played the leading revolutionary role. Unlike the 
bourgeoisie, who usually swell the ranks of participants only In the 
bourgeois CPVs from above - petit bourgeois participation is all per­
vading. They can be found in the ranks of CPVs 'from above* as well 
as In CPVs 'from below*. The dynamic role of the 'petit bourgeoisie*
In the 'revolutionary movements' of the world cannot be overlooked. 
Usually the CPVs which they Initiate and lead, reflect their Images of 
the 'ideal* society, fused with such themes as modernization and Indi­
vidualism, or nationalism, democracy and egalitarianism. In sum, the 
contribution of the petit bourgeoisie, the central roles they have 
played in terms of political leadership have gone a long way in deter­
mining the antecedents, outcomes and consequences of collective poli­
tical violence. Thus, as Skocpol, so aptly puts it: "How, for example, 
could the processes and outcomes of the Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese 
revolutions be understood without attention to the contribution of 
Leninist Communist Parties, or the French revolution without attention 
to the role of the Jacobins and Napoleon7"(1978: 125).
The revolutionary potential of the proletariat is 
undisputed. Juxtaposed with the tradition bound, conservative peasan­
try, the proletariat has historically been portrayed as the usherers
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of everything that Is progressive. As exemplified in such Instances 
of CPV as Russia (1917), Germany (1918 and 1919), Spain (1934) - this 
contention is more than proven. In each of these instances the CPVs 
were predominantly participated and partly initiated by the prole­
tariat in order to effect fundamental alterations in the societal 
structures of their respective countries.
The situation of the peasantry In so far as their 
participation in Instances of CPVs Is concerned Is as Interesting as 
it Is unique. Marx's exposition on the limited revolutionary poten­
tial of the peasantry is well known. History has partially confounded 
Marx's contention that subordinate, conservative, classes -for - them­
selves, such as the peasantry are incapable of initiating or control­
ling revolutionary processes. Their potential for political violence 
is realized only in alliance with the 'hegemonic revolutionary' classes 
such as the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Accordingly in our ana­
lysis of CPVs as demonstrated in the thirty cases in our sample - the 
role of peasantry as an allied class in the process of political vio­
lence - adds credibility to this contention. Therefore, in such 
cases of CPV as in Turkey (1925) and Afghanistan (1929), the peasantry 
joined hands with the petit bourgeoisie to stop the pace of moderniza­
tion. These 'reactionary* CPVs occurred in response to progressive 
changes in society, because such changes were perceived by the petit 
bourgeois elements and their peasant followers as threatening their 
roles in the existing system. Quite contrarlly the peasant participa­
tion in the CPVs In Rumania (1907), Bulgaria (1923), El Salvador (1932) 
alongside the petit bourgeoisie and/or the proletariat, were intended
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to realize socialistic, egalitarian principles,
The participation of the peasantry as one of the 
major producing classes, in the ranks of the 'revolutionaries' is 
crucial for the success of mass based CPVs from below. Similarly, for 
'elitist', 'reactionary' CPVs 'from above' the sympathy and active par­
ticipation of the peasantry or their total indifference Is necessary 
for positive outcome. Thus In short...."the varying outcomes of suc­
cessful social revolutions are significantly affected by the specific 
way in which the peasantry becomes Involved in the overall revolu­
tionary process ..... " (Skocpol, 1978: 131).
This Is not to underplay the fact that the peasantry 
In itself Is a self-conscious, inltlatlveless class, Incapable of 
becoming an organized 'truely conscious' class-in-itself. Peasants 
are mobilized for revolutionary action, by the other leading revolu­
tionary classes, either through manipulation, 'persuasion' or 'coer­
cion*. However, once mobilized for action they determine the revo­
lutionary outcome.
Our effort here at explicating the role of specific 
classes In the various CPVs has only been a limited one. The possibi­
lity of research In this area is simply endless.
Pointers for Future Research
Too many factors influence collective political vio­
lence at every step. A sincere effort at determining the etiology of 
collective political violence, or its outcome will have to start by
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considering societal, inter-societal and historical factors. With the 
dally shrinkage of the world, all soclo-hlstorlcal phenomena will have 
to be analyzed in the context of the 'international* system.
In our writing so far we have definitely made the 
implication that we are Interested in collective political violence as 
an lntra-socletal phenomenon. In our definition of CPV we had made It 
clear that we were dealing with attempts to overthrow the central 
government of a sovereign national entity. However, we realize that 
lnsplte of our assumption of autonomy it will be highly erroneous and 
naive if we totally obliviated the world inter-systemic processes. At 
the present stage of development of the world capitalist and socialist 
system, lntra-socletal processes cannot be isolated from inter-societal 
ones.
In his recent book on "Social change in the Twentieth 
Century" Daniel Chirot (1977) expands on this notion of world system.
He specifically talks about the capitalist world system. In the capi­
talist world system the countries are stratified in terms of their eco­
nomic diversification, technological development and degree of indepen­
dence from outside control. Chirot, therefore, talks about:
(i) Core Societies: which are economically diversified, powerful,
rich societies that are relatively Independent.
(ii) Peripheral Societies: which are economically overspecialized, 
relatively poor and weak societies that are subject to the manipula­
tion or direct control by the core powers.
(iii) Semi-Peripheral Societies: which are midway between the core and 
the periphery that are trying to industrialize and diversify their
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economies. While they are weaker than core societies, they are 
trying to overcome their weakness and are not subject to outside mani­
pulation and control as are peripheral societies. (Chirot, 1977)
Understanding the system of stratification is Impor­
tant, because the status of society as core, peripheral or semi-peri­
pheral correlates highly with their intrasocletal patterns of economic 
development, social stratification, the nature of domestic policies 
etc. The dynamics of collective political violence Is no exception to 
the rule. A full scale research could be undertaken to study just how 
the position of a country in the world capitalist system correlated 
with the nature and type of political violence that occurs within It. 
While this study falls within the confines of the structural and com­
parative historical approach recently advocated by Theda Skocpol (1978)
- "one which synthesizes an historically grounded, social structural 
style of explanation...with a comparative historical method of hypo­
thesis testing" - our effort was more limited.
This provides us with a few guidelines for future 
research. We could select three cases of collective political violence, 
one each from a 'core society', a 'peripheral society* and a 'semi 
peripheral society', as defined by Chirot, in order to determine the 
ways In which the position of countries in the capitalist world system 
influences their CPVs In terms of their antecedents and consequences.
The world systemic outlook would also enable us to 
accomodate one important class of political violence, which we had to 
abandon in the present endeavour, due to our definition of the subject 
matter and the limitations arising thereby. These are the nationalist
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movements attributable to the dialectics within the capitalist world 
system, which gives rise' to the ideologies espousing the formation of 
Independent states within the capitalist world, structurally liberated 
from the hegemony of the core societies. Today, in the era of emer­
gence of the new alternate 'socialist world system', it would be 
interesting to note which system the new emerging nations, offspring 
of these nationalist movements, espouse in their own intra-systemic 
development. This perspective would also provide ".,..a framework from 
which to interpret the results of revolutions, and help(s) us to under­
stand why there has been continual disillusionment when revolutionary 
outcomes failed to mesh with ideological claims ..."(Skocpol, 1978: 132)
The phenomenon of collective political violence is a 
researchers' gold mine. There is no end to the possible Issues which 
can be analyzed, studied and researched. Especially by integrating 
the idea of the world system, definite theoretical gains can be expec­
ted, especially in the realm of causes, structure and outcome of col­
lective political violence. Moreover, as all the societal and inter- 
socletal factors are Integrated within a theoretical framework, the 
task of drawing uniformities within apparently unique cases of poli­
tical violence might make more sense.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The bibliography is divided into three sections. The first part 
lists the General Sources consulted on the subject matter of collec­
tive political violence. The second part consists of the Sources 
used to Develop a Universe of collective political violence. The 
third part Is a comprehensive listing of the sources consulted to 
acquire information on each case of collective political violence.
The third part of the bibliography follows the appendix.
174
175
GENERAL SOURCES
Alker, Hayward R. and Bruce M. Russet. 1965. World Politics In the 
General Assembly. Yale University Press., New Haven & London.
Amann, Peter. 1962, "Revolution: a redefinition". Political Science 
Quarterly, 77.
Anderberg, Michael R. 1973. Cluster analysis for applications. 
Academic Press., New York.
Arendt, Hannah. 1963. On Revolution. Viking Press., London.
Bell, J. Bovyer. 1976. On revolt: strategies of national liberation. 
Harvard University Press., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Black, Cyril E. and Thomas P. Thornton. 1964. Communism and revolu­
tion: The Strategic uses of political violence. Princeton 
University Press., Princeton.
Blalock, Hubert M. 1960. Social Statistics. McGraw Hill., New York.
Blanks ten, George. 1958. "Revolutions", in Harold Eugene Davis,
Government and Politics in Latin America. The Ronald Press Co., 
New York.
Brlnton, Crane. 1938. The anatomy of revolution. Prentice Hall Inc., 
New York.
Bwy, Douglas P. 1968. "Dimensions of social conflict In Latin
America", in Louis H. Masottl and Don R. Bowen, Riots and Rebel­
lion. Sage Publications., Beverly Hills.
Calvert, Peter. 1970. A study of revolution. Clarendon Press.,
Oxford.
Chirot, Daniel. 1977. Social Change in the twentieth century.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovlch., New York.
Chorley, Katherine C. 1943. Armies and the art of revolution.
Beacon Press., Boston.
Davies, J. C. 1962. "Toward a theory of revolution", American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 23.
Davis, Harold Eugene. 1958. Government and politics In Latin America. 
The Ronald Press Co., New York.
176
Eckstein, Harry. 1964. Internal war: Problems and approaches.
The Free Press of Glencoe Colller-Macmillan Ltd., London.
Eckstein, Harry. 1965. "On the etiology of Internal wars", History 
and theory. Vol. 4.
Edwards, L. P. 1927. The natural history of revolutions. University 
of Chicago Press., Chicago.
Everltt, Brian. 1974 ? Cluster Analysis. John Wiley and Sons., New 
York.
Gamson, William A. 1968. Power and discontent. Dorsey Press., Home­
wood, 111.
Gamson, William A. 1975. The strategy of social protest. Dorsey 
Press., Homewood, 111.
Gerassl, John. 1971. The coming of the new international. The World 
Publishing Co., New York.
Giap, General Vo Nguyen. 1962. People's war People's army: The Viet 
Cong insurrection manual for underdeveloped countries.
Frederick A. Praeger., New York.
Goodspeed, D. J. 1962. The conspirators: A study of the coup d'etat. 
Viking Press., New York.
Gottschalk, Louis. 1944. "Causes of Revolution", American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 50.
Green, P. E. and F.J. Carmone. 1970. Multidimensional scaling and 
related techniques in marketing analysis. Allyn and Bacon., 
Rockleigh, N.J.
Greene, Thomas H. 1974. Comparative revolutionary movements.
Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
Gross, Feliks. 1958. The seizure of political power in a century of 
revolutions. The philosophical library., New York.
Gurr, T. R. 1968. "A causal model of civil strife: a comparative
analysis using new indices", American Political Science Review, 
vol. 62.
Gurr, T. R. 1968. "Psychological factors in civil violence", World 
Politics, vol. 20.
177
Gurr, T. R. 1970. "Sources of rebellion in western societies: some
quantitative evidence", Annals of American Academy of Political 
Science Review, vol. 62.
Gurr, T. R. 1973. "The revolution - social change nexus", Journal of 
comparative politics, vol. 3.
Gurr, T. R. 1970. Why men rebel. Princeton University Press., Prince­
ton.
Gurr, T. R. and Harry Eckstein. 1975. Patterns of authority: a struc­
tural basis for political injury. John Wiley and Sons., New 
York.
Gurr, T. R. 1976. Rogues, rebels and reformers: a political history 
of urban crime and conflict. Sage Publications., Beverly Hills.
Hagopian, Mark N. 1974. The phenomenon of revolution. Dodd, Mead 
and Co., New York.
Heberle, Rudolf. 1951. Social movements: an introduction to political 
sociology. Appleton Century Crofts., New York.
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1973. Mass political violence: a cross national 
causal analysis. John Wiley and Sons., New York.
Hobsbaum, Eric J. 1971. Primitive Rebels. Manchester University 
Press., Manchester.
Hoffer, Eric. 1951. The true believer. New American Library of World 
Literature., New York.
Horowitz, I. L. 1966. Three worlds of development: The theory and 
Practice of International stratification. Oxford University 
Press., New York.
Hunter, Robert. 1940. Revolution: why, how, when 7 Harper and Row., 
New York.
Huntington, S. P. 1962. Changing patterns of military politics. The 
Free Press of Glencoe Inc., New York.
Jalee, Pierre. 1969. The third world in world economy. Monthly 
Review Press*, New York.
Janos, Andrew. 1964. Authority and violence: The political frame work 
of internal war, in Harry Eckstein, Internal War, Free Press 
of Glencoe Inc., New York and London.
178
Janos, Andrew. 1964. The seizure of power: a study of force and
popular consent. Princeton University Press.» Princeton, N.J.
Janowltz, Morris. 1960. The professional soldier: a social and 
political portrait. The Free Press of Glencoe., Illinois.
John. J. Johnson. 1964. The military and society in Latin America. 
Stanford University Press., Stanford, California.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1964. Revolution and the social system. Hoover 
Institution Studies, vol. 3., Stanford.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1966. Revolutionary Change. Little Brown and Co., 
Boston and Toronto.
Kornhauser, William. 1964. Rebellion and political development, in 
Harry Eckstein, Internal War, Free Press of Glencoe., London.
Kllng, M. 1956. "Toward a theory of power and political instability 
in Latin America". Western Political Quarterly, vol. 9.
Lasswell, Harold D. and A. Kaplan. 1950. Power and Society; a frame­
work for political enquiry. Yale University Press., New Haven.
Lazarsfeld, P. F. and A.K. Pasanella. 1972. Continuities in the 
language of social research. The Free Press., New York.
Leiden, C. and K.M. Schmitt. 1968. The politics of violence: Revolu­
tion in the modern world. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliff.
Lewis, J. W. 1974. Peasant rebellion and Communist revolution in Asia. 
Stanford University Press., Stanford, California.
Luttwak, E. 1969. Coup d’etat: a practical handbook. Alfred A.
Knopf., New York.
Malaparte, C. 1932. Coup d'etat the technique of revolution. E.P. 
Dutton and Co. Inc., New York.
Mao Tse Tung. 1967. Selected works of Mao Tse Tung. Foreign Langu­
age Press., Peking.
McKinney, J. C. 1967. "Methods, procedures, and techniques in
Sociology", in Howard Becker and A. Boskoff, Modern Sociological 
Theory. Holt, Rinehart and Winston., New York.
McKinney, J. C. 1966. Constructive typology and social theory.
Appleton Century Crofts., New York.
Moore, B. 1967. Social origins of domocracy and dictatorship; lord 
and peasant in the making of modern world. Beacon Press.,
Boston.
179
Moore, W. E. 1964. "Predicting discontinuities in social change". 
American Sociological Review, vol. 29.
Oppenheimer, M. 1969. The urban guerrilla. Quadrangle books., 
Chicago.
Paige, J. M. 1975. Agrarian revolution: social movements and export 
agriculture in the underdeveloped world. The Free Press.,
New York.
Pettee, G. S. 1938. The process of revolution. Howard Fertlg.,
New York.
Roberts, R, E. and R. M. Kloss. 1974. Social movements: between the 
balcony and the barricade. The C.V. Mosby Co., St. Louis.
Rosenau, J. N. 1964. International aspects of civil strife.
Princeton University Press., Princeton.
Rummel, R. J. 1966. Dimensions of conflict behavior within nations. 
Journal of conflict resolution, vol. 10.
Rummel, R. J. 1970. Understanding factor analysis. Journal of 
conflict resolution, vol. 11.
Rummel, R. J. 1970. Applied factor analysis. Northwestern Univer­
sity press., Evanston, 111.
Russell, D. E. H. 1974. Rebellion, revolution, and armed force. 
Academic Press. , New York.
Salert, B. 1976. Revolutions and revolutionaries: Four theories. 
Elsevier., New York.
Skocpol, T. 1976. Explaining revolutions: In quest of social-
structural approach, in Lewis A. Coser and Otto N. Larson,
The uses of controversy in Sociology. Free Press., New York.
Skocpol, T. and E. Trimberger. 1978. Revolutions in the world
historical development of capitalism, in Barbara H. Kaplan, 
Social change in the capitalist world economy. Sage Publishers, 
Beverly Hills.
Sorokin, P. A. 1937. Social and cultural dynamics: fluctuation of
social relationships, war, amd revolution. American Book Co., 
New York.
Stokes, W. S. 1952. Violence as a power factor In Latin American 
politics. Western Political quarterly.
180
Stokes, W. S. 1959, Latin American Politics. Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 
New York.
Stone, L. 1966. Theories of revolution. World Politics, vol. 18.
Thorndike, R. M. 1978. Correlational procedures for research.
Gardener Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1975, The rebellious century. Harvard university 
Press., Cambridge, Mass.
Von der Mehden, Fred R. 1973. Comparative political violence.
Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The modern World system. Academic 
Press., New York.
Wilkinson, Paul, 1974, Political terrorism. John Wiley and sons.,
New York.
Wolf, Eric. R. 1969. Peasant wars of the twentieth century. Harper 
and Row., New York.
SOURCES USED FOR DEVELOPING A UNIVERSE OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Annual Register of World Events, 1907-1967. 
Encyclopedia Brltannlca, 1975.
New International Yearbook, 1907-1967. 
Statesman's Yearbook, 1907-1967.
Appendix
Variable Content of CPVs Sampled
The appendix contains information on the variable 
content of the CPVs sampled. The information presented here has pro­
vided the basis for evaluating each case of CPV, and has aided the sub­
sequent analysis of the data. In presenting the information on the 
variable content of the CPVs sampled, the first step has been to pro­
vide the data which was acquired from the varied historical sources. 
This has been followed by our own inference about the variable charac­
ter and the subsequent assignment of a particular variable code to 
every one of the multiple variables for each case of CPV sampled.
1. Portugal, 1915 (ID 1t 1)
Ideas
a) Information from sources:
"(The Democratic Party) accused the President of the Republic and 
the Ministry of having 'abused power* under the Constitution. Even­
tually they found allies in Carbonarlos, who worked secretly day and 
night, on the instruction of the revolutionary leaders, in an endeavor 
to shake off the dictatorship".(Braganca-Cunha, 1938:160)
"The Democratic organ 'Munde*, violently attacked the government 
and the dictatorship of General Castro, and the threats of violence 
and revolution were freely uttered " (Annual Register, 1915)
"In May 1915, a violent rebellion in Lisbon, backed by some army 
corps, the navy, and popular elements, threw the government out and 
reinstated the democrats," (de Oliveira Marques, 1938: 167)
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b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV in Portugal intended to
exchange the personnel In the positions of power. The Democrats wanted 
to assume power by overthrowing the government led by the Monarchist 
General Plmenta de Castro. There are no indications of constitutional 
or structural changes being Intended by the CPV. We can, therefore, 
code 'Idea' of the CPV in Portugal as involving the * exchange1 of the 
personnel in the positions of power.
Strategy
a) Information from sources:
" A revolutionary committee, in which Alvaro Castro, Antonio da Silva 
and Captain Leotte Rego were conspicuous figures, carefully organized 
the Insurrection, On May 14, in accordance with the plot, the conspi­
rators on Portugese warships in the harbor of Lisbon opened fire on the 
town. After two days of street fighting...the success of the Demo­
cratic coup d'etat was assured". (NIYB, 1915)
" Firing broke out, the Carbonarla were mobilized on May 14, In the 
streets of Lisbon....The success of the coup d'etat once again placed 
the Democratic Party in power...,." (Annual Register, 1915)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Information gathered indicate that the 
CPV though initially conspiratorial, assumed the form of open conflict 
in the latter stages. Therefore, strategy shall be coded as 'combi­
national/, that is involving the strategies of both open and conspira­
torial conflict.
Class Character
a) Information from sources:
" The democrats had behind them the bourgeois support of the major 
cities..." (de Oliveira Marques, 1938: 167)
See third quote under "Idea",
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b) Inference and Variable Coder Ab can be gathered from the sources, 
the CPV In Portugal was primarily a joined venture between the rank and 
file of the Democratic party and certain elements of the army and the 
navy. And as such It was a power struggle between organized political 
factions. Since none of the sources Indicate any proletarian and/or 
peasant elements In the CPV, It would be safe to assume that the class 
character of the CPV In Portugal was predomlnatly bourgeois and petit 
bourgeois.
Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from sources:
See first quote under 'strategy* and the quote under 'class charac­
ter'.
b) Inference and Variable Codet So far as organizational leadership 
Is concerned, the CPV In Portugal was Initiated and led by the Demo­
cratic party. So far as personal leadership leadership is concerned, 
NIYB refers to Alvaro Castro, Antonio da Silva, and Captain Leotte Rego 
as the "conspicuous figures, (who) carefully organized the insurrec­
tion" (NIYB, 1915). In view of these facts we can definitely code 
leadership structure as being centralized.
Leadership (Class)
None of the sources consulted provide any information about the 
class membership of the individuals who are recognized as leaders. In 
such situations the class of leadership is coded according to the 
class of predominant participants of the CPV. Accordingly on the basis 
of the information on the general class character of the CPV In Portu­
gal, the class of leadership has been coded as predomlnatly bourgeois
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an<* petit bourgeois.
Organization
a) Information from Sources:
See quote # 1 under 'strategy*.
b) Inference and Variable Code: NIYB (1915) very clearly notes that the 
CPV was very 'carefully organized', and that action ensued "in accor­
dance with the plot". Also according to Livermore (1947: 455) "The 
democratic party had carefully prepared the naval forces of the Tagus.." 
Following these facts we shall consider the CPV in Portugal as orga­
nized.
Participation
No definite estimate about the degree of participation is given by 
any of the authors consulted. Nevertheless, a rather significant 
following is Implied in most of the sources. If we are to take the 
casualty figures as any indication of the degree of participation then 
we can safely assume that participation was definitely more than 500. 
(See information under violence). We shall thus code participation 
as some.
Duration
a) Information from sources:
" Hostilities lasted two days." (Livermore, 1947; 455)
" After two days of fighting,  the success of the democratic
coup d'etat was assured". (NIYB, 1915)
b) Inference and Varlble Code: The CPV in Portugal lasted * less than a 
week'.
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Violence
The casualty figures range from 100 killed, 300 wounded (Annual 
Register, 1915, Braganca-Cunha, 1938) to 200 killed, 500 wounded (NIYB, 
1915). This does not create any problem for us, since In any case both 
figures exceed our maximum category. Thus violence Is coded as consi­
derable .
Area
The area of protest Is Indicated by all sources as being the capital 
city of Lisbon. This fulfills our maximum scale so far as area Is con­
cerned. Thus area shall be coded as Misturbance in capital city*.
Government Response
a) Information from sources;
"...General de Castro resigned office and was taken prisoner ". 
(Annual Register, 1915)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Government response is coded as posi­
tive, since the government of General Castro resigned.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from sources:
" The army had given the amplest assurance to General Plmenta de 
Castro that It would uphold the government, but it failed to give its 
promised support". (Braganca-Cunha, 1938: 161)
" ..the naval arsenal was a strong point for the revolution, and 
the members of the Fiscal guard and the Republican guard joined the 
movement." (Livermore, 1947: 455)
b) Inference and Variable Code: As can be gathered from the sources
not only did the army fall to give its promised support to the govern­
ment, it played an active part In the CPV. Armed force disloyalty
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In Portugal la coded high,
2. Germany. 1918 (ID # 2)
Ideas
a) Information from sources;
" Before the revolution In the closing weeks of 1918. and the esta­
blishment of a provisional government, the German Empire was a consti­
tutional Monarchy...Signs of a crisis were plain before the middle of 
October, the power of the Socialists becoming daily more assured...
By October 20. Herr Ebert, Herr Scheidemann and other socialist 
deputies in the Reichstag were openly demanding peace, popular govern­
ment and the abdication of the Kaiser. By the beginning of November, 
the revolution throughout Germany was in full progress ..." (NIYB, 1918 
249-254).
b) Inference and Variable Code: A general review of the sources indi­
cate that the Kiel mutiny of November 3 signalled the beginning of the 
German revolution. In itself the mutiny was apolitical. However, the 
success of the first efforts of the sailors led quickly to the formula­
tion of political and revolutionary policies, which included the demand 
for universal suffrage and the abdication of the Kaiser, And as the 
action spread throughout the country it assumed strictly political 
character with overthrow of the constitutional monarchy as its primary 
aim. The idea of the German CPV can thus be coded as espousing 
constitutional change.
Strategy
The sources indicate the use of general strike, rioting and mutiny 
as the strategies of violence utilized in the CPV (NIYB, 1918)
Class Character
a) Information from sources;
" ..soldiers bearing red flags soon flocked into the streets from
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the outskirts of the city. Workers from the factories joined them and 
some 3000 sailors from Kiel,..,11 (NIYB, 1918; 254)
b) Inference and Variable Code; Participation of petit bourgeois and 
intellectual elements such as Herr Ebert, Herr Scheldemann, Dr, Karl 
Llebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg Is also indicated in the sources. On 
the basis of these informations we can quote class as consisting of 
petit bourgeois and proletarian elements.
Leadership (Structure)
A number of personalities surface here and there in all the accounts. 
However, there Is no Information In these accounts which would Indicate 
that these individuals actually led the CPV. It is highly unlikely 
that the entire course of action was leaderless. At the same time no 
one source of leadership can be identified. We thus code leadership 
structure as decentralized.
Leadership (Class)
Since leadership structure was decentrallzed,leaders,lf any,would 
have originated from the ranks of the participants . Leadership class 
is, therefore, coded as petit bourgeois, proletarian.
Organization
a) Information from sources;
" Although the conservatives maintained that a widespread conspi­
racy for a revolution existed since January, 1918, there Is little 
evidence to support this view. The Independent Socialists as a party 
failed to commence organized revolutionary activity...(and when unrest 
and revolutionary activity ensued) It was not due to the machinations 
of the party" (Stanford University Publication on the German Revolu­
tion , 1922).
b) Inference and Variable Code; The CPV in Germany was, therefore, to
the most part spontaneous.
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Participation
All sources (NIYBt 1918; SUP, 1922 ) Indicate massive participation 
which easily exceeds our maximum. Participation is, therefore, coded 
as considerable.
Duration
The CPV had its beginnings in the Kiel mutiny, which took place on 
November 3 (NIYB, 1918: 254). It triumphed on November 10, when the 
Kaiser was forced to abdicate (NIYB, 1918: 254 and SUP,1922).
Violence
NIYB (1918: 254) points to the fact that casualties were minimum. 
Most sources contend that total casualties were less than 200 with 
approximately 50 dead. Thus violence is coded as some .
Area
It is quite evident from the sources that the CPV had "spread 
throughout other parts of the country (SUP, 1922 ). It has been indi­
cated earlier that the CPV was initiated to a certain degree in the 
capital city of Berlin. This easily meets our maximum scale so far as 
area is concerned. Are Is therefore, coded as disturbance engulfing 
the entire country.
Governement Response
Governemnt response was initially violent, especially when it acted 
to repress the Kiel mutiny. However, finally it acted positively with 
the abdication of the Kaiser. Governement response Is, therefore, 
coded as both positive and violent.
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Armed Force Disloyalty 
The fact that a naval mutiny Initiated the CPV and that throughout 
its duration the soldiers fraternized with the rioting civilians (SUP, 
1922 : 14, 31; NIYB, 1918) Indicates high armed force disloyalty.
3. France, 1934 (ID # 3)
Ideas
a) Information from sourcea:
" ...L'action Francalse in blaring headlines called for a revolt of 
Paris against the robbers, meaning the parliament and the government." 
(Shirer, 1969: 209).
b) Inference and Variable Code: According to Shirer (1969; 213) the
February demonstrations aimed to bring down the republican government. 
No indication is given about constitutional changes or structural 
changes being espoused by the CPV. Therefore the CPV shall be coded 
as espousing exchange of personnel in the positions of power.
Strategy
a) Information from sources:
" The riots did go on, increasing in violence.... It was the bloodi­
est encounter In the streets of Paris since the Commune of 1671". 
(Shirer, 1969: 209,220).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy involved was open con­
flict in the form of rioting and demonstrations.
Class Character
a) Information from sources:
" Middle and upper class youths many from the universities or just 
out of them, formed the phalanx of the various leagues that had taken 
to the streets" (Shirer, 1969: 201)
b) Inference and Variable Code: The fact that the demonstrators were
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"joined by civil servants and ex-servicemen protesting pay cuts", 
(NIYB.1934: 245) demonstrates the predomlnatly petit bourgeois charac­
ter of the movement.
Leadership (Structure)
Shirer Identifies certain individuals as the leaders of the leagues 
which participated in the riots (Shirer, 1969: 201, 209). However, 
their leadership was primarily organization oriented. There was a 
definite lack of determined leadership in so far as action was con­
cerned. Nevertheless, there did exist an identifiable source of cen­
tralized power.
Leadership (Class)
All the Individuals identified by Shirer as leaders were members of 
leagues such as Action Francals and the Camelots which were predomi­
nantly middle and upper class organizations which recruited mostly from 
university students. We, therefore, consider class of leadership as 
petit bourgeois.
Organization
The CPV in France Is considered seml-organized since the leagues 
and the Communists who joined the action Issued appeals to its members 
and other Parisians to "gather after day's work and march on the Cham­
ber of Deputies..." (Shirer, 1969: 213). However, beyond this Initial 
appeal there is nothing to show any planning or organization of fur­
ther action.
Participation
An idea of total participation can be gained by considering the 
fact that only for February 6, the estimated number of rioters
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exceeded the 40*000 mark (Shirer, 1969: 219). This easily meets our 
maximum In the scale of participation. Thus participation Is coded as 
considerable.
Duration
The riots started on January 9, 1934 and after reaching massive 
proportions on February 6, led to the fall of the second government in 
less than a month. (NIYB, 1934: 245, 246). Therefore, duration is 
coded as week to six months.
Violence
a) Information from sources:
"...fourteen were killed by bullets and two died later from their 
wounds, some 665 were injured...The police and guards lost - 1 killed, 
and 1664 injured". (Shirer, 1969: 219).
" Fifteen persons were killed and hundreds wounded" (Annual Register, 
1934: 169)
b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of these figures, we 
can appropriately code the maximum for casualty figures, I.e., consi­
derable.
Area
Rioting and demonstrations occurred In the streets of Paris,
Thus area is coded as disturbance in capital city.
Governement Response 
Governement response was initially violent, when mounted units of 
the mobile guards, policemen were called to control the crowd, however 
ultimately the government resigned In response to the consistent pro­
tests from the public. Governement response will accordingly be coded 
as both violent and positive.
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Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from sources;
" By 1934, It was clear that the intellectual revolt of the right 
against the parliament had spread to large sections of the officer 
corps. As the street riots spread, all during January and the police 
seemed unable or unwilling to put them down, there were doubts In the 
government that the army could be counted on to restore order" 
(Shirer, 1969: 224).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Shirer's Information does indicate 
the existence of a certain degree of armed force disloyalty amongst 
sections of the army corps. Since they did not join the rioters in 
action, armed force disloyalty will be coded as low.
4. Cuba. 1958 (ID # 4)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" ...the alms of the revolutionary antl-Batlsta movement were pri­
marily political and not social: to restore representative democracy 
and the 1940 constitution" (Goldenberg; 1965: 161 and 144),
" ..'what is your programme?' the American journalist asked. Castro 
replied 'to restore the 1940 constitution and to hold free elections' " 
(Goldenberg, 1965: 156)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Regardless of Its eventual outcome,
we shall code Ideas of the Cuban CPV as constitutional.
Strategy
a) Information from sources:
" ...disappointed In hls(Castro) hopes of a mass uprising, he 
shifted over to full scale guerrilla warfare- bombings, sabotage, and 
hit and run raids" (Draper, 1962: 14)
b) Inference and Variable Code: References are frequently made in
other sources consulted to "..guerrilla warfare tactics used by the
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rebels " (Draper, 1962: 14), Macgaffey and Barnett refer to the 
"much larger urban resistance movement (which) conducted terrorist 
activity (1962: 241), As can be definitely gathered from all these 
sources, the strategy was definitely conspiratorial.
CIsbs Character
a) Information from sources:
" Castro’s army was recruited primarily from the peasantry....To the 
Sierra Maestra also came a number of urban, middle class refugees from 
the Batista tyranny." (Lleuwen, 1961: 264).
" The revolutionaries were predomlnatly young intellectuals, The 
greatest sympathy with the movement existed amongst the middle classes. 
Raul Castro said that the Cuban revolution (was) a collaboration of 
workers, members of the liberal profession, intellectuals and business­
man..." (Goldenberg, 1965: 144).
" Those who followed Castro in 1953 were almost entirely men of 
the lower middle class or working class. Castro said that 90 % of his 
followers were workers and farmers- this seems to have been right" 
(Thomas, 1971: 824).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code class character as 
reflecting a petlt-bourgeols. proletarian, peasant alliance.
Leadership (Structure)
According to Thomas (1971) Castro was the supreme commander (p,894). 
Wolf (1969) contends similarly when he makes references to "82 men 
under Castro" (P. 268). Thomas (1971) also recognizes a hierarchy 
aboard the Granma, In which Raul Castro, Che Guevara, Juan Almeida, 
and others are referred to as 'captains* under the supreme command of 
Fidel Castro. Therefore, a central source of leadership is recognized.
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Leadership (Class)
The Individuals recognized as occupying the central core of leader­
ship were primarily urban, middle class, well-to-do Intellectuals and 
professionals. Leadership class Is, therefore, coded as petit bour­
geois .
Organization
So far as the 26th July movement is concerned there Is enough evi­
dence to consider It preplanned. As Macgaffey and Barnett (1962) con­
tend "the plan for the attack on Moncada had evolved from meetings In 
Havana"(p: 230). Moreover, the fact that the training in Mexico and 
expedition aboard ^ranma’ to Sierra Maestra coordinated with acti­
vities in Havana indicate preplanning. And finally as Thomas (1971) 
recognizes "most of the guerrilla tactics (were the) result of care­
ful study and planning" (p: 939). Therefore, all facts put together 
points towards preplanning and organization. Organization is, thus 
coded as organized.
Participation
a) Information from sources:
"Reliable sources say that on the day of the victory the whole 
Castro army consisted of 803 men, which together with all other groups 
made up a force of 1000 to 1500" (Goldenberg,1965: 159).
"The final rebel drive occured In late December as the guerrillas, 
now 8,000 strong and overwhelmingly supported by the civilian populace, 
descended from their mountain fastnesses and attacked the cities..." 
(Lleuwen,1961: 265).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the references consulted 
provide quite different estimates so far as participation Is concerned, 
this does not Inconvenience us very much. In either case our maxi­
mum scale for participation Is easily met - considerable.
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Duration
a) Information from sources;
" There is some consensus that the rebellion had its beginning on 
26 July 1953, with the assault on the Moncada barracks* And in early 
January 1959* Castro became the new ruler of Cuba*' (Russell*1974: 164).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Thus, the CPV spanned the course of
six years. Duration is therefore, coded as Six months plus.
Violence
a) Information from sources;
"... estimates of fatalities in the struggle against Batlata to­
taled about 1000 in the mountains, 19000 in the cities" (Macgaffey and
Barnettl962: 241).
"The official legend speaks of 20000 dead. But this is a delibe­
rately exaggerated figure..." (Goldenberg,1965: 144)
b) Inference and Variable Code; There exists considerable amount of 
disagreement about the actual number or even an approximate estimate 
of casualties. But nevertheless,all sources agree that it was defi­
nitely more than our maximum scale for violence. Therefore, violence 
can be safely coded as considerable.
Area
m
The maximum score for area is easily met when we consider the fact 
that the CPV in Cuba which had "burst out of the Sierra Maestra ... 
entered The Sierra del Cristal and the province of Las Villas" (Fagg, 
1965: 98). There were guerrilla activities in the provinces of Cama- 
guay, Plnar del Rio, the city of Sancti Spiritus, and the ports of 
Calbarien, Encrucija and Placetas. (NIYB, 1958: 122) Thus, area is 
coded as disturbance engulfing the entire country.
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Government Response
a) Information from Sources;
" There were all kinds of prohibitions, arrests and police 
brutalities....many rebels were captured, tortured and murdered " 
(Goldenberg, 1965: 113-150).
"  The BAtista government adopted...a policy of suppressing
all opposition by means of increasingly brutal police terrorism " 
(Macgaffey and Barnett, 1962: 241),
b) Inference and Variable Code: There is unanimous agreement that 
the Batista government responded with extreme police brutality and 
terrorism. However, in the end Batista was forced to relinquish 
power. Government response will thus be coded as violent and posi- 
tive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from Sources:
"  Batista's armed forces began to become worried and rest­
less. Batista had to crush a navy rebellion in Clenfuegos during 1957 
and in late 1958 air force pilots refused to follow his orders to bomb 
rebel held towns " (Lleuwen, 1961: 265).
"....the army became increasingly demoralized....many officers 
and still more soldiers withdrew without a fight while other officers 
deserted to the enemy or were persuaded to retreat " (Goldenberg,
1965: 146).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The information from the sources
Justifies coding armed force disloyalty in the Cuban CPV as low.
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5. Russia. 1917 (ID 0 5)
IdeaB
a) Information from sources:
" The masses were against the war and In favor of a radical land 
reform and socialization of Industry....The resolute elimination of 
the autocratic regime and the complete democratization of the country" 
(Gross, 1958: 86, 197-198).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The ideas referred not only to 
exchange of personnel but also to the reorganization of the authority 
structure and more importantly, redistribution of the bases of power. 
Therefore, idea shall be coded as structural.
Strategy
a) Information from sources:
" Strike became a major item in Russian revolutionary Inventory" 
(Gross, 1958: 195).
" The first bread riots took place in the capital on March 8,,.on 
the 9th the rioting spread.." (The Annual Register, 1917: 237,238)
b) Inference and Variable Code: As is evident from the sources, stri­
king and rioting became very important tactics in the Russian CPV. In 
February 1917 alone, the sources Indicate that there were extensive 
riots and strikes Involving 432,000 strikers, 200,000 In Petersburg 
alone. Strategy shall, therefore, be coded as open.
Class Character
a) Information from sources:
" Two fundamental forces, ... were the workers and the soldiers" 
(Gross, 1958: 199)
" The chief elements that had brought about the revolution, were., 
namely the working men and the soldiers" (NIYB, 1917: 599)
" The February insurrection took place without the participation of 
the bourgeoisie, indeed, without Its support - passive or otherwise.
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The bourgeoisie had neither led nor even followed a movement that It 
treated with a deep distrust compounded of fear and hostility"
(Liebman, 1970 ; 115-116).
'* The autocracy was overthrown by the combined action of the workers 
and soldiers who Joined them. The decisive part In the overthrow of 
the autocracy was played by the proletarian population of over a mil­
lion of Petrograd" (The History of the Civil War in USSR, 1936 : 93).
b) Inference and variable code: On the basis of above information
class character of the Russian CPV shall be coded as predominantly
proletarian.
Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from sources:
" It is often said that the February revolution was spontaneous, 
and in fact it was not organized by any party or by any political 
leader. The liberals did not want it, the revolutionary leaders were 
in far away Siberia or in political exile abroad. All alike were taken 
by surprise. Those who cannot imagine a strike without a leader, or a 
revolution without men pulling the strings behind the scenes, must 
find February 1917 a complete enigma; and none were mystified than 
those whom the revolution bore to power..." (Llebman, 1970 : 99).
b) Inference and Variable Code: In considering the leadership struc­
ture of the Russian CPV it has been realized that the CPV was almost 
totally devoid of any central organizational leadership. We can, as 
such, consider leadership structure as decentralized assuming that 
whatever leadership arose was situational and did not transcend 
beyond certain localities or groups.
Leadership (Class)
In case of decentralized leadership structure, that is when no 
single centre of power can be discerned, the class of leadership shall 
be coded as the class of the predominant participants in the CPV. 
Accordingly, for Russia the class of leadership I s  coded as prole­
tarian.
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Organization
a) Information from sources:
M ...the revolutionary committees neither ordered the strikes nor 
did they carry the leadership In the streets. The movement was sponta­
neous* it grew from the masses" (Gross* 1958: 199)
" The February revolution was begun from below* overcoming the 
resistance of its own revolutionary organizations'1 (Trotsky, 1957 t 50 )
b) Inference and Variable Code; The Russian CPV has been unanimously 
regarded as spontaneous.
Participation
a) Information from sources:
" On the day of the opening of the Duma (Feb. 7) 100*000 workers 
went on strike in Petrograd and 25,000 in Moscow" (Illustrated 
History, 1928).
"....432,000 strikers* 200,000 in Petersburg alone" (Gross* 1958: 
197, 201)
"....197,000 strikers in Petrograd" (Liebman, 1970: 100)
b) Inference and Variable Code: By all standards the estimates for 
participation exceeds our maximum score. Therefore, participation 
shall be coded as considerable (1000 plus).
Duration
According to Gross (1958), Liebman (1970) the strikes and rioting 
were most decisive and massive between February 23 and 27. These five 
days are usually accepted as the time span of the February CPV. 
Therefore* duration shall be coded as less than a week.
Area
a) Inforamtion from sources:
" the first bread riots took place in the capital..Moscow* Odessa 
and other large towns, and the army at the front Joined the revolu­
tion" (Annual Register* 1917:237-38 and 241).
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"The large factories of Petrograd played a very Important part In 
the whole revolution" (Illustrated History, 1928).
b) Inference and Variable Code; The riots and strikes occurred In the 
capital St, Petersburg and then spread to other large towns. In the 
front the army conducted revolutionary activity. Thus the CPV was 
engulfing the entire country. This fulfills our maximum score for 
area. We shall, therefore, code area as disturbance engulfing the 
entire country.
Government Response
a) Information from sources;
" I warn the people of Petrograd that the military have
instructions from me to use their rifles and ruthlessly to take any 
measures necessary to restore order....", (Warning by Lt. General 
Khabalov, the Commander of the Petrograd Defence Committee, as 
quoted In Illustrated History,1928).
"Then suddenly the mounted police charged the crowd...then came the 
sound of rifle shots". (Illustrated History,1928),
b) Inference and Variable Code: The references indicate the violence 
which the government forces used to quell the disturbance. Eventually, 
however, the government had to relinquish power In favor of the 
representatives of the people. We shall, therefore, code government 
response as both violent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from sources:
"Altogether on 27th February some 66000men, about a third of the 
troops in the city, defied their officers. Some of them simply went 
home; others merged Into the riotous crowds, which they sometimes led 
in attacks....The elementary fact that the soldiers were armed, where­
as... the striking workmen were not, more than made up for the dispa­
rity In numbers between the two groups. In this way what began as
a workers revolt  became a revolution through the Involvement of
the soldiers", (Keep, 1976: 60).
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"In 1917 the pillars of the tsarist system - the bureaucracy and 
the army - were disintegrating even before the workers and the people 
of St, Petersburg revolted", (Gross,1958: 194)
b) Inference and Variable Code; Armed force disloyalty in the Ruuslan 
CPV can be safely coded as high.
6. Turkey. 1908 (ID # 6)
Ideas
a) Information from sources:
"Among the objects of the movement were .,..the abdication of Abdul 
Hamid, a radical change of officials, and the Introduction of a repre­
sentative system by means of a parliament", (NIYB,1908; 708)
".....object of making the empire independent of foreign control, 
and of establishing a constitution to secure liberty and equality for 
all races and religions in Turkey". (Annual Register,1908: 325)
b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of the information de­
rived from the sources, we are justified in coding the idea of the CPV 
in Turkey as constitutional.
Strategy
a) Information from sources:
"  assassination of General Osman, Commander of the Turkish
forces at Monastir by an officer connected with the ’Young Turk
Movement'. This murder follows the assassination of General Shemsi 
PaBha". (New York Times, July 19, 1908)
"It Is rumored that 7000 Turkish troops in the Monastir district 
are in open revolt,...", (New York Times, July 20, 1908)
b) Inference and Variable Code: According to the sources consulted 
the strategy involved both conspiratorial tactics such as assassina­
tion, seizure of important personalities, seizure and occupation of 
important centres of power, and the usage of such tactics of open 
violence such as mutiny and revolt. We shall, therefore, consider
202
strategy as primarily combinational.
Class Character
a) Information from sources;
" In general, tbe revolution was said to be the work of the higher 
or middle classes, specially the members of professions and the better 
educated element In the population. The lower classes, except when 
they had come directly under the influence of the young Turk officers
or soldiers, were for the most part indifferent The recruits came
from the middle classes specially from the junior officers of the army 
and the navy and from the officers from the middle and lower ranks of 
the civil service, the professional classes and the Ulema." (NIYB, 
1908: 708)
b) Inference and Variable Code: The references suggest that the 
class character of the Turkish CPV was predominantly petit bourgeois.
Leadership (Structure)
The leadership structure both in terms of organization and persona­
lity was definitely centralized. The Committee of Union and Progress 
the organizational entity of the young Turks was the prime movers of 
all action. Similarly so far as individuals are concerned, Majors 
Niazi Bey and Enver Bey are recognized as some of the major persona­
lities so far as organization and dispersion of revolutionary activity 
and propaganda is concerned.("Viator", 1908: 366, Annual Register, 
1908: 325, NIYB, 1908: 708)
Leadership (Class)
a) Information from Sources:
" The young Turks belonged to the newly emerging professional 
classes; lecturers in the recently founded government colleges, 
lawyers trained in western law, journalists, minor clerks in the 
bureaucracy and junior officers trained in the western style war 
colleges" (Annual Register, 1908: 325)
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b) Inference and Variable Code; Just like the rank and file, the 
leaders of the young Turk movement belonged to the petit bourgeoisie.
Organization
a) Information from sources:
" The revolution....was the direct outcome of the young Turk move­
ment, which had been secretly and effectively carried on for many 
years....A Committee of Union and Progress was formed end a paper 
founded by Ahmed Reza became Its organ. Pamphlets were secretly dis­
seminated and circulated in the empire." (NIYB, 1908: 708)
" There seems to be little doubt that the general uprising was 
planned to take place in Macedonia on September 1, 1908 and that much 
blood was expected to flow before the Sultan could be made to come to 
heel." (Ramsaur, 1957: 133)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the sources differ on the 
actual date the uprising was planned for, there is general unanimity 
that the action which ensued on July 1908 was definitely organized.
Participation
a) Information from Sources:
" He (Sultan) was warned...by the revolutionists, that unless he 
proclaimed the constitution they would march against Constantinopole 
at once with an array 300,000 strong" (NIYB, 1908: 709)
" ...100,000 men would march on Istanbul" (Lewis, 1961: 205)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the figures on participation 
are varied, they easily meet our maximum score for participation. 
Participation can, therefore, be coded as considerable.
Duration
a) Information from Sources:
" The revolution began on July 22 at Resna, where Major Niazy Bey 
and his followers revolted" (Annual Register, 1908: 325)
" On July 24 Abdul Hamid decreed constitution for the Turkish 
Republic" (New York Times, July 25, 1908)
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b) Inference and Variable Code; Duration shall be coded as less than 
a week.
Violence
a) Information from sources;
" ...the whole revolution w s b  accompanied by much less bloodshed 
than those of other countries*' (Annual Register, 1906: 326)
" ..only seven lives are believed to have been sacrificed,..." 
("Viator", 1908: 354)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Violence shall be coded as minimum.
Area
References Indicate that the young Turk movement spread all over 
the country. (New York Times, July 19-26, 1908). Thus the CPV 
engulfed the entire country.
Government Response
a) Information from sources:
" Shemsi Pasha... received orders to put down (the) revolt imme­
diately and at all costs."(NIYB, 1908: 708)
" The secret police murdered 40,000 young Turks even before the 
July action had started" (New York Times, Aug 27, 1906)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Governement response shall be coded 
as both violent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from sources:
See quotation # 1 under 'class character1.
b) Inference and Variable Code; Armed force disloyalty will be coded
as high since the action was conceived, led and participated by the
officers and soldiers in the armed forces.
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7. Brazil, 1930 (ID # 7)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" We are fighting a counter revolution to reacquire liberty, to 
restore a pure republican regime and for national reconstruction" 
(Vargas as quoted in Young, 1967:54).
" The contest was ...mainly one of persons" (Annual Register,
1930: 302)
b) Inference and Variable Code: The specific and the immediate objec­
tive of the Brazilian CPV was to remove President Washington Luis 
Pereira de Souza and establish Getulio Vargas in his position. The 
idea was, therefore, primarily exchange oriented
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
" The coup d ’etat in Rio De Janeiro was accompanied by lively street 
fighting" (NIYB, 1930: 110)
b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy was a combination of
open and conspiratorial tactics.
Class Character
a) Information from sources:
" The revolution.... is supported by all classes including rich farm 
owners, manufacturers, the middle classes and the working men..,” 
(Young, 1967: 65)
b) Inference and Variable Code: References indicate that the CPV was 
supported by the bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, and the prole­
tariat .
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Leadership (Structure)
Certain personalities are relatively more prominent In the CPV than 
others. Vargas, General Tasso Fragoso, General Mena Barreto are repea­
tedly referred to as the prime movers of the CPV. (Dulles, 1967: 70; 
Russell, 1974: 105; Annual Register, 1930: 305)
Leadership (Class)
The individuals mentioned above originated from the bourgeoisie 
and upper petit bourgeoisie. Vargas was a lawyer, whereas Fragoso and 
Barreto occupied high positions In the military hierarchy.
Organization
a) Information from Sources:
" Although the 1930 revolution may have been carried out to change 
the election results.... there is sufficient evidence indicating that 
military operations were being planned well before the Presidential 
election took place'1 (Young, 1967: 55)
b) Inference and Variable Code: As Young and others(Russell, 1974:
106; Skidmore, 1967: 5) contend, the Brazilian CPV was jointly 
organized by a group of military men and civilians.
Participation
a) Information from Sources:
" The number of rebel troops in the field was estimated from twenty 
to thirty thousand" (Young, 1967: 63)
" According to the ....revolutionists high command, 30,000 men,... 
had moved up from the south" (Bello, 1966: 273)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Participation can be safely coded as 
considerable.
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Duration
a) Information from Sources:
'* The military revolution began at 5 O'clock on the afternoon of 
October 3" (Young, 1967: 54)
" The struggle was terminated on October 24 when a junta of army 
and naval officers headed by General Fragoso deserted the government
and seized control of Rio de Janeiro" (NIYB, 1930: 109)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration shall be coded as week to 
six months.
Violence
a) Information from Sources:
" It was, in fact, practically bloodless revolution" (Camacho, 1952:
46)
*' In Belo Horizonte....sixteen soldiers were killed...in Rio Grande 
about eight were killed, in Recife thirtyfive had been killed..." 
(Dulles, 1967: 68-69)
b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of the above facts, we
can code violence as some.
Area
The rebellion went smoothly in southern Brazil, in the states of 
Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gereas and simultaneously in the extreme 
north of the republic. Ten days of fighting gave the rebels control 
of the ten states of the twenty in the federation" (NIYB, 1930: 109)
As has been pointed out already the most significant aspect of the
movement had occurred in the capital. Therefore, all information put
together indicates that the CPV engulfed the entire country.
Government Response
a) Information from Sources:
" The government immediately proclaimed martial law in ...the 
states where revolutionary movement had made most headway" (Annual 
Register, 1930: 304)
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b) Inference and Variable Coder Besides proclaiming martial law 
President Luis also sent his miniscule troops still loyal to quell the 
CPV, which resulted In a few Bklrmishes. Finally, however, he relin­
quished power in favour of the revolutionists. All of these would 
Indicate that government response was violent, non violent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from Sources:
" The majority of the lieutenants....gave their unqualified support
to the revolution By eleven O'clock that night (October 3) most of
the Federal troops of Porto Allegre had gone over to the rebels"
(Young, 1967: 55, 63)
" ....the revolutionists began a propaganda campaign against loyal 
Federal troops stationed in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The theme 
was that brothers should not fight brothers. It was very effective.." 
(Young, 1967: 59)
b) Inference and Variable Code: All sources(Bello, 1966: 273; Lieuwen, 
1961: 75; Camacho, 1952: 46) indicate that majority of the armed forces 
gave their unqualified support to the revolution. Therefore, armed 
force disloyalty is coded high.
8. Iraq, 1958 (ID # 8)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" The intention of the officers' movement, headed by Brigadier 
Abdul Karim Kasem, was announced as the removal of the monarchy and 
the previous ruling faction" (Annual Register, 1958: 320)
" ...the free officers preferred the republican system and decided 
to disestablish the monarchy....not only was the new regime declared 
to be a republic, but also a people's republic elected by and for the 
people" (Khaddurl, 1969: 44, 48)
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b) Inference and Variable Code: The intention of the CPV was to 
remove the monarchy and establish a popular republic. The CPV sub­
sequently carried out Its objectives. We shall code idea as consti­
tutional change.
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
" ....a sudden military movement, long contemplated In higher army 
circles but in complete secrecy, seized strategic points in the capital 
invaded the palace, and caused the instant deaths of King Feisal, the 
Amir Abdul Ilah, and at least a dozen members of the royal family" 
(Khaddurl, 1969: 51).
" The rising was military in conception, planning, organization 
and execution; the military character of the conspiracy was preserved" 
(Dann, 1969: 19).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy was undoubtedly conspira­
torial.
Class Character
Information from Sources:
" The officers who engaged in politics...... came from lower
classes most from lower and poorer classes, but some who held
higher ranks were either upper class or were older men who identified 
themselves with that class. The soldiers, as a rule, belonged to the 
peasants and working classes" (Khaddurl, 1969: 16)
" ....the new middle classes in Iraq, including the lower middle 
class...is particularly significant, because it is the people of 
these groups who made the revolution" (Caractacus, 1959: 87).
b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of information gathered
from sources, we shall code class character as primarily petit bour­
geois. proletarian and peasantry oriented.
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Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from Sources;
" Even In Its preparatory stages, the revolution In Iraq had become 
a one man job, effected by Kassem with Colonel Abd-al-Salem Arif 
acting as his trusted personal aid" (Dann, 1969: 19)
b) Inference and Variable Code: The head of the movement is recog­
nized quite unanimously as being Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem followed 
by Colonel Abd-al-Salem Arif. We can thus code leadership structure 
as centralized.
Leadership (Class)
Both Kassem and Arif occupied high positions in the military elite, 
and are regarded as representing the new Iraqi upper middle class who. . 
"imbued with intense nationalism, ...identified themselves with the 
national aspirations of their civilian contemporaries" (Khaddurl, 1969: 
19). Leadership class can, therefore, be coded as petit bourgeois.
Organization
a) Information from Sources:
See quotation 4 2 under 'strategy*.
" He (Kassem) held a meeting of the Central Organization in the 
evening of that day (July A) at his house...at which a decision to 
carry out the plan of occupying Baghdad was approved." (Khaddurl,
1969: 39)
b) Inference and Variable Code: All the sources (Dann, 1969: 19; 
Caractacus, 1959: 119; Annual Register, 1958: 320) point towards the 
existence of considerable amount of planning and organization before 
actual action ensued. Therefore, we can code that the CPV in Iraq 
was organized.
211
Participation
a) Information from Sources:
" The number of officers who took part In underground activities 
and called themselves the free officers was relatively small- only 172 
according to one Informant, and 300 according to another. The latter 
estimate seems to include all those involved in the activities of the 
free officers, the former figure only those who were active in the 
leadership of the movement." (Khaddurl, 1969: 17)
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code participation as few.
Duration
a) Information from Sources:
" The revolution which ....broke out in Baghdad ended in a day" 
(Annual Register, 1938: 320)
b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration shall be coded as less than 
a week.
Violence
a) Information from Sources:
" A year later Kassem asserted with pride that in the glorious revo 
lutlon of the 14th July only 19 people were killed..there is no 
reason to doubt this estimate... the casualty list is very short"
(Dann, 1969: 34).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Violence shall be coded as minimum.
Area
According to all sources the coup occurred in Baghdad, the capital 
city. Therefore, area will be coded as disturbance in capital city.
Government Response 
The government had no chance to respond either violently or non- 
violently. It was overwhelmed and forced to yield by the revolution­
ary forces before it became conscious of the true extent of the situa­
tion. Government response is thus coded as positive.
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Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from Sources:
See quotes under 'ideas', 'strategy' and 'class character'.
b) Inference and Variable Code: The extent of armed force disloyalty 
Is more than evident. Armed force disloyalty Is therefore coded as 
high.
9. Mexico. 1910 (ID # 10)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
M Madero's ....suuporters demanded the resignation of Diaz,
Nothing less would satisfy them" (Atkins, 1970: 61).
" The demands of Madero and his group were for political opportu­
nity to participate in the government, to stop the perpetual reelec­
tion of the dictator....It was to change the leadership, the gover­
ning group" (Tannenbaum, 1933: 146)
b) Inference and Variable Code: The Mexican CPV demanded exchange
of personnel in the positions of power.
Strategy
The references consulted (Johnson, 1968: 50, 61; Atkins, 1970:69 ; 
Tannenbaum, 1933: 115, 119) give accounts of two major battles fought 
between the rebels and the Federal troops - the battle of 'Cassas 
Grandes* and the battle of 'Juarez*. In addition to these there are 
numerous accounts of skirmishes throughout the republic between the 
Federal troops and an "elusive enemy who would strike and fade away. 
In to the sierra or the desert (Johnson, 1968; 50) Indicating
the widespread use of guerrilla tactics. Since both open and conspi­
ratorial tactics were utilized, strategy shall be coded as combi-
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national.
Claaa Character
a) Information from Sources:
" Peasants, ranchers, school teachers, lawyers, students, and mer­
chants were oiling their rifles, strapping cartridge belts across 
their chests and stealing off to join self constituted jefes of the 
revolution" (Johnson, 1968: 50).
" The real battles of the movement were fought anonymously by little 
bands of peasants and soldiers to vindicate their right to overthrow 
the government. Small groups of Indians under anonymous leaders were 
the revolution" (Tannenbaum, 1933: 119).
b) Inference and Varlbale Code: The Mexican CPV was primarily a 
peasant affair. And all sources Indicate the predominant participa­
tion of the peasantry. Other classes which participated were city 
labourers, cow boy population laboring on the large cattle ranches 
(Wolf, 1969: 25, 26), rural school teachers, small merchants and 
students. We can accordingly code class as primarily petit bourgeois, 
proletarian and peasant oriented.
Leadership (Structure)
Tannenbaum*s (1933) contention "that the real battles of the move­
ment were fought anonymously ...under anonymous leaders" (p: 119) 
captures the actual nature of the leadership structure of the Mexican 
CPV. Francisco Madero usually cited as the initiator of the plan and 
executioner of the movement, in reality provided little more than 
mere symbolic leadership. Individuals like Emiliano Zapata, Pancho 
Villa and Pasquale Orozco provided the leadership In the field.
However, even these Individuals cannot be credited as being the sole 
leaders of the movement. It is therefore appropriate to adopt 
Tannenbaum's contention that "it is important to understand...the
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anonymous character of the movement, without Intellectual leadership, 
without military organization" (Tannenbaum, 1933: 121). We shall 
accordingly code leadership structure as decentralized.
Leadership (Class)
As we have done earlier, in the cases with decentralized leadership 
class of leadership is coded as originating from the midst of the rank 
and file, and in this case from among the petit bourgeois, proletarian 
and peasant ranks.
Organization
a) Information from Sources:
" Madero accomplished the overthrow of Diaz in ten months of plan­
ning and action" (Womack, 1969: 67)
11 It was the custom of the leaders of the Mexican uprisings to 
publish a 'plan* on the lines of a political manifesto, announcing 
their intentions if the people would help them into power. Madero*s 
plan was Issued from San Antonio, it was given the title of The Plan 
of San Luis Potosl" (Atkins, 1970: 49).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the references indicate that a 
certain degree of planning and coordination existed before the CPV took 
place, actual actions that followed barely adhered to that plan. To 
the most part, they were local and spontaneous in nature, without 
prior organization. We shall code Mexican CPV as semi-organized.
Participation
It has been impossible to ascertain the exact number of men who had 
participated in the CPV, However all sources Indicate that the esti­
mates definitely outnumber our maximum score. We shall, therefore, 
code participation as considerable.
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Duration
a) Information from Sources;
" The first shots in the revolution were fired ....on November 18" 
(Atkins, 1970: 50).
" Diaz resigned on May 25" (Cumberland, 1952; 150).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration shall be coded as b !x  
month plus.
Violence
There are no exact estimates on the actual number of casualties. 
Approximate estimates given for different battles and skirmishes 
easily add upto more than 2000. Our maximum score for casualty is 
safely met. Violence will thus be coded as considerable.
Area
It is unanimously held (Atkin, 1970: 73; Cumberland, 1952: 137; 
Parkes, 1969: 319 ; Johnson, 1968: 50) that the CPV had spread to 
every state, every major city and town in the nation. Area is thus 
coded as engulfing entire country.
Government Response
a) Information from Sources:
" ...the Federal commanders in the north fought on ruthlessly to 
preserve the dictatorship; all captured rebels were shot" (Atkin, 
1970: 62).
" The police began shooting over the heads of the mob...In to the 
centre of that surging mass, the riflemen on the tower poured their 
fire...It killed and maimed and maddened" (Aykin, 1970: 75).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Government response will be coded as 
both violent and positive, the latter because Diaz was forced to 
resign.
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Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from Sources:
" 111 fed* badly clothed and rarely paid, ordinary soldiers' 
chief ambition was to desert and get back to the family....(he) 
showed no stomach for fighting against men with whom he had every 
sympathy" (Atkin, 1970; 55, 60).
b) Inference and Variable Code: There is nothing to indicate that 
the soldiers deserted the army to Join the rank of the rebels.
Thus, we can only code armed force disloyalty as low.
10. Afghanistan, 1929 (ID # 10)
Ideas
The unrest against King Amanullah resulted from his proposals to 
westernize Afghanistan causing a lot of dissatisfaction among the 
populace. By the middle of January 1929 the unrest had reached 
such proportions that "on the 14th King Amanullah, in the hope of 
living to fight another day, thrust the crown into the unwilling hands 
of his elder brother, Inayatullah and escaped out of the capital" 
(Fraser-Tytier, 1967: 216). On the 17th the rebels captured the 
capital and Bacha-i-Saqao the leader of the CPV was left in control 
of the throne. As is evident, the unrest was ultimately geared to 
the exchange of personnel in the positions of power.
Strategy
The unrest assumed the form of open battle between the rebels 
and the government troops. Accounts of major battles and numerous 
skirmishes (Hew York Times, November 29 through January 18, 1928-29) 
add credibility to the contention that the strategy employed was one
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of open violence.
Class Character
The rank and file of the CPV was made up of "priests, agricul­
turists, merchants and soldiers.... all seething with discontent at 
the new reforms" (Fraser-Tytier, 1967: 214). We shall code class 
character as petit bourgeois, proletarian and peasant oriented.
Leadership (Structure)
All sources (Fraser-Tytier, 1967, New York Times, 1928-29, Sykes, 
1940) indicate that Bacha-i-Saqao was the primary leader of the 
unrest. And following the termination of hostility he was crowned 
the king. Leadership structure is, thus, coded as centralized.
Leadership (Class)
Bacha-l-Saqao is described as a peasant, a brigand leader of a 
gang of outlaws (Sykes, 1940: 314, 315). We shall, therefore, code 
leadership class as peasant.
Organization
There is no Information in any of the sources which would indicate 
that the CPV was preplanned and organized. It evidently was sponta­
neous .
Participation
The sources imply significant participation. The number of rebels 
is usually given in the thousands (Fletcher, 1965: 216-217). In 
general, therefore, a rebel population of over a thousand can be 
safely assumed.
Duration
The rebellion lasted for two months, starting on 14th November, 
1928 and terminating with Bacha-i-Saqao assuming power on January 17,
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1929.(NIYB, 1929: 15, Fraser-Tytler, 1967: 214), Duration will be 
coded as one week to six months.
Violence
According to the New York Times (December 8, 9 and 19, 1928) at 
least 10,000 casualties are reported in the different battles fought. 
Violence, therefore, is coded as considerable.
Area
The rebellion engulfed the entire country.
Government Response
Before surrendering power, King Amanullah responded to the CPV 
violently. He sent his troops to encounter the rebel force. The 
subsequent battles resulted in significant violence. Government 
response shall be coded as both violent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
The most significant factor against the king was the fact that 
the army was dissatisfied, ill-fed, ill-paid, and in majority of the 
cases- thrown in their lot with the rebels. They fraternized with 
the rebels and rose against the king (New York Times, December 18,
19, 1928). We shall thus code armed force disloyalty as high.
11, Paraguay, 1936 (ID # 11)
Ideas
The CPV resulted from the strong resentment in the Paraguayan army 
against the professional politicians. This took the form of a strong 
sentiment both in and outside the army in favor of establishing a 
military government and overthrowing the existing government under
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President Ayala. (New York Tines, February S, 1936) Idea can thus be 
coded as primarily exchange oriented.
Strategy
Street fighting and battling Indicate open violence (New York 
Times, February 18, 19, 1936).
Class Character
Primary participation of army officers and men is indicated in all 
the sources (NIYB, 1936: Raine,1956: 248-249). They conceived and 
executed the plan. They also had the effective support of the war 
veterans, students, workers, landless agricultural workers. Thus, 
class character of the Paraguayan Cpv can be coded as primarily 
petit bourgeois, proletarian and peasantry oriented.
Leadership (structure)
The individuals who have been cited as the active plotters and 
leaders of the "revolution", are, Dr. Gomes Freire Esteves, Colonel 
Federico W. Smith ("two real leaders"), Fecundo Recalde, Juan Stefa- 
nich, and so on (Warren, 1950: 9). We can thus code the leadership 
structure as centralized.
Leadership (class)
As is evident the leaders were high ranking military officers, and 
professional people (Warren,1950: 9) We can thus code class of 
leadership as petit bourgeois.
Organization
According to Warren (1950) the CPV was preplanned and organized 
before action ensued (p.10-11). Other sources do not contradict this
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contention. We can therefore, code the CPV as being organized.
Participation
Warren (1950) and New York Times (February 5, 18, 19, 1936) 
specifically refer to 300 army officers and AO,000 veterans who 
rallied behind the CPV. Thus the rebel participation was definitely 
over 1000.
Duration
According to all sources the CPV started on February 17, 1936 and 
ended the same day with the surrender of President Ayala. Duration 
is thus coded as less than a week.
Violence
There is no indication in any of the sources as to the extent of 
casualties. A certain number are indicated in New York Times though 
no definite estimates are available. In these situations violence 
will be assumed to be less than 50.
Area
Since the CPV occurred primarily at Asuncion, the capital city.
we shall code the maximum score for area.
Government Response
With only the city police to support him. President Ayala gave up 
after a brief fight (Warren, 1950: 10, 11). Government response shall 
be coded as violent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
As has been quite evident, in our description so far the CPV in 
Paraguay was conceived, plotted and executed by the army and navy
officers and men. Armed force disloyalty was high.
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12. Haiti. 1946 (ID # 12)
Ideas
The CPV was directed towards overthrowing President Lescot. On 
January 11. Colonel Frank Levaud,army chief of staff went on air to 
announce that the Prsident was a prisoner. A three men military 
junta had taken over the government (Newsweek, January 21: 1946). We 
shall code exchange of personnel as the idea , since that Is what was 
essentially effected by the CPV.
Strategy
The strategy was combinational. Street demonstrations and riots 
by primarily the students, and a coup d'etat which effected the final 
blow,together constituted the strategy (Rodman : 28).
Class Character
The participants were primarily from the ranks of the students, 
intellectuals and the higher echelons of the army hierarchy (Rodman:28, 
Newsweek, January 21, 1946). Therefore, class shall be coded as 
bourgeois, petit bourgeois.
Leadership (Structure)
There are indications that the coup d'etat was led by Colonel Frank 
Levaud. However, there are no indications of any definite centralized 
leadership so far as the mass demonstrations are concerned. We shall, 
therefore, code leadership structure as decentralized.
Leadership (Class)
In keeping with the decentralized structure of leadership we shall 
code leadership class as primarily bourgeois, petit bourgeois.
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Organisation
There Is no Indication that the CPV was organized* Therefore, we 
shall code the CPV as spontaneous.
Participation
Newsweek (January 21, 1946) refers to "thousands of demonstrators 
(who) took to the streets". Therefore participation was considerable.
Duration
The CPV lasted for less than a week.
Violence
According to Time (January 21, 1946), the only source which gives a 
definite estimate of the casualty figure, the four days of fighting 
resulted in at least 25 deaths. Thus violence was minimum.
Area
Since the demonstrations and violence occurred at Port au Prince, 
capital of Haiti, our maximum score for area is met.
Government Response
Lescot did put up a brief fight before he gave up. Machine guns 
and tanks were used to fight the demonstrators before Lescot was 
finally forced to resign. We shall code government response as both 
violent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
The fact that the army officers struck the death blow and the 
soldiers folded their arms and let the demonstrators storm the govern­
ment buildings( Rodman : 28), Indicate that the armed force disloyalty 
was high.
223
13. Yemen. 1962 (ID # 13)
Ideas
Yemen's CPV was based on the pronouncements of the rebels, "casti­
gating the evils of the reactionary Imamate and asserting the cause of 
republican government and Arab socialism" (Brown, 1963: 349-50). As is 
evident from the other sources (Boxhall, 1964: 201-209; Wenner, 1967: 
196; Schmidt, 1968: 25-29) the CPV was based on the idea of removing 
the Imam and establishing a republican form of government. We shall 
code idea as constitutional.
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
" On the night of September 27, six tanks surrounded Imam Mohammed 
In al-bashayan palace at Sana and shelled It. Palace guards fought 
back until they were overcome. Colonel Abdullal al Sallal occupied 
the badly damaged palace.... captured members of the royal family and 
their close supporters and executed them" (Annual Register, 1962: 296).
" One truckload of men....took over the radio station, and another 
the airport. They met little resistance" (Schmidt, 1968t 28).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy evolved from a deep laid 
plot to overthrow the Imam. As evidenced by all the sources, the 
strategy involved was a coup d'etat.
Class Character
The CPV was primarily an army venture. It was conceived, planned, 
and executed by the top and middle ranking officers in the army. A 
significant portion of the army battalions were mobilized for the ope­
ration, Class character is coded as bourgeois, petit bourgeois and 
proletarian.
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Leadership (Structure)
As all sources indicate, the two primary personalities in the 
unrest who assumed leadership were Colonel Abdullal al Sallal and 
Lieutenant al Moghny. Leadership structure Is thus coded as centra­
lized.
Leadership (Class)
Both Sallal and Moghny were very high ranking officers In the army. 
Sallal In fact was the General Chief of the Imam's army. Leadership 
class Is thus coded as bourgeois.
Organization
There is enough evidence to prove that the general idea of the CPV 
had been brewing for quite a while, Sallal and his followers had been 
preparing at least since 1959. Therefore, all evidence point to the 
fact that the CPV was organized.
Participation
a) Information from Sources:
" General Sallal surrounded the royal palace in Sana with 4,000 
troops...” (Time, October 26, 1962 : 38-40).
" ....(the CPV) enlisted the service of ...almost the entire 
armoured force” (Schmidt, 1968: 28).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We can safely assume that participa­
tion was considerable.
Duration
The coup d'etat started and terminated in a single day. Duration, 
Is thus coded as less than a week.
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Violence
About fifteen members of the Imam's family and government were 
executed during the first few hours of the republic,(Wenner, 1967: 
196). Besides this about 80 men were killed In a bloody fight between 
rebels and about 300 loyal officers and men (Schmidt, 1968: 29). 
Therefore, the total amount of violence was about 100, We shall code 
violence as some.
Area
The coup d'etat took place In the capital city of Sana.
Government Response
The rebel forces overwhelmed the loyal forces before the government 
realized the real extent of the situation. Therefore, government did 
not have any time to respond violently or non-violently. Its effort 
was only defensive before it was finally overthrown. Government res­
ponse Is coded as positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
Since the CPV was planned and executed by army officers and men, 
armed force disloyalty is obviously high.
14. Ghana, 1966 (ID # 14)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources;
" There is ample Justification for our moves on the 23rd of Febru­
ary, 1966; and when the operation commenced we had no doubts in our 
minds as to the justness of our cause, ThlB conviction gave us the 
additional courage to carry the exercise through at all costs and if 
the worst came to the worst, to fight a civil war and stand our ground 
until the Nkrumah government was overthrown" (Afrlfa, 1966: 31).
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" The coup of February 24, 1 9 6 6 . .overthrew the Nkrumah regime 
(and) brought to power army officers...1' (Aluko, 1976; 21),
b) Inference and Variable Code; Exchange shall be coded as the idea
behind the CPV.
Strategy
According to all sources what occurred in the early hours of Satur­
day the 24th February was a military coup d'etat which awiftly seized 
all key points In the capital. Strategy was thus conspiratorial.
Class Character
a) Information from Sources:
M The army and police chose to take power while President Nkrumah 
was on a diplomatic visit to China" (Pinkey, 1972: 9).
b) Inference and Variable Code; The participants in the coup came 
from the ranks of the highest officers in the army and police, the 
middle ranking officers, the ordinary soldiers and the police. Class 
character is thus coded as bourgeois, petit bourgeois and proletarian.
Leadership (Structure)
The leadership of the coup was concentrated in the hands of Colonel 
Kotoka, commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade group, Major Afrifa of 
the 2nd Brigade, John Harlley, Commissioner of the police and Lieute­
nant Colonel John Addy, garrison commander of Tamale,(Barker, 1969:78) 
Leadership structure can thus be coded as centralized.
Leadership (Class)
The Individuals who have been identified as the leaders occupied 
the higher echelons in the army and the police hierarchy. Leadership 
class can thus be coded as bourgeois, petit bourgeois.
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Organization
a) Information from Sources;
" Our plan for the coup was simple and most flexible. We had 
planned a full scale military operation lasting for a considerable 
period and Colonel Kotoka had made all the necessary contacts and 
arrangements designed to ensure the success of the operation"
(Afrifa, 1966: 36),
" The plans for a coup originated and was finalized in its Initial 
form as early as May 1965" (Barker, 1969: 78).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Both Barker and Afrifa referred to 
the extended and intricate planning which was carried out before the 
coup leading us to code organization as organized.
Participation
Both Afrifa (1966) and Nkrumah (1968) in their accounts of the coup 
contend that about 600 men took part in the operation. Participation 
was thus coded as some.
Duration
According to all sources action commenced on February 23 and by the 
early hours of February 24 the coup had succeeded. Duration was thus 
less than a week.
Violence
a) Information from Sources:
" In all, the total was probably around 1600 dead and many more 
injured" (Nkrumah, 1968: 27).
" According to unofficial report 27 men died" (Lefever, 1970: 58).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Whereas Nkrumah cites a spectacular 
figure, the actual figure probably is more near the estimate given by 
Lefever. If we add up the isolated cases of casualties mentioned in 
Afrifa (1966) and Barker (1969), the figure resembles Lefever1* more
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than Nkrumah*s. We shall, therefore, code violence as minimum.
Area
According to all sources the CPV occurred in Accra the capital city.
Government Response 
The government was caught totally unaware. It did not have the 
chance to respond, Since the government was overthrown, we shall 
code government response as positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty 
Since it was the army officers who put the plan for the coup toge­
ther and with the help of the soldiers overthrew Nkrumah, we shall 
code armed force disloyalty as high.
15. Bolivia, 1952 (ID # 15)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
"By a carefully prepared revolt on April 11 the Movimiento Nacio- 
nallsta Revolucionarlo (MNR) took its revenge for the crushing defeat 
it had suffered six years before. It had won a majority of seats in 
the General Elections of May 1951, but was ousted from power by a coup 
d'etat...." (Annual Register,1952).
"The end of the Military junta under General Balllvian came with 
unexpected swiftness and almost entirely without warning. Its over­
throw was brought about b y  the MNR and the forces of organized
labour" (Osborne,1964: 69).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was primarily exchange orien­
ted.
Strategy
a) Information from Sourcesi
" The original plan smacked strongly of a Vlllarroel type formula.
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that ist a rapid coup involving little civil participation,(however, 
in reality)... three days of strong fighting which led to progressively 
broader social movements...(constituted the CPV)"(Malloy,1970: J57-58).
” Workers and miners from Orruro joined the police,,,for three days 
of incarnadine battle" (Barton, 1968: 252),
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code strategy as open.
Class Character
a) Information from sources:
" The uprising was the result of a conspiracy between ...the chief 
of the Carablneros (the National Military Police) and the MNR...The 
police were supported in the revolt by the workers loyal to the MNR" 
(Alexander, 1958: 44).
"The end of the junta ....was brought about by the coalition bet­
ween the MNR and the forces of organized labor"(Osborn, 1964: 69),
b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was a result of bourgeois. 
petit bourgeois and proletarian alliance.
Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from Sources:
" ...led by General Selene and Senor Lechin, the miners' leader,
It staged one of the bloodiest revolution ever experienced in the 
country" (Annual Register, 1952: 344).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code leadership structure as 
centralized.
Leadership (Class)
General Antonio Selene was the Chief of the National Military 
Police and Senor Juan Lechin was the Executive Secretary of the Federa- 
clon Sindlcal de Trabajadores Minerios. We can code class of leader­
ship as both bourgeois and petit bourgeois.
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Organization
a) Information from Sources:
" The National Revolutionary Movement executed a carefully planned 
revolution on April 9, 10 and 11" (NIYB, 1952; 68).
" By a carefully prepared revolt on April 11, the MNR took its 
revenge." (Annual Register, 1952; 344).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code the Bolivian CPV as 
organized.
Participation
Since no precise figures on participation is available, It seems 
safe to assume that the number of active rebels was considerable, 
because it involved members of the MNR, the entire police force, the 
workers and miners.
Duration
The sources agree that the CPV lasted only three days from the 
morning of April 9 till April 11. Therefore, duration was less than a 
week.
Violence
There Is considerable agreement among the sources that the number 
of casualties was considerable.
Area
The CPV was restricted to La Paz,the capital, Cochabamba, Potosl 
and Oruro. The maximum score for area is easily met.
Government Response
a) Information from Sources:
" The army, to protect the Junta, fought its way uptown from the 
military barracks in San Jorge. By utilizing artillery, mortars and 
planes to strafe and bomb the street fighters they at first appeared 
to be winning" (Barton, 1968: 253).
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b) Inference and Variable Code; Though initially the government 
tried to fight the rebels, eventually it had to give in and hand over 
power to the rebels. Government response will thus be coded as vio­
lent and positive.
Armed Force Disloyalty
The Bolivian CPV is characterized by a mass disloyalty among the 
police. But so far as the army is concerned all evidences show that 
the bulk of the army remained loyal to the government and moved to 
crush the rebellion. Since only a segment of the armed forces had 
joined the rebels, whereas substantial portion of the army was still 
loyal to the military junta, we shall code armed force disloyalty as 
low.
16. Germany, 1919 (ID # 16)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" Encouraged by ....demonstrations of the 'popular will' and by 
rumours of troops in Spandau joining the fresh revolt, the leaders of 
the Berlin Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and the Commu­
nist Party of Germany (KPD) and leaders of the Foreman approved.... 
the immediate declaration of war against the Ebert regime to the 
bitter end" (Berlau, 1949: 243).
" The Impact of the huge mass demonstrations upon the assembled 
functionaries was so great that they believed sincerely that the 
masses were ready to overthrow the Ebert cabinet and support a new 
revolutionary government of the left wing radicals" (Waldman, 1938; 
172).
b) Inference and Variable Code; The original idea behind the mass 
demonstrations in Berlin on January 3 was to protest the dismissal of
Elchhorn by the Ebert government. However, the mass demonstrations
232
convinced the leaders that the people were ready to overthrow the 
Ebert government and replace It with a radical left wing government.
As all sources indicate and as can be implied from the Ideological 
orientation of the parties Involved, the ultimate objective was to 
overthrow the Ebert government and lay the foundations for a socialist 
society in the image of Russian socialism achieved only two years 
earlier. Thus idea shall be coded as transitional and structural.
Strategy
Striking and rioting in the streets made up the general strategy 
of the movement(Coper, 1955: 204; Angress, 1963: 30). Strategy thus 
involved open violence.
Class Character
a) Information from Sources:
" What happened on Monday in Berlin was perhaps the greatest pro­
letarian mass action in history" (Waldman, 1958: 177).
b) Inference and Variable Code: All sources indicate that the CPV 
was primarily proletarian in character.
Leadership (Structure)
The Provisional Revolutionary Committee which was made up of the 
USPD, the KPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, provided the ini­
tial Impetus and the ideological leadership to the movement. We shall 
therefore code leadership structure as centralized.
Leadership (Class)
The leaders who made up the Provisional Revolutionary Conmilttee 
emerged primarily from the ranks of the Intellectuals and trade 
unionists. Leadership class can thus be coded as petit bourgeois.
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Organization
a) Information from Sources:
" It was not the product of a deliberate plan formulated by any 
particular political faction" (Angress, 1963; 29).
" The swiftness of the action (by government troops) waB possible 
because the revolutionaries had no plan, no coordination, and no 
direction whatsoever" (Coper, 1955: 212).
b) Inference and Variable Code; The CPV can be attributed more to 
the spontaneity on part of the workers than to organized planning on 
part of the leaders.
Participation
a) Information from Sources;
" Hundreds of thousands of workers demonstrated on 5th and 6th
January, 1919 " (Coper, 1955: 202).
" On Sunday January 5, ....huge throngs of workers surged into
the streets of Berlin " (Waldman, 1958: 171),
b) Inference and Variable Code: Participation was considerable.
Duration
All sources refer to January 5, as the day when the workers demon­
strations hdd started and January 13 as the day when the uprising was 
completely and ruthlessly suppressed. Duration Is coded as week to 
six months.
Violence
a) Information from Sources:
" The number of persons killed during the January uprising remains 
unknown. Even relaible estimates are not available " (Waldman,1958: 
185).
" Halperln claims over one thousan casualties for 'Spartacus week* 
in Berlin, but fails to indicate on what sources he bases his figure. 
Stampfer stated that 156 persons were killed in addition to Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Official reports assert that 
approximately 200 persons were killed" (Waldman, 1958: 185).
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b) Inference and Variable Code: Whatever the estimatet our maximum 
score for violence Is easily exceeded. Violence Is coded as consider­
able.
Area
Berlin the capital city was the location of the disturbance.
Government Response
a) Information from Sources:
" The January riots had demonstrated the strength of the govern­
ment and its willingness to use It. Some of the ablest leaders of the 
left were killed In the struggle, notable among them were Luxemburg 
and Llebknecht. The struggle broke the back of the power of the 
Spartaclsts in Berlin " (Berlau, 1949: 244).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Government response was mercilessly 
violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty 
The total absence of armed force disloyalty is significant. Thus 
armed force disloyalty is coded as nil.
17. Greece, 1935 (ID # 17)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" In particular, the more ardent Republicans among the officers of 
the Fleet and army feared that, if a restoration of the monarchy took 
place, they would inevitably lose their commands and they, therefore, 
determined to forestall such a possibility by forcibly ejecting the 
existing government.*' (Forster, 1958: 187).
" The Flagship Averoff and several smaller naval units put to sea 
and summoned the garrisons of the provinces by a wireless proclama­
tion to Join the movement to overthrow the government " (Forster, 
1958: 187).
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b) Inference and Variable Code; The CPV in Greece in 1935 was geared 
towards the forcible overthrow of the existing government. Thus, idea 
shall be coded as exchange of personnel in the positions of power.
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
"In February 1935 several hundred Republican Army officers attemp­
ted a coup d'etat against the Popular Party government" (Mcneil1,1947: 
29).
"The uprising in Athens was quickly suppressed by troops loyal 
to the Tsaldaris government, after some severe fighting" (NIYB,1935:
294) .
b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV is referred to have involved 
both a coup d'etat and also open uprising and fighting in Athens. We 
shall, therefore, code strategy as combinational.
Class Character
a) Information from Sources:
"While republican officers in the officers' school and the Presi­
dential guard in Athens attempted to seize control of the city, a 
handful of naval officers occupied the naval arsenal at Salamls..." 
(NIYB,1935: 294).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Since most participants were army and 
navy officers, it would be appropriate to code class as petit bourgeois.
Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from Sources:
"The rebellion broke out on 1 March 1935 with Plastlras.....ser­
ving as the nominal leader" (Papacosma,1977: 182).
"The insurgents (were) led by a group of retired officers" (Fors­
ter, 1956: 187).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Leadership structure can be coded as 
centralized.
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Leadership (Class)
Leadership class can be justifiably coded as petit bourgeois.
Organization
a) Information from Sources:
" This revolt was better organized ....than the revolt of 1933 " 
(McNeill, 1947: 29).
M On 1st March, a military rising, which had been for some months 
in secret preparation, suddenly threw the country into turmoil" 
(Forster, 1958: 187).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code the Greek CPV as orga­
nized.
Participation
No definite number of participants can be discerned from any of 
the sources. However, the fact that at least three different groups 
were acting at the same time implies that even by conservative stan­
dards participation must have been at least 500. Participation is 
accordingly coded as few.
Duration
According to both NIYB (1935: 294) and Annual Register (1935: 232) 
the CPV lasted for at least eleven days. Duration is coded as week to 
six months.
Violence
a) Information from Sources:
" Some rather severe fighting, in which 210 were killed and some
600 wounded, took place before the republican opposition collapsed"
(NIYB, 1935: 294).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Violence can justifiably be coded as 
some.
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Area
Area la coded as disturbance In capital city.
Government Response 
As all Bources contend, the uprising was quickly suppressed by 
the loyal troops with significant force. We shall thus code govern­
ment response as violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from Sources;
" The movement failed to enlist the support either of the majo­
rity of troops or of the general public " (Forster, 1958: 188).
" It attracted no great support among the general public or the 
majority of the armed forces " (Carey and Carey, 1968: 101).
b) Inference and Variable Code: It is almost unanimously agreed that 
armed force disloyalty was low.
18. Spain. 1934 (ID I 18)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" The Asturian uprising became, in the minds of the Spanish 
workers, anarchists as well as socialists, an epic example, the first 
attempt by the workers to seize power through class organizations " 
(Broue and Temlme, 1970: 63).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The Spanish CPV started off as a 
protest move against the inclusion of three members of the Conserva­
tive Catholic Party, in the Lerroux government. However, it eventually 
assumed civil war proportions paralyzing the economic life of the 
whole country, and attempted to seize power from the existing capi­
talist regime for the workers class organizations (Araquistaln, 1935:
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247 ; Jackson, 1965: 148 ; Madariaga, 1958: 435 ; Thomas, 1961: 80 ; 
Brenan, 1969: 283; Manuel, 1938: 136). On the basis of information 
derived from sources the idea behind the CPV can be coded as struc­
tural and transitional.
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
" On October 5, the parties of the left issued a call for a 
general strike which was followed immediately by a revolutionary out­
break throughout the northern and central parts of Spain. For three 
days the fate of the government hung in the balance. There was des­
perate street fighting in Madrid and many other cities " (NIYB, 1934: 
662).
" On the night of October 4, when word of the new cabinet 
arrived, the committees decided immediately to call a general strike. 
In Mleres, where Communist miners predominated, 200 militants, armed 
with about 30 rifles, surrounded the town hall and the barracks. 
Through a combination of surprise, terror, and exaggeration of their
numbers they obtained the surrender of the civil and assault
guards " (Jackson, 1965: 156).
" Meanwhile a general strike of the U.G.T (General Workers' 
Socialist Union) was going on all over Spain, the miners of the
Asturias were battering their way into Oviedo and there was fighting
in the streets of Madrid " (Brenan, 1969: 284).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Strategy shall be coded as open.
Class Character
a) Information from Sources:
" The real protagonists of the October revolution was the working 
class " (Araqulstain, 1935: 256).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The participants came primarily from 
the ranks of the Asturian miners, the workers from Oviedo, Guljon and 
other surrounding towns. It was during the October CPV that for the 
first time in Spanish history, all the working class organizations 
were united in a common effort (Carr, 1966: 635). Class character was 
undeniably proletarian.
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Leadership (Structure)
The movement was led by the Allansa Obrera, which was a coalition 
of all working class parties. It was the popular front led by Largo 
Caballero to provide details of revolutionary takeover and organized 
action (Carr, 1966: 632; Brenan, 1969: 284-85; Araqulstaln, 1935: 259). 
Leadership structure shall be coded as centralized.
Leadership (Class)
Largo Caballero and the other Individuals who are recognized as 
playing leading roles in the CPV originated from the ranks of the pro­
letariat which they led.
Organization
The Spanish CPV lacked military organization and direction.
Most actions were spontaneous and directed by local leaders. However, 
it did have political organization, as evident In the coalition of the 
working class parties which organized the details of the revolutionary 
takeover. We shall likewise code the Spanish CPV as semi-organized.
Participation
Most estimates of participation ranged from 6000 to 70,000. In 
any case our maximum score for participation is easily met. Thus par­
ticipation is coded as considerable.
Duration
The day on which the general strike ensued, was October 5. Accor­
ding to all the references hostilities continued for two weeks and by 
the end of that time the CPV was completely suppressed. Duration was 
thus week to six months.
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Violence
a) Information from Sources:
" With its brutal repression.... the Asturian rising reached the 
dimensions of a civil war with 4000 casualties and a great deal of 
physical destruction " (Carr, 1966: 635).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The general number on which majority 
agree is between 3000 dead and 10,000 wounded. Violence was thus con­
siderable.
Area
Area shall be coded as engulfing the entire country.
Government Response 
The violence, repression and brutality which the government used 
in putting down the CPV is evidenced in all the accounts. Government 
response was needlessly violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
a) Information from Sources:
" Contrary to the expectations of the left leaders, the army 
remained loyal to the government " (NIYB, 1934: 662).
" The comportment of the army in the suppression of the revo­
lutionary insurrection of October 1934 was, as far as political res­
ponsibility was concerned, excellent. There was never either vacilla­
tion or insubordination in obeying orders " (Carr, 1971: 85).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Armed force disloyalty was nil.
19. Japan. 1936 (ID # 19)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" ....the military revolt of about 1500 troops of the Tokyo garri­
son aimed at the overthrow of the parliamentary regime " (NIYB, 1936: 
368).
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” The rebels attempt(ed) to overthrow the regime and change the 
leadership of the armed forces..." (Shillony, 1973: 167).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV in Japan does not indicate 
anything beyond simple overthrow of the regime and exchange of per­
sonnel .
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
" Directed by a handful of junior army officers and moving with 
great secrecy in the early hours of February 26, the troops occupied 
the Metropolitan Police building and other strategic centers near the 
Imperial Palace grounds, while a group of officers attacked the resi­
dences of six leading statesmen and governement officials " (NIYB,
1936: 368-69).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Strategy shall be coded as conspira­
torial .
Class Character
As Shillony (1973) contends, the twentyone officers who took part 
in the CPV came from elitist, well to do families. Whereas, the rank 
and file came from poorer, working class and labouring families (p: 21, 
22). Class character is accordingly coded as petit bourgeois, prole­
tarian.
Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from Sources:
" Although the rebellion was a military operation, it had no 
commander and was formally led by all twentyone of the rebel officers. 
There existed a leadership group, which according to the trial verdict 
was composed of Isobe, Muranaka, Koda, Ando and Kurlhara. Yet, as in 
the case of Mejl restoration there was no single leader ” (Shillony, 
1973: 147).
b) Inference and Variable Code: A central leadership structure can be 
definitely identified, either in the person of the twentyone officers 
or the five mentioned. Leadership structure was centralized.
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Leadership (Class)
As Indicated earlier, the leaders originated from the petit 
bourgeoisie.
Organization
a) Information from Sources:
" The rebels did...-plan their action in advance and had some 
definite goals in mind " (Shillony, 1973: 123).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was organized.
Participation
According to Bergamini (1971), there were ”1483 mutineers..."
(p: 636). Other sources do not contradict this figure. Participation 
was thus considerable.
Duration
The CPV had started on February 26, 1936 and by February 29 all 
the troops had surrendered. Thus the CPV lasted less than a week.
Violence
The amount of violence was very small. Only four Individuals had 
died and about two others were seriously injured. Violence was 
minimum.
Area
The CPV occurred in Tokyo, the capital city.
Government Response 
The government responded by proclaiming martial law, trying and 
executing thirteen of the rebels. Government response was thus both 
nonviolent and violent.
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Armed Force Disloyalty 
Since the CPV was conceived, planned and executed by the army 
officers and the fact that there was much sympathy for the mutineers 
in the army, we shall code armed force disloyalty as high,
20. Rumania. 1907 (ID # 20)
Ideas
The CPV advocated distribution of land, universal franchise, the 
shortening of the term of the military service and the decrease in the 
land tax (NIYB, 1907: 693). According to Roberts (1951) the CPV had 
"explicit and obvious political dangers" (p: 4). Since the CPV 
attempted to transform the power base, it shall be coded as striving 
for structural change.
Strategy
The strategy generally involved rioting, looting, assault and 
destruction of properties (Eidelberg, 1974: 1; Annual Register, 1907: 
335). Strategy shall be coded open.
Class Character
The Rumanian CPV Is recognized as a "massive and violent peasant 
revolt" (Eidelberg, 1974: 1). Class character is thus peasant oriented.
Leadership (Structure)
a) Information from Sources:
" ...the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received 
any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks and 
school teachers" (Roberts,1951: 3).
b) Inference and Variable Code: In other words the leaders if there 
were any emerged from the lower echelons of the petit bourgeoisie and
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the peasantry.
Organization
There are no Indications in any of the sources which would point 
towards any organization of the CPV. It was a spontaneous outburst.
Participation
No definite numbers are given so far as participation is con­
cerned. However, the fact that 140,000 troops were required to put 
down the CPV (NIYB,1907: 693; Eidelberg,1974:1), suggests that the 
numbers of insurgents was massive. We shall code participation as 
considerable.
Duration
Eidelberg*s account is the most substantive on the subject, and 
according to him the govrnment crushed the revolt in less than a week.
Violence
The figures on violence range from 11,000 (Roberts,1951: 3) to
20,000 (Eidelberg,1974: 1). Our maximum score is exceeded. Violence 
was thus considerable.
Area
The CPV engulfed the whole country (Eidelberg,1974: 1).
Government Response
Government crushed the CPV with extreme violence.
Armed Force Disloyalty
There is no Indication of armed froce disloyalty in any of the 
references. Thus armed force disloyalty was nil.
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21. Bulgaria. 1923 (ID # 21)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" The Central Committee of the Communists resolved to prepare an 
armed insurrection to overthrow the Tsankov government and replace it 
with one of workers and peasants." (Rothschild, 1959: 133).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Idea is coded as structural.
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
" There was fighting during the week of September 23...terrorism 
was (also) carried out." (NIYB, 1923: 113).
b) Inference and Variable Code; Strategy was combinational.
Class Character
a) Information from Sources:
" The peasantry provided most of the participants and casualties 
of the rebellion...Even in those towns in which the fighting reached 
serious proportions, the major effort was made not by the local prole­
tariat but by Invading hordes of peasants from adjacent villages, 
frequently led by school teachers..." (Rothschild, 1959: 145).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Class character was overwhelmingly 
peasant oriented.
Leadership (Structure)
There is no leadership structure which can be recognized as pro­
viding the CPV with organizational and military direction. The central 
conmittee of the Communist party set up a military committee. But the 
latter cannot be indicated as providing military or organizational 
leadership. However, in so far as the communist party was in fact the 
central organization which had called forth the CPV, we shall code 
leadership as centralized in the Communist party.
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Leadership (Class)
We shall code leadership class as petit bourgeois.
Organization
According to the sources, the CPV in Bulgaria was a mix of spon­
taneity and organized action. We shall code it semi-organized.
Participation
The rebels claimed by the Communist party sources were about
20,000 strong. Even If this figure is considered exaggerated, never­
theless the figures on violence justifies coding participation as 
considerable.
Duration
According to both NIYB (1923) and Annual Register (1923), the CPV 
lasted for about two to four weeks before it was suppressed by the 
government. We shall code duration as week to six months.
Violence
On the basis of his extensive research Rothschild (1959) contends 
that it would be reasonable to place the number of killed in the 1500 
to 2500 range (p: 144-45). So violence was considerable.
Area
The CPV occurred in an area extending several large provinces 
in south central, northwestern parts of Bulgaria. So area meets our 
medium score for scale.
Government Response
Government response was ruthlessly violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
Armed force disloyalty was nil.
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22. Ethiopia. 1960 (ID # 22)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" ...the weight of evidence suggests that this was more an attempt 
to seize power than to effect basic political and social reforms " 
(Lefever, 1970: 146).
" ...(an) attempted coup on December 13 designed to replace the 
emperor, Haile Selassie I, by the crown prince " (Annual Register,
1960: 330).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Idea shall be coded as primarily 
exchange oriented.
Strategy
a) Information from Sources:
M The Immediate strategic objective of the plotters was to take 
all key points in Addis Ababa and win over or imprison principal poli­
tical leaders... Bodyguard troops seized control of communication cen­
ters and stationed themselves at key points in an around the capital 
city " (Lefever, 1970: 146).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy used was conspiratorial.
Class Character
The participants in the CPV were made up of Commander of the 
Imperial bodyguards, a subprovincial governor, the Chief of Security, 
the Police Commissioner, intellectuals and the Imperial guards. It is 
thus justified to code class character as bourgeois, petit bourgeois 
and proletarian.
Leadership (Structure)
As all sources Indicate leadership structure was undeniably cen­
tralized.
Leadership (Class)
The leaders were the highest officers in the armed forces and In
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the admlsnlstratlon. Leadership class was definitely bourgeois.
Organization
The intricate, long term planning of the CPV is indicated in all 
the sources. Greenfield (1965) gives a detailed account of the
planning phase (p: 381-85). We shall code the CPV as organized.
Participation
Participation was considerable.
Duration
All sources cite December 13, 1960 as the day on which the CPV 
started and December 16 as the day on which it was suppressed. We 
shall code duration as less than a week.
Violence
The figures for casualties range from 324 dead and 785 wounded to
200 dead or wounded. In any case our maximum score is exceeded. Vio­
lence was considerable.
Area
The disturbance occurred in the capital city.
Government Response
The government responded with extreme violence to crush the CPV.
Armed Force Disloyalty
The plotters totally miscalculated the response of the army and 
the air force, which remained loyal and fought the CPV till it was 
suppressed. "The army and the bodyguards were two entirely separate 
military formations, which Halle Selassie kept apart In rivalry to one 
another; when the guard went against him, a counter-vailing military 
force was therefore immediately available In his support." (Clapham,
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1968: 496). On the basis of this Information we shall code armed force 
disloyalty as low.
23. Thailand. 1933 (ID tf 23)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" The rebels demanded that the government tender its resignation 
...and...that force will be used to seize control of the government" 
(Landon, 1968: 38).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code idea as exchange.
Strategy
The strategy indicated by the sources is definitely conspira­
torial.
Class Character
As all sources indicate, the CPV from the start to the finish was 
a royalist movement. It was made up of the members of the royal 
family and royal favourites who had suffered loss of prestige, influ­
ence and privileges after the 'revolution1 of 1932, including army 
officers and their troops who rallied in support of the royalist move­
ment. Class character was thus bourgeois, petit bourgeois and prole­
tarian.
Leadership (Structure)
The CPV was led by Prince Bovaredej, a member of the royal family 
and the former defence minister (NIYB, 1933: 746). Leadership struc­
ture was thus centralized.
Leadership (Class)
Leadership class was bourgeois.
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Organization
According to all the sources a definite plan of the CPV, existed 
prior to the start of the action. Thus It was organized.
Participation
Participation can be safely assumed to be considerable (NIYB, 
1933: 746).
Violence
NIYB (1933) is the only account which provides a definite figure 
for violence. "By October 16, the rebels were in retreat from the 
capital, having lost some 500 killed and 1000 wounded " (p: 747),
Thus violence was considerable.
Duration
October 12 is given as the date when the CPV started and October 
18 as the date by which It was completely suppressed. The CPV lasted 
for less than a week.
Area
The CPV had engulfed the entire country.
Government Response
The government proclaimed martial law and used extreme violence 
to suppress the CPV. Thus government response was both nonviolent and 
violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
There are indications that the rebel leaders had succeeded in 
rallying the support of a significant section of the air force and the 
garrisons. The navy refused to help suppress the insurrection. All 
these definitely indicate high armed force disloyalty.
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24. El Salvador. 1932 (ID # 24)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" ...a communist plot to overthrow the government of provisional 
President Maxlmilliano Martinez " (hackett, 1932: 843).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was an attempt to overthrow 
the existing government and establish Instead a workers and peasants 
government, thus aiming at restructuring the power base.
Strategy
Strategy involved techniques of open violence such as looting, 
destruction of property and annihilation.
Class Character 
According to all the sources, the CPV was "a mass campesino 
movement" indicating peasant following and participation,
Leadership (Structure)
From the account given by Anderson (1971) Augustin P. Marti seems 
to occupy the central position in the leadership of the movement. 
Organization of the masses, planning the movement were all carried out 
according to Marti's instructions. Thus the leadership structure was 
centralized.
Leadership (Class)
Marti and his principal lieutenants were all student intellectuals. 
Leadership class was thus petit bourgeois.
Organization
All the sources, specially Anderson (1971) indicate that the CPV 
was organized and preplanned.
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Participation
According to a source cited by Anderson (1971) at least 16,000 
persons had taken part in the uprising. No other sources refer to 
participation at all. On the basis of Anderson's account we can code 
participation as considerable.
Duration
a) Information from Sources:
" The revolt came on the very night for which it was predicted, 
the night of January 22 and 23...the revolt was over by January 25, 
for all practical purposes, and the matanza (massacre) was well under 
way by that date " (Anderson, 1971: 98, 137).
b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration was less than a week.
Violence
About 10,000 rebels may have lost their lives for the hundred 
they had taken in the course of the CPV. Violence was thus consider­
able.
Area
The CPV engulfed the entire country.
Government Response
It is quite evident from the sources that Martinez was extremely 
and needlessly ruthless in suppressing the CPV. As Anderson puts it 
"the terrorism of the Martinez government on this occasion Is still 
a vivid memory in El Salvador " (1971: 369). Government response 
was thus violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
Armed force disloyalty w s b  nil.
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25. Peru. 1932 (ID # 25)
Ideas
No explicit account on the objectives of the Trujjilo uprising 
is given In any of the sources consulted. However, in so far as the 
uprising was an integral part of the Aprlsta campaign to overthrow the 
regime of President Sanchez Cerro, this can be satisfactorily coded as 
the motive of the Trujjilo uprising. (Werlich, 1978: 197). Idea can 
be coded as exchange.
Strategy
The strategy involved both open and conspiratorial tactics of 
violence. Strategy was thus combinational.
Class Character
a) Information from Sources:
" The fight started with an attack by a mob of several hundred 
workers from nearby sugar plantations upon part of the Trujjilo garri­
son..." (New York Times, July 9, 1932).
" Thousands of unruly sugar workers from the nearby plantations 
joined the movement " (Werlich, 1978: 197).
b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code class as peasant 
oriented.
Leadership (Structure)
According to Werlich (1978) the movement was led by Manuael 
Barreta. We shall thus code leadership as centralized in the person
of Manuel Barreta alias 'Buffalo'.
Leadership (Class)
Barreta emerged from the ranks of the plantation workers. As such
leadership class shall be coded as peasant oriented.
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Organization
Though the uprising In Trujjilo took place without the orders of 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) it was to be a part of 
the overall Aprlsta plan for revolution. Therefore, organization was 
definitely there. However, the actual execution of action was sponta­
neous. We shall thus code the CPV as semiorganized.
Participation
According to Werlich’s (1978) account there was some participa­
tion .
Duration
According to NIYB (1932) the unrest started on July 6 and was 
suppressed by July 10. Thus it lasted for less than a week.
Violence
Both Werlich (1978) and Marett (1969) point out that casualty 
figures range from 1000 to 5000 persons. Thus violence was consider­
able .
Area
The outbreak occurred In Trujjilo. The rest of the country was 
quiet. Area shall thus be coded as disturbance in a large province.
Government Response
Government response was violent. The CPV was suppressed with much 
cruelty and bloodshed. Most rebel leaders captured during action were 
shot to death. Loyal troops quelled the uprising with much violence.
Armed Force Disloyalty
Armed force disloyalty was nil.
26. Honduras. 1933 (ID # 26)
Ideas
The Honduran uprising resulted from dissatisfaction with the 
results of the election, as is the usual case In so many of the Latin 
American nations. The specific Intentions of the action are not expli­
citly mentioned In any of the accounts consulted. However, overthrow 
of the regime of President Carlas Is implied in every account. Power, 
which the liberals lost as a result of their failure in the elections, 
was to be gained through this uprising. Thus, Idea was exchange orien­
ted.
Strategy
Forcible occupation of towns and cities and the inevitable battle 
with the loyal troops (NIYB, 19 33: 358; New York Times, November 15, 
December 6, 1933) indicate open strategy.
Class Character
No indication is given in the accounts as to the exact class 
character of the rebels. What can be inferred is the fact that a sig­
nificant portion of the rebels was made up of disloyal liberal generals 
in the army and the garrisons they led. Therefore, it would be safe 
to assume that class character was bourgeois, petit bourgeois as well 
as proletarian.
Leadership (Structure)
After surveying our sources we can generally conclude that Gene­
ral Jose Marla Reina was the predominant leadership figure. Leadership 
was thus centralized.
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Leadership (Class)
Jose Marla Reina was a general in Che Honduran army. His class 
can be coded as bourgeois.
Organization
There is no information in any of the sources which would indi­
cate any prior planning. It was probably spontaneous.
Participation
According to Russell (1974) participation was considerable.
Duration
The CPV started on November 14, 1932 and was finally suppressed 
on January 14, 1933. It thus lasted for a week to six months.
Violence
According to Russell (1974), violence was considerable.
Area
As the NIYB (1933) contends, the CPV had spread throughout the 
entire country.
Government Response
Government response was extremely violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
Since the CPV was initiated, led and participated by extensive 
sections of the army, armed force disloyalty was high.
Note: Inadequate information on Honduras plagued our research at every 
point. It is hard to speculate why the CPV failed despite high armed 
force disloyalty.
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27. Turkey. 1925 (ID # 27)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" The Kurdish rebellion had been led by dervish Seyhs, who had 
urged their followers to overthrow the godless republic and restore 
the Caliph " (Lewis, 1961: 261).
b) Inference and Variable Code: The February outbreak was based on 
the objective of overthrowing the Republic and restoring the Caliphate. 
Thus the Idea was constitutional.
Strategy
Severe fighting would Indicate the strategy of open violence.
Class Character
The participants in the CPV came primarily from the ranks of the 
local tribes, nomadic hunters and hills people(Toynbee and Kirkwood, 
1927: 267). According to Hassan Arfa (1966) the Insurgency was also 
supported by feudal landlords and chiefs of tribes. We shall thus code 
class character as petit bourgeois and peasant oriented.
Leadership (Structure)
Shaikh Said is recognized by all sources as the undisputed leader. 
Thus leadership structure was centralized.
Leadership (Class)
On the basis of the information from the sources Shaikh Said can 
be coded as belonging to the petit bourgeois class.
Organization
Information from sources Indicate that the CPV was not completely 
spontaneous. Neither was it organized or preplanned. Thus we shall 
assume that the CPV was semi-organized.
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Participation
According to Hassan Arfa (1966), the CPV originally had a parti­
cipation of 7000 but it Increased as the CPV progressed. Thus we are 
justified in coding participation as considerable.
Duration
As all sources contend, the outbreak occurred in February, 1925
and was quelled by the end of April of the same year. Duration can be
coded as week to six months.
Violence
Violence was considerable.
Area
On the basis of our informatlon, we can generally conclude that
the CPV had spread almost all over the country.
Government Response
The government proclaimed martial law, dispatched large govern­
ment forces to suppress the uprlsal and after it was over; executed 
Shaikh Said and twentyone of his followers. Government response was 
thus both non-violent and violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
There is no indication of armed force disloyalty. Thus we shall 
code it as nil*
28. Panama. 1958 (ID # 28)
Ideas
a) Information from Sources:
" The communist dominated students led a movement to try to over­
throw the de la Guardia government in mid May, 1958" (Dubois, 1964:198).
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b) Inference and Variable Code: The Idea was predominantly exchange 
oriented.
Strategy
Rioting, street fighting and sniping and similar other tactics 
of open violence characterized the rebel strategy.
Class Character
The outbreak was pioneered primarily by students and intellec­
tuals. Thus the class character was petit bourgeois.
Leadership (Structure)
The individuals identified as leaders were Cleto Manuel Souza 
and Bolivar Davalos (Dubois, 1964: 199). Leadership was thus centra­
lized.
Leadership (Class)
Both the leaders are described by Dubois (1964) as "perennial 
students". Leadership class was thus petit bourgeois.
Organization
A certain degree of planning is implied in all the sources. We 
shall thus code the CPV as semi-organized.
Participation
On the basis of Dubois' (1964) account participation was not more 
than 1000. Thus participation was some.
Duration
The CPV lasted for less than a week.
Violence
According to official sources, the toll in the street fighting 
and Isolated clashes was 10 dead and between 70 to 80 wounded. This 
will fall in our 50-150 scale or some violence.
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Area
Fighting occurred In Panama cltyf the capital.
Government Response
The government suspended constitutional guarantees for 30 days 
and imposed censorship of the press and radio (Dubois, 1964; 199).
The government also used the National guards to restore peace with 
force and violence. Government response was both non-violent and 
violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
Armed force disloyalty was nil.
29. Paraguay. 19A7 (ID 0 29)
Ideas
As all the sources contend (Warren 1949: 350-51; NIYB, 1947: 382) 
the rebel leader Major Ceasar Agulrro was seeking to overthrow the 
government of President Hlglnlo Morenigo and establish a provisional 
government till free elections could be held. Thus the idea was pri­
marily exchange.
Strategy
According to all the sources (Raine, 1956: 265, New York Times, 
March 31, 1947) the strategy involved one of open frontal attack by 
the rebel forces.
Class Character
The rebel forces were made up of the disloyal factions of the 
army and navy and also a large number of workers (Raine,1956: 264). 
Thus class character was petit bourgeois and proletarian.
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Leadership (Structure)
Leadership was concentrated in the hands of Major Caesar Aguirro 
and Colonel Rafael Franco. Thus leadership was centralised.
Leadership (Class)
Both the leaders were high ranking officers In the army. Thus 
leadership class was petit bourgeois.
Organization
As all the sources Indicate, "the big show of 1947" was the result 
of a plot long prepared by the Febreristas along with the Communists. 
Thus the CPV was organized.
Participation
When the uprising started Major Aguirro had more than 1500 sup­
porters. By the time it ended he had rallied an estimated number of 
10,000 rebels. Thus participation was considerable.
Duration
The CPV had started on March 8, 1947 and by August 20 of the 
same year the rebels were completely defeated. The CPV lasted for a 
week to six months.
Violence
Violence was considerable.
Area
The CPV extended over the entire length of the country.
Government Response
Government's loyal troops utilized significant force to crush the 
CPV. Thus government response was undeniably violent.
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Armed Force Disloyalty
Our sources Indicate that at a point so much of the army went 
over to the side of the rebels that It looked as though nothing could 
save the government. This would Indicate high armed force disloyalty.
30. Honduras, 1956 (ID if 30)
Ideas
The Honduran CPV was an attempt to exchange the existing govern­
ment with one participated by the rebels.
Strategy
The strategy indicated in the New York Times (August 2» 1956) 
includes the tactics of both open and conspiratorial violence. Thus 
strategy was combinational.
Class Character
The participants were members of a garrison at Teguchlgalpa. It 
Included both officers and men. Thus class character was both petit 
bourgeois and proletarian.
Leadership (Structure)
Captain Santo Osorto Paz is recognized as the leader of the CPV. 
Thus leadership was centralized.
Leadership (Class)
Leadership class was petit bourgeois.
Organization
Though there Is no definite reference to preplanning, a certain 
degree of planning can be assumed without error due to the nature of 
the CPV, which Included a partially conspiratorial takeover of the
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barracks. Thus the CPV was semi-organized.
Participation
Our sources specifically refer to "300 men" in the barracks who 
had declared themselves In rebellion. Thus participation was less 
than 500.
Duration
The Honduran CPV started on August 1 and was quelled the same day 
after a three hour battle. Thus duration was less than a week.
Violence
About thirty casualties were reported after the battle. Thus 
violence was minimum.
Area
The CPV occurred in the capital city of Teguchlgalpa.
Government Response
The government called out troops from another part of the capital 
to quell the CPV. Thus government response was violent.
Armed Force Disloyalty
According to our sources, three hundred men in one of the Tegu­
chlgalpa garrisons rose against the regime. According to Statesman's 
Yearbook for 1956, the entire Honduran army was fixed at 2500. On the 
basis of this figure the disloyal faction was only twelve percent of 
the entire force. Thus armed force disloyalty was low.
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1 1 2 ! • ! 0 . 0 M 1 . 0 f . l 0 . 0 O . a 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 > 0I a •*! o . a . 0 o . a 1 * " o . a o . a a . a a . O 1 . 0 a . Ot 1 1 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 ! • “ e . o 0 . 0 o . a 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0I s 0 . 0 o . o l . a o . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . o a . a 1 . 0 a . a 0 . 0
4 i ; ! * * * 0 . 0 >•£ 0 . 0 0 . 0 a . a o . o l . a a . o 0 . 0I 3 0 i . o o . a 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . a a . a a . o I  . a 0 . 0
t N C A N 0 . 2 e . o 0 . 0 O . a 0 . 2 0 . 0 o . a 0 . 2 V . 5 O . a o . a
I 2 '•! 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . a l . a a . o o . o a . o2 t o « . o 0 . 0 1 * 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . a l . a o . o a . u o . o
2 2 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . a o . a l . a a , a 0 . 0 1 . 02 2 0 0 . 0 u . u 1 * 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . a 0 . 0 1 . 0 a . O a . o a .  a2 a 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . a o . a l . a a . o a . u
2 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . o O . a a . o 1 . 0 o . o
2 • ■ C A N 0 . 2 0 . 2 O . T O . T 0 . ) 0 . 0 o . a O . T 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 2
3 I 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 a . O
I 2 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 O . a l . a 0 . 0 a . o o . o
J 1 0 1 . 0 a . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 I  . a 1 . 0 a . u a . a a . u
i 1 " 1 . 0 u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . a 1 . 0 a . u 0 . 0 0 . 0J 2 a 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 a . u l . a o . a o . a a . u
J M f  Ah. O . a O . a 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . a o . a l . a 0 . 0 a . o a . O
A 3 '■! 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 a.o• I T !•* a . O 0 . 0 l > 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 a . a 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 * * 0 . 0a 2T 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 ' ° 0 . 0 O . a l . a 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . aa 2 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 a . a l . a a . o a . O a . O
• neon 0,5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 a . a 0.0 o.o o.o a . l 0.0
5 2 1 0.0 1 . 0 0.0 O . o 0.0 1.0 0.0 o . a o.o 1 . 0 0.0s 2 b 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 1 1 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 0 , 0 0 . 0 o . a 1 . 0 o.o
5 me a n 0 . 0 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0.0 0 . 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
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CLUSTE* LISTING
C L U I T E A 1 0 C L . A P B N A C L A P B H B C L A P W U L C L A P E A S L E A C E N T P L E A C E N T D L C L B O U H G L C L P S N A L C L P B H N L C L P H O L L C L P E A S O B C t P O N t
1 1 ! - ! 1 . 0 0 . 0 ! * 5 ' * 2 0 . 0 1 . 0 ‘ • 5 0 , 0 0 . 0 0 , 0 O . oI 1 * ! • * 1 * 2 1 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0I T 1 . 0 > * s 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 V . o l . o 1 . 0 0 , 0 v . o 0 , 0 0 . 01 I S l ' ° 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 , 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 01 1 1 * ■ 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . u 0 . 0 0 , 0 0 . 0i 2 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 > • 2 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . u 0 . 0 0 . 0i 2 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 u . O 0 . 0i 1 2 * • 2 1 . 0 o . u o . u 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 U . o O . U 1 . 0I A ' • 2 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 01 1 1 ’ * 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . o} A 1 . 0 1 . 0 ! * 2 1 * 2 1 . 0 o . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 o . o o . o 0 . 0 u . Ol I ’ ! • * * > • 2 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 ! ■ * 0 . 0 O . u 0 . 0l l u 1 , 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U O . o o . u 0 . 0 O . U
l M a n 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . s 0 . 2 0 . 9 0 . 1 O . A 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 1 e . o 0 . 1
{ 2 t . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . * 1 * 02 1 ° o . o 1 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 O . o 0 . 0 V . O u . o 1 . 0 1 . 0
I 2 * ‘ • 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 , 0 1 * 0 0 . 0 u . o u . o 0 . 0 I * A
i 2 9 * * 2 l * 2 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
i A 1 . 0 1 . 0 ‘ • 2 1 . 0 1 * 2 0 , 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 l . U o . o 0 . 0 o . o2 A V . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 o . u O . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0
2 M A N 0 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 o.s O . T 0 . 3 0 . 2 O . S o . s 0 . 3 0 * 3 o . s
S 2 * ® 0 . 0 1 * ® * • 2 0 . 0 A . O O . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 * 91 2 0 O . o 0 . 0 O . o 1 * 0 0 . 0 i * ° o . u 0 , 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0i t o 0 . 0 0 . 0 t . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 0 , 0 0 . 0 1 * 0i 1 * 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 u . u u . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 9
i 2 a 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U u . u v.o 0 . 0 0 . 0
3 M A N O . o O . o O . A 0 . 9 0 . 0 O . A 0 . 0 O . A U . ' A 0 . 9 0 . 2 0 . 0
A J 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
A I T 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 .  1. 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U l . U u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0
9 2 1 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U t.o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
A 2 * l.o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U o . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . A
A M a n 0 . 0 0 . * 0 . 0 0 . 1 t.o 0 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
1 2 < 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 >•2 O . o 0 . 0 O . o 1 . 0 u . o t . o 0 . 0s 2 * 0 , 0 0 . 0 o . a 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 O . o V . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0
5 M a n 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o.s O . u 1 . 0 0 . 9
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C L U 9 T E 0  L 1 9 T I N 6
I*TE« 10 oa&sENi O K U PtNTfEM PENT90*1 P M K Q N 9 OUNOLT* t)UKtp9« DUD* IMP VIOL*IN N VIOLSOME VIDLC0N9 MEM.UC
1 t c.O 1.0 0 . 0 1 .0 0 .0 1 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 . 0 1 .0 a.O
1 i * u.r l.a U.O 1 .0 u.u l.U 0 .0 0 .0 1 .0 U.O a.u 0 . 0
I T o.o l.U 0 .0 O.U 1 .0 U.O 1 .0 V.O 0 .0 1 .0 a .o o . u
1 19 o.a 1 .0 u.o 0 .0 1 .0 l.U O.U u.u U.u a.u 1*0 u.u1 I J i.a U.O 0 .0 l.U l.U 0 .0 o.u 0 .0 1 .0 a.o o .u
I 22 O.u l.U O.U O.a l.U l.U O.U u.u a.u u . o 1 .0 u .o
I 2) o.a l . o o.a 0 . 0 l.U 0 . 0 o.u v . o 0 . 0 l.U O.a
I 12 o.a v . o O.U 0*0 ! • * 1.0 0 .0 a.o l.U 0 . 0 u.o 0 .0I k 0 . 0 1.0 u.o a.u 1.0 l.U 0.0 o.o 1 .0 u . o u.u 0 .0
1 11 o . a i.a u.u 0.0 1 .0 l.U 0.0 O.U i.a 0 , 0 e.o a.u
I a o.a l.U 1.0 o.u 0,0 l.U o.u O.U i .a 0.0 u.o a.o
1 IV 0.0 l.U U.u o.u 1 .0 1.0 a.u o.u i .a o.a 0.0 0.0
i So 1.0 u.u 1.0 0.0 o.a l.U o.u o.u 1 .0 a.a u.o o.a
i « f u a.i 0.6 0 .2 0 . 2 O.T o . a 0 .1 U.o a.5 0.2 0.3 a.o
2 2 o . a o.u u.u o . a 1.0 a . u 1.0 0.0 4.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
5 1* o . a u .o o.a 0.0 1.0 o . u l.U o.a a.u a .o 1.0 o.a
2 2k . a.o u.o o.a 0.0 1.0 a . o l.a !*v u .o u .o i.a2 2* 0.0 l.o o.u 0.0 o.o 1.0 o .u o.o 0.0 l.a a.o
« • o . a 1.0 o.o 0.0 1.0 a . u 0.0 l.U 0.0 u .o 1 .0 o.a
2 V 1 .0 a.o u .u e . o 1 .0 o . u 0 .0 1 .0 o .u 0 . 0 l.U a.o
2 ME*N 0.2 0 .1 0 .0 0 . 0 l.a o.o O.T 0.3 o .o 0.2 0.6 0 .0
, 5 0 . 0 o.a o .a 0 . 0 1 .0 !•* 0 . 0 0 .0 0 .0 a .o 1.4 0 , 01 2k o.a u.u u.u u.o 1 .0 i.a a .o o.u u.o u .u 1 .a o.u1 Ik o . a o.a 0.0 0 . 0 1.0 0 . 0 l . U 0.0 0 .0 o .a 1.0 0 . 0■ I0 1.0 u.u 0.0 o.a 1.0 ••S *•! o.a O.o u.o l.U 0 . 01 2* 0.0 1.0 o.a o.a 1.0 l . o V.O u.u a .o U.o 1.0 0 , 0
I •EON 0.2 U.2 0 .0 0 . 0 1 .0 o . a o.a 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1.0 0 .0
• 1 l . o U.o 0 .0 0 . 0 t.o 0 . 0 !•* a.o 0 .0 o.a 1 .0 0 .04 IT I I . 0 l.U i.a o.u O.a 0.0 1.0 u.u 0.0 1.0 a.o 0 . 0
• 2? l.o u.u U.U o.a i ! o o.u 1.0 a.o o.a l.U a.O o.a
V 2k l.o u.o u.u 1.0 u.o l.U 0.0 U.O a.u 1.0 a.u a.o
• MEkN o . a O.s a . i 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 a.o 0.0 u .o 0.3 0.0
} 21 1.0 o .a o.o o . a l.o a . o 1*0 0.0 O.o 0.0 1.0 ••!4 24 1.0 u.u 0.0 1 .0 0.0 1.0 a.o 0.0 o.a a.o t.o 0.0
5 MCkN 1.0 0.0 ".0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0 .0 u .o 1.0 o .o
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I 2 2
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t a
t i i
1 •
1 i t
I 3 0
t M E A N
I 1 0c
2
2 I t
2 a
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2 M E A N
1 %
J 2 0
S I t
S I t
3 2 *
3 M E A N
A 3
* i f
• 2 T
• 2 t
a M E A N
S 2 1
S 2 5
% M ^ A N
A R C A R R O W A R C A C N T N C O R O  I G H N V I O L C R V I O L A F D N J L
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c *s l . U 1 . 0 o . o 0 , 0 U . u
2 * ° . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 V . U0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 U.O 1 . 0 U . u
0 . 0 1 . 0 l ' Q o . o 0 . 0 v . u
2 * ® . 0 O.o 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . uo .o . u 0 . 0 1 . 0 l . o u . u
2 * ® 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 v . u0 . 0 1 . 0 } * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . o
S * ° 1 . 0 1 . 0 v . o 1 . 0 U . uo .o 1 . 0 1 * * U . o 0 . 0 V . u
2 * # ! * 2 0 . 0 1 . 0 l . U U . Wo .o l . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0
o . o 1 . 0 0 . 7 0 . 2 0 . 7 0 . 0
2 - ° 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 o . a
2 * 2 1 . 0 1 * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 o . v
2 * 2 l . o 0 . 0 U . O l . o u . u
2 * ° 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . o 1 . 0 V . u
2 * ° } • * o . o l . V v . o0 . 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 v . o
0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 7 0 . 0 1 . 0 o . v
2*2 . 0 1 * ° o . o 1 . 0 o . v
?•? . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 l .Vo . o . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U l.U
2 * * . 0 O . o 0 . 0 l . U l . U0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 V . o 1 . 0 l.U
o . o 1 . 0 0 . 2 0 , 0 1.0 U.A
! • * .0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 00 . 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 O . u
0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1.0
0.0 1.0 0.0 1 . 0 1 . 0 l . U
0.0 1.0 0 .3 v . 5 1.0 u.s
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.U
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.U
1.0 o . o 0.0 0.0 1.0 l . V
2 2 :  I t  S U N L A I ,  N L v t R b E R  1 2 .  I S 7 S  ?
A F O L O n A F D N I G M
0 . 0 1 . 0
0 * 0 1.0
0 . 0 l . V
l . V V . o
u . v t . o
l . U V . o
U . O l . U
v . o l . o
V . u 1 . 0
U . u l . U
U . o 1 . 0
V . o l . V
1 . 0 0 . 0
0 . 2 0 . 0
v . o l . U
u . u 1 . 0
0 . 0 l . U
o . u 1 . 0
l . V O . o
l . U u .o
0 . 3 0 . 7
O.U 1 . 0
U . U 2 * °o.u o.u
0,0 V . u
V . u o . u
u . o 0 . 2
> • 2 0 . 01 . 0 o . u
v . O 0.0
u.o o . u
u.b 0 . 0
U . u u.v
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2 2 1 « 2  SUMJAY, N U V E M O E U  u ,  IOTA
C l u s t e r ID FSTNORLO SCn a ORLO THRNORLO IOEAEICH 10EACOMS i o e a s t r c IDEATbAN ST h a u p c n STUACONS blNACONO CLASUUVG
1 1*! 0.0 o.s .0 9*® 0.0 O.V o.v 0.0 1.0 1*01 A o.o 0.0 1.0 •  ! 0.0 o.v o.v o.u 1.0 V.u l.VT ®*5 0.0 1.0 .0 0.0 u.v 0.0 0.0 u.u 1.0 1.0IS o.5 O.o 1.0 .0 0.0 u.o o.u 1.0 O . v o.u 1.0
1) o.o 8** 1.0 l.U 1.0 v.o o.u o.v l.U V . O 1.0li 0.4 0.0 l.V l.U V.u v.o o.v 0.0 1.0 o.v 1.0
e j v.o o.u 1.0 0.0 O.V o.v u.u l.U u.o 1.0
IE 0.0 0.0 .0 v.o 0.0 U.v o.u V.o 1.0 1.0
A v.o O.u 1 .0 1l.V 1*5 0.0 0.0 V.o u.u 1 .0 0.011 0.0 u.o 1.0 1.0 0.0 V.o 0.0 1.0 0.0 v.o o.oA o.u O.u l.U 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 e.o l.V v.u u.v
I'* 1.0 U.O O.u l.V u.o u.o o.u v.o l.V U.u u . oJO 0,0 O.V 1.0 l.V v.u 0.0 O.v v.u u.o 1.0 u.v
N £ A A 0.2 o.u o.s o.s 0.2 0.0 o.u v.2 0,5 O.A 0.0
2 1 * ° 0.0 v.o l.V 1 * 9 0.0 0.0 l.V 0.0 O.U v . OIV 0.0 0,0 1.0 1.0 0.0 V.U v.u l . V u.u u.u u.v
2 t > 0 . 0 o.u l.U 1.0 u.o o.u o.v 1.0 u.o o.u l.V
20 0.0 O.u i.0 I * * 0.0 v.o v.o l.V u.u O.v o.vA 0.0 l . V 0.0 1.0 1*® 0.0 o.u o.o 1.0 o.v 0.0* 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.o 0.0 0.0 o.v 0.0 u.u 1.0 u.o
M ( A N 0.2 0.2 O.T O.T 0.3 0.0 0,0 O.T 0.2 0.2 0.2
J 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 O.U t.o U.o u.o 0.0
24 0.0 1.0 u.u l . o v.o 1.0 0.0 1.0 U . U v.o u.o
1 A 1.0 u.o 0.0 /.o O.v 1.0 1.0 1.0 u.u 0.0 v.o
h 1.0 O.u u.u u . o v.u l.U l.U l.U U.v u . u u.o
2* 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 U.v l.U u.v o.v 0.0
N C A ' « O.A O.A 0.2 1.0 0.0 l . V O.A 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
J 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 o.v 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
I f 1.0 O.o v.o 1*0 0,0 0.0 0.0 U . o s * ® 1.0 v . o2T 0.0 0.0 l . U 1l.o 1.0 0,0 0.0 t.o O.V ®*8lb 0.0 U.O l.o L * ° 0.0 0.0 O.u l.V o.v v.o 0.02 1 0.0 1.0 u.o ■l.o 0.0 1 * ® o.u u.v V . u ! * 9 u.v2 b 0,0 O.o 1.0 l.U 0.0 0.0 u.u v.o u.u 1.0 O . u
m £ a n 0.1 0.2 V.S I . T 0.2 0.2 0.0 0 . 5 v.o 0 . 5 0 . 0
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CLUOTEO L IS T IN f i
I t  I I S I D C L 4 F 0 * * C L 8 F 0 H S C L 8 F R 0 L C L 0 P C 8 3 L E O C E N T R l e s c e n t d L C L t O U N C L C L P O * * t c i u a u a L C L F R O L L C L F E i f O O C t F O N T
I 1 l . V 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 t . o e . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 e . o 0 . 0 0 . 0
} I * 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 U . o 1 . 0 1 , 0 o . v e . o 0 . 0 0 . 0
I T l . U l . V 1 . 0 0 . 0 l . V U . o l . U l . U O . V O . u 0 . 0 o . o
i I S 1 . 0 1 , 0 l . V t . o 1 . 0 U . v l . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 l . U V . O 0 . 0
i 1 3 1 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 2 - u 1 . 0 v . o o . v V . O e . o o . o
i 2 2 1 * 0 l . V l . U 0 . 0 1 . 0 O . v 1 . 0 o . u e . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
i 2 3 l . V l . V t . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 o . v o . o o . u 0 , 0 0 , 0
i 1 2 1 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 1 * 0 l . V 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0I V * « 2 l . U o . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 ! * “ O . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . v u . o o . oi 1 1 1 . 0 l . U l . o l . U 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . o l . V 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
j 8 ■ • 2 l . U 1 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 0 , 0 0 . 0 l . V e . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . oI 1 * 1 . 0 1 . 0 > • 2 o . v 1 . 0 u . o o . u 1 . 0 l . U u . u 4 . 0 0 . 0i S u l . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 V . o 1 . 0 u . o e . o 1 . 0 o . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . e
i « * C » i a 1 . 0 l . U 0 . 0 0 . 2 O . o 0 . 1 o . f c 0 . 0 0 . 2 u . l V . O o . l
2 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 t . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 - 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 ! < o2 I D 0 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . O 0 . 0 o . u O . o 0 . 0 l * o l . U2 2 » 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 V . U 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 O . V v . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 1*0i 2 0 1 . 0 l . V 1 . 0 u . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . o l . V o . u u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0
i • l . o ■ • 2 1 . 0 l . V l * 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0« • o . v 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o.u l . V 1 . 0 1 . 0 e . o
2 * 1 4 * 4.1 l . t t 1 . 0 o.s 0 . 7 0.1 0 . 2 o.s o.s 0.3 V . 3 O.s
i S U.O V . O 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 o . v O . v 1.0 O . v 1 . 0
i tit O . v v . o u . o l . U u . o l . U U.o 0.0 1.0 u . v 1.0 1.0
i If o.o u . u l.V 0.0 l . V u . o u . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 U . u V . O 1 . 0
} 1 8 U . V 0 . 0 1 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 v . o o . v u . o V . o l . V 0 . 0 v . u
J 2 « V . o v . u O . V 1 . 0 1 . 0 O . V o.o 1 . 0 u . v u . o O . u v . o
3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 8 0 . 0 0 . 4 0 . 0 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 0.2 0 . 4
0 3 M 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0• I T 1 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 O . v 1 . 0 U . o 0 . 0 l . U l . V u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0
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